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The scheduling component of the time management process was used as a 'paradigm' 
to develop a process model of expected duration estimation. The main contention of 
the model is that people will attempt to estimate the expected duration of an upcoming 
event by 'reflecting' back upon memories of similar events. Although it is presumed 
that this 'reflection' will often involve reconstructing eventls from memory traces 
they will often appear (to the estimator) to be a veri similar representation of a specific 
event. A time management context was also utilised to conduct four experiments that 
explored components of the expected duration estimation model. Experiment 1 
explored the effect that presenting a highly salient, similar to-be-estimated task had on 
a subsequent task estimate. Participants in this experiment tended to allocate 
significantly less time to the completion of a task if they had previously estimated the 
expected duration of a similar, shorter task. Conversely, they tended to allocate 
significantly more time to the completion of a task if they had previously estimated 
the expected duration of a similar but longer task. Experiment 2 investigated the 
importance of appropriate temporal boundaries when making an expected duration 
estimate. Participants in this experiment were required to provide expected duration 
estimates for tasks under varying remote temporal boundary scenarios. It was found 
that remote externally derived temporal boundaries significantly affect expected 
duration estimates. Experiment 3 and 4 looked at the effect that the tendency to 
provide estimates in the fonn of prototypical temporal values had on accuracy. 
Additionally, these two experiments investigated whether chunking tasks together for 
scheduling purposes would help overcome estimation inaccuracies presumed to be 
partly due to the predisposition to round estimates to prototypical temporal values. 
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The majority of estimates from both experiments could be categorised as being 
prototypical temporal values. The chunking together of the tasks used in Experiment 
3 resulted in a significant increase in estimation accuracy, however it had the opposite 
effect in Experiment 4, which utilised somewhat longer tasks. 
Introduction 
"Time is nature's way of keeping everything from happening at once" 
(source unknown, cited in Block, 1989, p.340) 
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The primary purpose of this PhD thesis is to provide a greater understanding 
of the processes involved in making expected duration estimates. The scheduling of 
to-be-completed tasks, as part of the time management process, was used as a 
'paradigm' to develop a process model of expected duration estimation. This 
paradigm was also utilised in order to conduct four experiments that explore 
components of the proposed model. These four experiments explored the effect that 
individual presentations have on updating schematic event memory (predicted to be 
an important source of information when making an expected duration estimate), the 
importance of providing appropriate temporal boundaries, and the effect that people's 
tendency to provide estimates in the form of 'prototypical' temporal values had on 
estimate accuracy. 
The thesis begins by highlighting the importance of the concept of 'time' to 
humanity. Chapter 1 outlines the inherently perplexing nature of time and how 
humanity has struggled to understand this inescapable, yet elusive, concept. The 
second part of this chapter introduces the important concept of 'psychological time'. 
As very little research has been conducted specifically addressing expected 
duration estimation, a thorough investigation of duration estimation research in 
general is conducted in Chapter 2 in order to build a framework for understanding this 
specific type of estimation. This chapter provides a general introduction to duration 
estimation research. It includes a discussion of the importance of understanding the 
human duration estimation process and also outlines the main research paradigms. 
Leading on from this overview of duration estimation research, the chapter reviews 
the main theories that attempt to explain various types of duration estimation. This 
chapter also includes a discussion of individual differences in relation to duration 
estimation ability. 
Before introducing my model of expected duration and associated 
experiments, a real-world 'paradigm' in which to base this work needs to be 
introduced. Chapter 3 summaries the time management literature, with emphasis 
placed on the task-scheduling component ofthis process. This chapter demonstrates 
the importance of making accurate expected duration estimates for the time 
management process, and ultimately psychological well-being. 
Chapter 4 introduces my model of expected duration estimation. The four 
main components ofthe model are discussed individually: (1) searching memory for 
similar tasks or events to the task or event which is to be estimated; (2) gauging the 
appropriateness ofthe remembered tasks or events; (3) what has been labelled the 
'retrospective process'; and (4) lastly what has been labelled the' expected process'. 
During this discussion the four experiments undertaken to investigate components of 
the model are introduced. 
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The following three chapters describe the four experiments. Chapter 5 
describes Experiment 1 which demonstrates that a highly salient individual 
presentation of a similar task can up-date schematic event memory information from 
which the estimation of a subsequent task is derived. Chapter 6 describes Experiment 
2, which addresses the effect that remote temporal boundaries have on expected 
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duration estimates. Although the general thrust of the literature in the area tends to 
suggest that temporal boundaries inhibit accurate duration estimation, the present 
experiment demonstrates the importance of having appropriate temporal boundaries 
when making expected duration estimates. Chapter 7 describes Experiments 3 and 4 
which suggest that the patterns of over and underestimation found in past expected 
duration estimation research can at least be partly explained by the tendency to 
estimate prototypical temporal values. Results from Experiment 3 suggest that the 
overestimation of relatively short duration tasks (the 2-10 minute range) is 
predominately (or at least significantly) due to the tendency to provide estimates in 
multiples of 5 minutes. Further, in line with the above reasoning it is demonstrated 
that grouping these relatively short duration tasks for scheduling purposes results in 
significantly less overestimation and hence more accurate estimates. The fourth 
experiment utilising longer tasks (20-40 minutes), again finds evidence for a tendency 
to report prototypical temporal values. However for these longer tasks grouping 
resulted in less accurate estimates. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides concluding comments and discussion concerning 
my model and the four experiments. Discussion revolves around the model's 
application, including the experimental results, to the improvement ofthe task 
scheduling component ofthe time management process. Suggestions for future 
research are also provided. 
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Chapter 1 
The conceptualisation of time 
Duration estimation is embedded within the much wider concept of 'time' and 
temporal experience. In light of this integration, before embarking on a discussion 
concerning duration.estimation, it is important to understand some ofthe history 
concerning time and its relationship to humans. This chapter begins by providing a 
brief introduction to the all encompassing, and somewhat perplexing, nature of time in 
relation to our own existence. The chapter concludes with a discussion ofthe 
important concept of psychological time. 
1.1 Time and humanity 
Time is probably humanity's most important dimension (Navon, 1978), it has 
puzzled and intrigued our species since the dawn of civilisation (Szamosi, 1986). 
This fact is evidenced throughout history. Saint Augustine (1949), in writing his 
'Confessions' around 400AD stated: "When then is time? If no one asks me I know, 
but in wish to explain to him who asks I know not" (p. 26). More recently, 
Whitehead (1861-1947, cited in Mays, 1959) noted that contemplation oftime forces 
a recognition of a sense oflirnitation of the human mind. The complexity and 
abstraction of the concept of time is evident by the way it is defined. The first of the 
51 different definitions given by the Collins Concise Dictionary is "the continuous 
passage of existence in which events pass from a state of potentiality into the future 
through the present, to a state of finality in the past" (Hanks, 1989, p. 1239). 
Clocks have become so ingrained into our everyday lives that it seems 
somewhat absurd to think of them as being metaphors oftime - 'they are time'! 
Although devices for measuring time are somewhat omnipresent, this has by no 
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means always been the case. The formal representation oftime, the most ubiquitous 
example being the clock metaphor, was ultimately formalised in the 17th century with 
the help of Newton's mechanics (Dohm-van Rossum, 1996). Furthermore, time in the 
precise terms that we have come to take for-granted is arguably a recent phenomenon, 
as Aldous Huxley (cited in Campbell, 1990) points out: 
"To us, the moment 8:17 am means something -something very important, if 
it happens to be the starting time of our daily train. To our ancestors, such an 
odd eccentric instant was without significance - did not even exist. In 
inventing the locomotive, Watt and Stevenson were part inventors of time." (p. 
211) 
In fact, to our prehistory ancestors 'cutting up' and displaying time would 
probably be a terrifying idea. A fact recognised in S. M. Stirling's recent novel 
'Island in the Sea of Time' whereby an American island is sent back to a historically 
accurate 1250 BC. The following abstract describes the experience of one prehistory 
local's view towards the Americans' clocks: 
"The temple tower had another one of those clocks in it. He shuddered. 
Cutting away your life, second by second, the way the Crone's knife did at the 
last when she put you in the Cauldron. Seconds, he thought. Only the 
Amurrukan (sic) would divide time into pieces like that, like a cook dicing 
onions for soup." (Stirling, 1998, p. 192-193) 
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Somewhat surprisingly, the conception of time as a quantifiable and uniform 
entity that operates independently to the motions taking place in it appears only to 
have been realised relatively late in human history - emerging around the 12th century 
with musical notations denoting different intervals (Szamosi, 1986). The cultural 
evolution concerning reasoning about time implies that the way we conceive of time 
should not be taken as self·evident. For example, although both children and adults 
typically appear to readily perceive the unidirectionality of time (Levin & Zakay, 
1989) this is not universal (Navon, 1978). Additionally, Freud (1952) noted that 
during dreams and imagination, time's arrow can change direction. 
To summarise, although time is one of the most important concepts in our 
lives it is also one of the most poorly understood (Zakay, 1989). At the root of the 
problem is the difficulty we have in conceptualising time. As Gibson (1975) puts it, 
"events are perceivable, but time is not" (pp. 195). 
1.2 Psychological time 
Given the richness of the concept it is not surprising that 'time' sheds light on 
a wide variety of psychological areas including development, cognition, perception, 
psycho1inguistics and education (Levin & Zakay, 1989). Similarly, all behaviour is 
under the control oftime (Michon & Jackson, 1985). For example, Wessman (1973) 
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concludes that an awareness of the temporal aspects of one's environment is essential 
to the development or organisation of many of our most important cognitive 
functions. Furthermore, he argues that the way we order and structure our lives with 
respect to time is a basic feature of our personality. 
Likewise, the classic work of Ornstein (1969) clearly demonstrates time's 
importance. "Time is one ofthe continuing, compelling and universal experiences of 
our lives, one ofthe primary threads which combine in the weave of our experience. 
All our perceptual, intellectual and emotional experiences are intertwined with time" 
(Ornstein, 1969, p. 15). 
The central interest of this thesis is psychological time, namely time as it is 
processed by the human mind (Levin & Zakay, 1989). More specifically, 
psychological time is the processes by which a person adapts to, and represents, the 
temporal aspects of environmental proceedings (Block, Zakay, & Hancock, 1999). 
Psychological time is essential for humans (and many other organisms) to orientate in 
their surrounding world, enabling them to adaptive1y organise themselves so that their 
behaviour remains tuned to the sequential relations oftheir environment (Michon, 
1985; Zakay, 1990). 
One of the paradoxes about human time perception is that it involves the 
perception of something 'nontemporal' (Poynter, 1989). Part of this paradox is the 
fact that while other forms of perception involve the transduction of physical energy 
by a sensory organ, thus providing a physical correlate of what is perceived, a similar 
process is not readily identifiable with the perception ofthe passage of time. There 
appears to be no single sensory organ or perceptual system that can fully account for 
the richness and complexity of psychological time (Poynter, 1989; Zakay & Block, 
1996). 
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One ofthe first psychologists to address the issue of psychological time was 
William James (1890) who provided the following insight: "In general a time filled 
with varied and interesting experiences seems short in passing, but long as we look 
back. On the other hand, a tract of time empty of experiences seems long in passing, 
but in retrospect short" (p. 408). The belief here was not that time accelerates but that 
our sUbjective estimation of it changes. A fact that is adeptly described in the 
following description of a battle: "Four minutes, more or less. Time always went like 
that in a fight, stretching like a thread of thickening maple syrup while you waited for 
it to start, then blurring past once it got started" (Stirling, 2000, p. 260). 
More recently, a large and complex literature has developed looking at 
philosophical and scientific issues surrounding psychological time (e.g., Damasceno, 
1996; Gould, 1988; Grondin, 2001; Hardcastle, 1996; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; 
Shmotkin & Eyal, 2003). More specifically, the psychological literature has 
addressed issues such as time perception and estimation (e.g., Ornstein, 1969), time 
perspective and future orientation (e.g., De VoIder & Lens, 1982; Nuttin, 1985), and 
the psychopathology of time (e.g., Melges, 1982). One aspect of this research into 
psychological time is our ability to estimate duration (e.g., Block, 1990), and it is to 
this topic that attention is now directed. 
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Chapter 2 
An introduction to duration estimation research 
This chapter reviews research that has addressed duration estimation. 
Included is a description of the two predominate research paradigms - prospective 
and retrospective - and a potential third category - expected. Included in this 
discussion are the typical durations that are researched. Subsequently, four potentially 
important individual differences are discussed in respect to duration estimation 
accuracy - age, gender, IQ, and culture. Lastly, the main types of models, which have 
been developed to explain and understand duration estimation, are introduced. 
2.1 The importance of understanding human duration estimation 
As has been mentioned, there is a relatively rich history of the study of many 
aspects of psychological time (Block, 1990; James, 1890). Early research focused on 
duration estimates for their obvious intrinsic interest (see Woodrow, 1951). More 
contemporary researchers have studied duration estimates to help understand many 
psychological, memorial, and attentiona1 processes (Block, 1990). Block (1990, pp. 
9) states "if an event or episode persists longer than a few milliseconds, people 
experience, remember, and may therefore be able to judge duration." 
Probably the most frequent use of time concerns cognising in the 'specious 
present' within a range of a few seconds. However in order to represent their external 
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environment, humans are regularly required to make duration estimates ranging from 
milliseconds to years (Poppel, 1988). In light of this fact, experience of duration is 
the most researched of all aspects of psychological time (Block & Zakay, 1997). 
Fraisse (1984) distinguishes between estimation and perception of duration. 
Perception, he suggests, only involves the psychological present (1 OOms - 5sec), 
while longer intervals involve a long-term episodic memory mechanism. He suggests 
that estimation occurs when memory is used either to link past events or to associate a 
moment in the past with a moment in the present. Likewise as Richelle (1996) points 
out: 
"Estimation of duration in humans is not a primitive intuition ofthe passage of 
time, but on the contrary it is the result of an elaborate inference process, 
which takes into account a number of variables such as number and quality of 
events occurring during the estimated time period, and the complex 
relationship between other aspects of things going on." (p. 10-11) 
2.2 Research paradigms 
Traditionally there have been two main types of duration estimation paradigms 
that are of interest to researchers (Burt & Kemp, 1994). James (1890) first made the 
important distinction between prospective and retrospective time, which are now 
referred to as the 'prospective paradigm', and the 'retrospective paradigm'. 
Perceptively, James (1890) went on to add that duration in passing lengthens when 
"we grow attentive to the passage of time itself' (p. 626), whereas duration in 
retrospect lengthens as a function of "the multitudinousness of the memories it 
affords" (p. 624). It is important to point out that although their names appear to 
imply otherwise, both the prospective and retrospective paradigms involve a person 
judging the duration of a past event/period oftime. 
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The prospective paradigm, or 'experienced time' (Block, 1990), involves 
situations where the person knows in advance that they will be required to make a 
duration judgement. There are a number of commonly used duration estimation 
methods used in this paradigm (see Fraisse, 1984). For example, using the method of 
'verbal estimation', a participant might be informed that they will be required to 
estimate to the nearest minute or second how long an upcoming event is (see Fraisse, 
1984). The other popular method is 'reproduction' which is where a participant is 
asked to reproduce an objectively measured duration using a subjectively defined time 
duration. For instance, the participant may be exposed to an event lasting two 
minutes then asked to delimit a second duration (by saying start and stop) to estimate 
the target duration (see Fraisse, 1984). Overall, there appears to be no significant 
difference in the patterns of results as a consequence of method from studies using 
verbal estimation or reproduction (Block & Zakay, 1997). 
The retrospective (remembered duration) paradigm involves situations where 
the person is not aware until after the time period is over that an estimation of its 
duration will be requested (see Block, 1990). In general, more research has been 
conducted using the prospective than the retrospective paradignl (Block & Zakay, 
1997). One ofthe reasons for this is that after a participant has been asked to make a 
retrospective duration estimation he or she will be aware that future duration estimates 
may be required rendering these prospective in nature. However, recent studies by 
Boltz and colleagues have demonstrated ways to partly overcome this problem by 
using multiple event presentations before the duration estimation phase (e.g., Boltz, 
1998a; Boltz, 1998c; Boltz, Kupperman, & Dunne, 1998). Given the fact that many 
everyday actions require retrospective 'type' duration estimates there is a need for 
further investigation using the retrospective paradigm, a view that is backed by 
leading theorists (e.g., Block et aI., 1999). 
14 
Despite one of the first studies to compare these two different paradigms 
reporting no significant differences (Bakan, 1955), overall prospective estimates tend 
to be more accurate than retrospective ones (e.g. Block, 1992; Block & Zakay, 1997; 
Brown, 1985). Most contemporary research reports distinctly different patterns of 
results for the two paradigms and a wide range of theorists argue that different 
mechanisms are involved (e.g. Block, 1992; Block & Zakay, 1997; Brown, 1985; 
Grondin & Macar, 1992; Macar, Grondin, & Casini, 1994; Nichelli, 1996). For 
example, Block (1992) demonstrated a 'double dissociation' showing that prospective 
duration estimates decreased as a processing task became harder, while having no 
significant effect on retrospective duration estimates. Conversely, another study by 
Block (1992) found that retrospective duration estimates increased in relation to the 
number of tasks the participant performed during the interval, while having no 
significant effect on prospective duration estimates. Although duration estimates in 
these studies tended to be underestimates, a recent meta-analysis conducted by Block 
and Zakay (1997) suggests that overall, prospective duration estimates tend to be 
longer, as well as less variable than retrospective ones. It is suggested that processing 
difficulty selectively influenced prospective duration estimates, while duration length 
and stimulus complexity selectively influenced retrospective duration estimates 
(Block & Zakay, 1997). 
Relatively recently Burt and Kemp (1994) highlighted a potential third 
category of duration estimation - expected duration. This 'paradigm' requests all 
duration estimates for an activity before it is actually perfOlmed - a task which 
individuals often undertake in everyday life before engaging in an activity (Burt & 
Kemp, 1994). For instance, while at work people are often required to schedule the 
completion of an upcoming event by 'blocking-out' the time they think will be 
required in their diary. Similar to Burt and Kemp (1994), it will be argued in this 
thesis (see Chapter 4) that, with the addition of a number of steps, the expected 
duration estimation process is heavily reliant on retrospective duration estimation 
processes. 
Another important issue to consider is the length of the objective duration 
utilised in research. Most duration estimation research is concerned with relatively 
short durations of less than five seconds, and rarely exceeds two minutes (Block & 
Zakay, 1997; Block et a1., 1999; Fraisse, 1984). For example, the 20 prospective 
studies used in Block, Zakay and Hancock's (1999) recent meta-analysis all used 
objective durations under 100 seconds. Fraisse (1984) suggests that three distinctly 
different processes are involved in three categories of objective durations: less than 
100 milliseconds; 100 milliseconds to five seconds; and, above five seconds. 
Although the validity ofthese demarcations is less than clear it highlights the 
importance of utilising an appropriate objective duration in order to explore 
hypothesised temporal processes (Zakay, 1990). 
Some of the earliest empirical investigations of duration estimation were 
undertaken by Vierordt (1868, cited in Yarmey, 2000) and Horing (1864, cited in 
Fraisse, 1963) who found that short objective durations tend to be overestimated, 
whereas longer ones tend to be underestimated. This is commonly referred to as 
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'Vierordt's Law'. Empirical support for this 'law' has indeed been found - people do 
tend to overestimate short durations lasting up to a few minutes (e.g., Loftus, 
Schooler, Boone, & Kline, 1987; Orchard & Yarmey, 1995), while underestimating 
longer events lasting 20 minutes or more (e.g., Yanney, 1990). 
It is worth noting at this point that the terms over and underestimation are 
potentially problematic (Block, 1989; Eisler, 1996; Hancock, Arthur, Chrysler, & Lee, 
1994; Wahl & Sieg, 1980). Eisler (1996) suggests that the terms are often used in an 
ambiguous way and therefore should be avoided altogether. One of the examples he 
cites is the situation were a duration is experienced as longer than a standard. "One 
would say that it is overestimated when using an estimation method (5 clock seconds 
are estimated as 6 seconds), and underestimated when using production (5 clock 
seconds are produced when six ~ SUbjective ~ seconds are requested)" (Eisler, 1996, 
pp.66). He favours using a precise description of the relationship. Although it is 
acknowledged that this is a valid concern for duration estimation research, it is argued 
that in the present context the terms over and underestimation are appropriate. There 
are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, all research carried out in this thesis 
concerns one type of duration estimation (to-be-completed tasks) using one type of 
reporting method (written estimates of required - unprompted temporal scale - clock 
time), indicating that it is clear what the terms mean. Secondly, and most importantly, 
unlike much of the literature concerning duration estimation, the present research is 
focused on 'real-world' duration estimates. Specifically, it is concerned with 
furthering our understanding of how people estimate the duration ofto-be-completed 
tasks for scheduling purposes as part of their time management strategies. In this 
context over and underestimation have real and clearly opposing non-ambiguous 
consequences - completing a task early and having 'time on your hands', or not 
having enough time to complete the task. 
2.3 Individual differences in respect to time estimation ability 
Developmental differences in time estimation ability 
Cognitive time skills are often considered developmental in nature (Hayes-
Roth, 1980; McCormack, Brown, Maylor, Darby, & Green, 1999). Given that 
duration estimates are required for many, ifnot most, everyday situations it is 
important that research is focused on how this process develops. For example, in 
order for a child to be able to cross a road effectively he or she is required to make 
many duration estimates (see Hancock & Manser, 1997, for a number of other 
examples). 
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There are many other situations where an understanding of the developmental 
status of duration estimation is imperative. For example, this type of information is 
required when deciding how much weight to place on a child's duration estimation in 
courtroom eyewitness testimony (Block et al., 1999). Overall, as predicted by a 
reconstructive model (Burt, 1992, 1993; Burt & Kemp, 1991, 1994) it appears that 
children between one to five years gradually move from knowledge about duration of 
events or activities, which are acquired through specific personal experiences, to 
abstract knowledge allowing them to cognise about the temporal parameters of a 
variety of situations (Droit, 1998). 
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Reviews of early research conducted by Friedman (1978) and Goldstone and 
Goldfarb (1966) reached the conclusion that in broad terms younger children tend to 
overestimate duration more than older children, however very little in the way of a 
systematic understanding of the processes underlying these differences was provided. 
There have been a number of studies that have addressed developmental 
changes in very short duration estimation accuracy. For example, McCormack et al. 
(1999) undertook a developmental study of duration estimation within the scalar 
timing framework. Using both generalisation tasks (participants were required to 
compare a stimulus duration with a previously presented stimulus duration) and 
bisection tasks (participants were presented with two - one short and one long -
standard stimulus durations, then required to decide whether future stimuli were most 
similar to the long or short' standard stimuli ') they reported significant developmental 
differences on both types oftasks. Specifically, older adults and children were less 
accurate than young adults. However as acknowledged by the authors, this study 
addresses developmental changes in timing behaviour of very short (e.g., 
milliseconds) unfilled intervals. For longer time intervals it is more likely that 
cognitive processes will contribute to developmental changes (Block et aI., 1999). 
A recent meta-analysis by Block, Zakay & Hancock (1999) provides an 
excellent overview of developmental changes in prospective time estimation. 
Utilising 20 studies, their analyses suggest that children, when compared to older 
participants, make larger verbal estimates, similar productions, and shorter 
reproductions of duration. In addition, children's duration estimates tend to exhibit 
greater inter-individual variability than their older counterparts. The trend towards 
less inter-individual variability continued from adolescent through to adult 
participants. Block et.al. (1999) discuss these findings in light of both physiological 
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and cognitive hypotheses of duration estimation. They conclude that the findings can 
be explained in terms of their attentiona1-gate model (discussed earlier in this 
chapter), and go on to suggest that the main reasons for these differences are that 
children may not have yet learned the verbal labels for duration units (during verbal 
estimates), and that they are more impatient during relatively empty durations (using 
the method of reproduction). 
Additionally, it has been noted that children with emotional and behavioural 
disorders including ADHD often have problems planning to-be-completed tasks, 
which has been attributed to poor duration estimation skills (Barkley, 1990; Grskovic, 
Zentall, & Stormont-Spurgin, 1995; Nelson, Smith, Dodd, & Gilbert, 1991). These 
deficits are evident using both prospective (e.g., Bruno, Johnson, & Simon, 1988; 
Walker, 1982; White, Barratt, & Adams, 1979) and retrospective paradigms (e.g., 
Dodd, Griswold, Smith, & Burd, 1985; Francis, 1988; Goldman & Everett, 1985; 
Nelson et aI., 1991). However, it is worth noting that none of the above retrospective 
studies controlled for IQ (see later discussion of the relationship between IQ and 
duration estimation accuracy). 
Gender Differences 
A commonly reported finding from early research was that women tended to 
overestimate durations to a greater extent than men (e.g., Axel, 1924; Gulliksen, 1927; 
MacDougall, 1904; Yerkes & Urban, 1906). However, later studies generally found 
no such differences (e.g., Baldwin, Thor, & Wright, 1966; Eson & Kafka, 1952; 
Gilliland & Humphreys, 1943; Harton, 1939; Loehlin, 1959). As such, some 
researchers suggested that this change in duration estimation accuracy reflects socio-
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cultural changes in sex-role stereotypes. Gilliland, Hofeld, and Eckstrand (1946) 
concluded that "it seems likely that the modem woman is called upon to make time 
estimates as often as men. Since time perceptions may be primarily dependent upon 
learning the sexes probably do not differ in ability to estimate time" (p. 168). 
Similarly, Goldstone (1968) concluded that "the stereotype of the female who is never 
on time is more consistent with the older findings of reduced accuracy which has not 
been demonstrated in the laboratory in recent years" (p.214). 
More recently, proponents of a gender difference in respect to duration 
estimation suggest that this variation reflects differences in memory processes rather 
than socio-cultura1 influences (e.g., Halpern, 1992; Rammsayer, 1998). This view is 
backed up by the fact that sex differences are sometimes found using the method of 
reproduction, which presumably is not reliant on socially learned time units 
(Rammsayer, 1998). In addition, it has been suggested that men appear to be more 
proficient at representing information in memory (Halpern, 1992), which may result 
in women being relatively less efficient at representing a cognitive representation of 
temporal information (Rammsayer, 1998). 
However, it needs to be made clear that while a number of studies have 
addressed gender, their findings are often ambiguous or conflicting and overall 
difficult to summarise or provide a definitive viewpoint. For example, while a 
number of studies using the verbal estimation method have found support for the view 
that women tend to overestimate duration significantly more than males (e.g., Adkins, 
1972; Hornstein & Rotter, 1969), many more studies report no signifIcant differences 
(e.g., Baldwin et aL, 1966; Carlson & Feinberg, 1970; Delay & Richardson, 1981; 
Geer, Platt, & Singer, 1964; Getsinger, 1974; Hawkins & Meyer, 1965; Kirkcaldy, 
1984; Roeckelein, 1972; Smith, 1969). 
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The typical cited reasons for conflicting gender difference results are similar to 
those cited for other conflicting duration estimation results - mainly, the inconsistent 
use of the tenns 'overestimation' and 'underestimation' (Eisler, 1996; Hancock et aI., 
1994; Wahl & Sieg, 1980), and specific idiosyncrasies of the duration estimation 
method used (Block, 1989; Zakay, 1990). However, not controlling for other 
potentially important moderating variables, such as personality (Davidson & House, 
1978; Kirkcaldy, 1984; Rammsayer & Rammstedt, 2000), IQ or level of education 
(Doob, 1971; Grskovic et aI., 1995; McNutt & Melvin, 1968), or age (Nichelli, 
Venneri, Molinari, Tavani, & Grafinan, 1993; Somoza & Parra, 1995), may also be 
adding to the confusion. 
However, it needs to be reiterated that most of the above studies involve very 
short duration estimates using the prospective paradigm. In respect to the present 
focus, the picture appears to be somewhat clearer. Significant gender differences 
have not been reported in studies addressing pure retrospective duration estimates, or 
studies addressing the duration estimation of to-be-completed tasks (expected 
durations) for objective durations in the range of minutes (e.g., Boltz, 1998c; Boltz et 
aI., 1998; Burt, 1999; Burt & Forsyth, 1999; Burt & Kemp, 1994; Forsyth, 1998; 
Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 1999; Hayes-Roth, 1980; Josephs & Hahn, 1995), 
therefore gender is not deemed to be a important moderating variable in the 
experiments conducted as part of this thesis. 
Duration estimation and IQ 
A number of studies have reported an association between IQ and duration 
estimation accuracy. For instance, a study by Grskovic, Zentall, and Stormont-
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Spurgin (1995) that looked at retrospective duration estimation and planning abilities 
of students with and without mild disabilities, suggested that significant differences 
found between these groups with respect to their duration estimation accuracy could 
be accounted for by variations in lQ. Another interesting finding in this study was 
that students who were less accurate at estimating how long daily tasks had taken 
(retrospective) were more likely to make use of notes and lists to help organise their 
day (even after the effects of IQ were controlled for). Additionally, children with a 
higher IQ were more likely to plan ahead for important activities. IQ is 'controlled' 
for in the experiments conducted as part of this thesis through use of random 
assignment to experimental groups and/or where feasible within participant design. 
Cultural differences in duration estimation 
Intercultural differences concerning attitudes and belief systems associated 
with time have a long history in the sociology and anthropology literatures (see 
Whorf, 1956). It is clear that an individual's temporal reasoning needs to be 
approached in relation to the collective time perspective of their society or culture 
(Whorf, 1956). Although there is relatively little research conducted addressing 
cultural differences in respect to duration estimation per se, there is a body of research 
that suggests there are cultural differences in respect to duration estimation processing 
and accuracy (e.g., Akbar, 1991; Hill & Stuckey, 1992; Nobles, 1991; Rubin & 
Belgrave, 1999). It is suggested that any differences that occur are due to variations 
in how different cultures conceptualise time, Whereas a Eurocentric world view 
emphasises the future, an Afrocentric view sees time as being flexible with an 
orientation toward the past and the present - time is seen as being 'very elastic' 
(Akbar, 1991). Similarly, Hill and Stuckey (1992) report that African American 
students tend to have a different factor structure of beliefs concerning time, which 
they suggest could result in different cognitive styles in relation to temporal 
processing. 
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Rubin and Belgrave (1999) conducted a study to look at cultural differences in 
the use of relative time estimates (i.e., elastic and flexible, such as 'very early') as 
opposed to mathematical time (i.e., a quantifiable time, such as '15 minutes early'), 
by asking students when they would arrive at various formal and informal situations. 
They found that African American students were significantly more likely to use 
relative time as opposed to mathematical time than European American students in 
formal structured situations (e.g., ajob interview, or going to work). However, this 
difference was not evident in more informal situations (e.g., attending a movie with 
friends). The issue is not whether one is right or wrong, the issue is which orientation 
is congruent with the enviromnent a person lives in. Jackson and Sears (1992) 
suggest that a time incongruent orientation (i.e. an Afrocentric orientation in an 
Eurocentric enviromnent) may contribute to such negative consequences as increased 
stress, illness and disease morbidity. Rubin and Belgrave (1999) similarly suggest 
that in a European enviromnent African Americans may be perceived negatively 
because of their use of relative time, and may be seen as lacking motivation or 
showing non-compliance to norms. 
Similarly, cultures differ in their norms of what constitutes punctuality and 
lateness suggesting that there will be differences in duration estimation expertise and 
accuracy. Hall and Hall (1985, cited in Helfrich, 1996) suggest this constitutes part of 
what they call the 'silent language' of a culture, and go on to distinguish two types of 
time patterns - monochromc and polychronic. Monochronic is the norm in western 
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'individualistic' cultures and is characterised by exact time schedules and time 
pressure, whereas polychronic tends to be associated with 'collectivistic cultures' and 
is characterised by an allowance for ignoring fixed time schedules in favour of 
promoting the need for social hannony. Interestingly, from the present perspective, 
the 'timelessness' associated with polychronic time, which is typical in collectivistic 
societies (e.g., Japan), is also often evident in certain areas of west em society, such as 
those at the higher levels of hierarchical organisations (Deutschmann, 1982, cited in 
Helfrich, 1996). 
Another important temporal cultural difference that is likely to effect duration 
estimation accuracy is the social pace of life. In fact, research suggests that pace of 
life is the single most significant defining element of social time (Levine, 1996). 
There are strong cultural nonns about the speed of action including talking, walking, 
and working pace. For example, Levine (1996) found a strong and consistent 
difference across cultures in the pace oflife as measured by such things a walking 
speed, and work service speed (postal transaction). Interestingly, one of the measures 
used in Levine's study was the relative accuracy of bank clocks. These were found to 
be highly correlated with other measures of pace oflife (i.e., more accurate clocks 
associated with faster walking and postal service requests). Similarly, an interesting 
study by Doob (1960) comparing urban with rural Jamaican people, reported that the 
increased social pace of life associated with urban living led to an enhancement of 
temporal awareness, but somewhat surprisingly, less precise duration estimates. 
Further, Helfrich (1996, pp. 114) suggests that "the amount of attention allocated to 
time seems to be highly susceptible to cultural influences such as social pace of life" 
However, not all research suggests that duration estimation ability should vary 
greatly across different cultures. Hill, Block, and Buggie (2000) found in a recent 
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cross-cultural study of black American, black African, and white American college 
students that although all three groups differed in their beliefs about physical and 
personal time, they shared similar beliefs concerning both prospective (e.g., 'time' 
seems to pass more quickly when you are busy) and retrospective duration (e.g., 
remembered duration seems longer if they are performing a single task) experiences. 
In addition, these groups demonstrated considerable agreement concerning the factors 
(e.g., 'filled' versus 'empty' duration periods & pleasant versus unpleasant tasks) that 
influence these duration experiences (a similar finding was reported by Block, 
Buggie, & Matsui, 1996, who compared Japanese, Malawin and American students' 
belief structures concerning time). Moreover, the three groups had similar belief 
structures concerning the accuracy of duration estimates, and whether experienced 
and remembered duration resulted from conscious and rational processes. Hill, Block, 
and Buggie (2000) go on to suggest that "beliefs about duration experiences may 
represent an etic factor that transcends cultures" (p,443). An 'etic' factor is one that 
transcends cultural boundaries, as opposed to an 'emic' factor which is culturally 
specific. In addition, the design of their study enabled them to examine whether the 
determinants of beliefs about time are predominately genetic or culturally derived. 
However, their data did not clearly favour one determinant over the other, suggesting 
that any simplistic explanation (either genetic or culture) will not fully explain the 
differences and similarities in human temporal experience (see Block et aI., 1996, for 
a discussion on this topic). 
2.4 Models of duration estimation 
As Vandierendonck (1998) points out in the introduction to the recent 
publication 'Time and the Dynamic Control of Behavior ': "Despite all efforts, today 
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no single theory or model of time estimation has been shown to explain all data 
available. So, the attempt to construct an adequate theory or model remains a 
challenging task" (pp.9). In order to provide explanatory breadth, a theory of duration 
estimation, especially for the retrospective or expected duration paradigms, needs to 
consider perceptual input, retention interval, the existence of general event 
know ledge, and the extent to which the interval or event in question can be defined as 
an event. 
Following is a review of the main types of models that attempt to explain 
various types of duration estimation. There are a number of ways to categorise 
different models. For example, Ornstein (1969) differentiated between models using 
a 'sensory-process' approach (utilising a cumulative pulse mechanism), and those 
using a 'cognitive' approach. Similarly, Block and Zakay (1996) differentiate 
approaches as involving a 'timer' from those without a 'timer'. 
The present discussion will begin by introducing two of the main types of 
internal timer models - internal clock and chronobiological models. This is followed 
by a brief overview of a prominent hybrid model of prospective duration estimation-
Block and Zakay's (Block & Zakay, 1996; Zakay & Block, 1997) attentional-gate 
model. Lastly, and most importantly, due to its relevance to the present topic on 
expected duration estimation, the major models of retrospective duration estimation 
will be introduced, including Ornstein's (1969) storage size model, Poynter and 
Roma's (1983) change/segmentation model, Boltz's (1998c) 'structured 
remembering' approach, Block and Zayak's (1996) contextual-change model, and 
Burt and Kemp's (1991; 1994) reconstructive model. 
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Internal clock type models 
There is a rich history of theorising about the possibility of internal 'clocks'. 
von Skramlik (1934, cited in Macleod & Roff, 1936) suggested that the human 
physiological clock is approximately 400 times less accurate than the best human-
made clock. More recently a number of different models of duration estimation based 
on the idea ofan 'internal clock' have been put forward, such as Treisman's (1963) 
influential model. Many of these models are based on the view that a pacemaker 
sends periodic impulses to an accumulator, with the perceived duration being the 
number of pulses stored (Church, 1984). 
A prominent theory in this genre is 'Scalar timing theory'. According to 
Scalar timing theory, timing behaviour is based on the output of an internal clock that 
provides long-term memory representations that can be retrieved and compared with 
representations of the current temporal interval held in short-term memory (Church, 
1984; Wearden, 1995). The term 'Scalar' refers to the proposed weberian property 
whereby the coefficient of variation remains constant over varying duration intervals 
(Ferrara, 1998). This type of timing theory was originally proposed to explain animal 
timing (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984), however recently it has been 
employed to explain timing behaviour (predominately very short duration) in humans 
(e.g., Wearden, 1994; Weardon, 1998). 
In support of these types of theories, there is some evidence to suggest that 
such variables as brainlbody temperature and metabolism, psychoactive drugs, and 
arousal levels can alter perceived duration (e.g., Boltz, 1998b; Hancock, 1993; 
Maricq, Roberts, & Church, 1981; Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995). 
Although internal clock type models appear to be useful in the understanding 
of animal timing (Church, 1984) and human short duration estimates (see Wearden, 
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1995; Weardon, 1998), most are unable to explain why cognitive factors influence 
duration estimates. In addition, they tend to focus on prospective duration estimation. 
Block (1990) suggests that these types of models represent an oversimplified view of 
the complex mechanisms that underlie psychological time. De Vooght, van der 
Goten, and Vandierendonc (1998) also comment on the limited range of phenomena 
internal clock type models can account for. For example, no account can be given for 
retrospective duration estimates. Likewise, Lejeune and Richelle (1996), in their 
discussion of the Scalar model, suggest that it is both an advantage and shortcoming 
that it is a model of 'pure time', typically excluding such processes as attentional 
strategies, motivation, and linguistic transfonnations. 
Chronobiological models 
As mentioned earlier, time can only be perceived or inferred through changes, 
typically in our external environment. However, there are many internal changes that 
offer a degree of salience that can afford a person an effective frame of reference for 
time's passage, such as thoughts, proprioceptive feedback, and biological internal 
rhythms (Block, 1990). It is however unclear to what extent these potential 
pacemakers which underlie circadian rhythms, are involved in day-to-day duration 
estimation. It appears that longer duration estimates (in the order of hours) are 
influenced by circadian rhythms whereas shorter ones (seconds to minutes) may not 
be (Aschoff, 1984, 1985, 1993; Campbell, 1990). Most societies now substantially 
modify many of the natural cycles (e.g., shift work and 24-hour shopping), however 
this has not totally released humans from the constraints of these natural cycles of 
circadian periodicity (Lejeune & Richelle, 1996). 
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Research suggests that the estimation of long periods of time (hours) reveals a 
slight shortening of experienced duration. Specifically, there is typically a trend 
towards underestimating objective durations in the order of 1.1 (Campbell, 1990). For 
instance, participants may emerge from a 'time free' environment after 14 days and 
believe that only nine days have elapsed (Webb & Agnew, 1974). It is suggested that 
this underestimation is related to the tendency of our circadian rhythms to 'free-run' 
(without the aid of any external temporal cues) with periods slightly longer than 24-
hours (Aschoff, 1984). Similarly, studies have also shown that subjective time slows 
as metabolic rate slows (e.g., Campbell, 1986, 1990). 
Another interesting finding from this type of research is that the accuracy of 
these relatively long duration estimates appear to be moderated by the degree to which 
the participants' behaviour deviates from their normal daily habits (Campbell, 1990). 
Others have gone as far as to suggest that a 'normal' daily routine is essential for 
effective duration estimation (Siffre, 1964). 
The attentional-gate model of prospective duration estimation 
Although the cognitive and physiological components of duration estimation 
can be viewed separately, a number of researchers have proposed hybrid models 
which include both these elements. One prominent example is Block and Zakay's 
attentional-gate model (e.g., Block & Zakay, 1996; Zakay & Block, 1997). On the 
whole this model is functionally isomorphic to Block's (1992) contextual-change 
mode] of duration estimation (sec, Block & Zakay, 1996). This mode] suggests that 
duration estimates are dependent on both physiological elements (e.g., arousal level) 
and cognitive elements (e.g. an attentional-gate). The attentional-gate is theorised to 
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control how much temporal infonnation is transferred to memory. This gate opens 
and closes depending upon how much attention is allocated to time. When the gate is 
open pulses from a pacemaker (the rate of which can be influenced by both general 
and specific arousal) are transferred to a cognitive counter. Put simply, duration 
estimates involve the counting of the number of accumulated pulses. 
The important difference between this model and internal clock models is that 
it allows, and specifies the consequences of, a person dividing their attention between 
external events and attending to temporal factors (Block & Zakay, 1996). The model 
is predominately a model of prospective duration estimation, however a variant, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter, has been proposed to explain 
retrospective estimates (Block & Zakay, 1996). 
With this model the accuracy of prospective duration estimates are directly 
related to the amount of information processing a person allocates to temporal 
infonnation (i.e., how wide the attentional gate is and how long it stays open). 
According to this model a person requested to make a prospective estimation will 
divide their attention between temporal and non-temporal (stimulus) information 
(Zakay & Block, 1996). This view suggests that such duration estimates should be 
most accurate when the cognitive load or processing of presented stimuli is low 
because a greater amount of attention can be allocated to time and so opening the 
attentional gate (for example if participants are not required to respond to the 
presented stimulus) (Block, 1990). Research has found some support for this claim 
(e.g. Block, 1992). Further support was provided by Block and Zakay's (1997) meta-
analysis of duration estimation studies that used the prospective paradigm. Overall 
they found support for the view that as the cognitive load of the target event increases 
the experienced duration decreases. In other words if a person is required to place 
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greater attention on processing non-temporal infonnation, less attention is directed to 
the processing of temporal infonnation, and hence less time is experienced. 
stimulus versus contextual retrospective duration models 
Models of retrospective duration estimation can also be classified as being 
'stimulus-based' or 'context-based' (Block, 1985, 1986). Whereas stimulus-based 
hypotheses, like Ornstein's (1969) 'storage-size hypothesis' or Vroon's (1970) 
'infonnational hypothesis', attempt to explain these duration estimates by focusing on 
the processing of the stimulus infonnation presented during the time period, context-
based hypotheses, like Block and Reed's (1978) 'contextual-association hypothesis' 
or Boltz's (1992) 'structured remembering approach', assume that these estimates 
involve more than just processing stimulus events. As Block (1986) puts it " ... 
aspects of the cognitive context that is supplied by a person as events occur are 
assumed to be encoded and retrieved as an integral part of the experiencing and 
remembering of the events" (p. 105). This is an important observation as Block 
(1986) demonstrates that stimulus type models are unable to explain the 'richness' of 
retrospective duration estimation findings. 
For example, a number of studies have not found a clear relationship between 
degree of 'memory' for an event and duration estimation accuracy (Block, 1986; Burt, 
1999). In addition, most stimulus-based hypotheses cannot explain the common 
finding of positive time order effects (Block, 1982, 1986; Block & Reed, 1978). A 
positive time order effect is, all things being equal (or controlled through 
counterbalancing), being presented with two events of objectively equivalent 
durations, and judging the first to be longer than the second. Contextual type theories 
32 
are able to explain this effect by assuming that cognitive context changes more rapidly 
at the start of a new experience, such as being in an experiment which results in more 
contextual 'change' at the start of the experience, therefore the first interval will be 
judged as longer (Block, 1986). Support for this type of reasoning comes from 
studies that show that a time order effect can be eliminated by such things as 
providing a different environmental context for each event (Block, 1982) or by 
providing a similar control event between the two to-be-estimated events (Block, 
1986). 
Models of retrospective duration estimation 
Most models of retrospective duration estimation assume that "duration is a 
cognitive construction which is influenced mainly by attention and memory 
processes" (Block et al., 1999, pp. 185). Variants focus on factors such as attention, 
memory storage, and memory change (see Block, 1990, for a review). 
During retrospective duration estimates it is often presumed that no, or very 
little, temporal information can be retrieved from memory. In line with this 
theorising, retrospective duration estimation is presumed to be directly related to the 
coding and retrieval of non-temporal information (Block, 1992). This is likely to 
include the remembered number of changes in cognitive context. Specifically, 
accuracy ofthese types of duration estimates are directly related to the amount of 
stored and retrievable information, remembered changes, contextual changes, or 
segmentation of the duration (Block & Reed, 1978; Fraisse, 1963; Ornstein, 1969; 
Poynter, 1989; Vroon, 1970). These models can all be classed as 'change models', 
which assume that duration estimation is based on the amount of change experienced 
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during the target duration. As Poynter (1989) suggests "change is the psychological 
index of time passage" (p. 307). 
For example, Ornstein (1969) proposed that the more information stored 
during the interval to be estimated, the longer the duration will be recalled - the 
'storage size' metaphor. Subjective duration depends on the 'size' of the information 
stored in memory - the greater the storage size the longer the estimate. Therefore 
when information is numerous or complex in the environment (and that information is 
stored in memory), the subjective duration is longer. 
A number of empirical studies have found support for the storage size model 
(e.g., Gray, 1982; Underwood, 1975); although there are others who question it (e.g., 
Block, 1986; Burt, 1992, 1999; Burt & Kemp, 1991). For example, Burt (1999) had 
participants produce a narrative describing a recently viewed video of a robbery, and 
also retrospectively estimate its duration. He found no significant correlation between 
estimated duration of the robbery and the number of words used to describe the event 
(storage size). Similarly, evidence to question the storage size hypothesis was 
provided by Block (1986) who demonstrated that although an internal-imagery task 
(for example a task requiring a person to navigate around an imaginary room in their 
'mind') was remembered as being longer than a environmental-imagery task (a task 
involving an actual room) of equivalent objective duration, the environmental-
imagery task resulted in significantly better free-recall than the internal-imagery task 
- the opposite result to that predicted by the storage size hypothesis. 
Alternatively, Poynter (1983; 1989), and Poynter and Homa (1983) proposed a 
change/segmentation model of retrospective duration estimatjon. Poynter suggests 
that "if the interval is filled with sensory stimuli, then the estimate will be based 
primarily on the number and discreteness of the sensory changes remembered from 
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the interval" (Poynter, 1989, p.312). One of the more pertinent aspects of this model 
is that it recognises the importance of discreteness and memorability of events in 
providing an effective framework for storage and retrieval of information on which to 
base the duration estimation (Poynter, 1983) - the more salient and discrete an event, 
the easier the event can be 'chunked' for efficient encoding and retrieval. Poynter 
(1989) suggests that one form of salience which greatly assists us in making 
retrospective duration estimates is that, because of the unidirectionality of time (at 
least we perceive it as such, see Leggett, 1978; Stenger, 2000, for a discussion on this 
topic), we have learned the temporal relations of many natural event sequences. For 
example, it is easy for us to temporally organise a sequence of photographs depicting 
the cutting down of a tree and the making of furniture from the resulting wood. 
At the same time, like other models of retrospective duration estimation, the 
change/segmentation model acknowledges the importance of observer variables, such 
as attentiona1 demands and capacity, and motivation in influencing remembered 
duration. Poynter (1989) suggests that the model's strength is that it is relatively 
parsimonious in that it suggests we judge duration in much the same way without 
clocks as we do with clocks, "by accounting for the 'nontemporal' change between 
delimiting events" (p. 329). 
In a similar vein is Boltz's (1998c) 'structured remembering' approach. In 
common with Poynter's change/segmentation model, the 'structured remembering 
approach' suggests that "the remembering of event durations is dependent upon the 
inherent organisation of information within an event's time span" (Boltz, 1998b, p. 
113). It is argued that incoherent events lack structural predictability, which disrupts 
both attending and remembering processes (Boltz, 1998b). Using a retrospective 
paradigm, Boltz (1992; 1994) required participants to perform a series of perceptual 
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rating tasks with tonal sequences, or environmental sounds, which varied in their 
degree of structural predictability and number of presentations. Overall these studies 
found that durations for coherent events were well remembered, which also showed a 
learning effect in relation to the number of presentations. However, incoherent events 
were poorly remembered and showed no learning effect. 
It was suggested by Boltz (1992) that events which are invariant over time 
(highly predictable), have inherent structures which influence attention, expectancy, 
and memory, thus allowing for the recapitulation and accurate duration estimation of 
these events (individuals are thought to incidentally learn the inherent duration). This 
viewpoint is in tune with current theorising in the area of autobiographical memory. 
For example, Neisser (1986) suggests that nested structure is important in the storage 
and retrieval of autobiographical memories. Payne (1993) also highlights the 
importance of structure and coherence during prospective remembering -
remembering to do things. 
Although, Block and Zakay's (Block & Zakay, 1996; Zakay & Block, 1997) 
attentional-gate (contextual change) model discussed above is predominately a model 
of prospective duration estimation, a variant has been proposed to explain 
retrospective estimates. In common with most theorising concerning retrospective 
duration estimates, this model suggests that "judgements do not depend so much on 
retrieval of temporal contextual information as on retrieval of other kinds of 
contextual information" (Block & Zakay, 1996, p.187). Based on accumulated 
research (e.g., Block, 1986), this model represents a continual development and 
refinement of Block and Reed's (Block & Reed, 1978) original contextual 
explanation. The contextual information is presumed to be encoded with more 
general event information, and incorporates environmental, emotional, and process 
information. Overall, the duration estimation is a function of the amount of 
contextual changes that can be retrieved from memory (Block, 1992). 
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Figure 1 depicts Block and Zakay's (1996) contextual change model for 
retrospective estimates. Most of the focus is on associations formed (mostly 
automatically) between the context generator (supplier of context information) and 
event information (stored in long-term episodic memory). This model allows for the 
fact that on rare occasions the person may attend to temporal factors at the time of 
encoding. In these cases the 'gate' win be opened al10wing the context recorder to 
hold information concerning contextual changes, and associate this information with 
concurrent events. This information is also sent to a 10ng-term reference memory 
which "holds information about the average amount of unique contextual information 
stored during durations of various lengths" (Block & Zakay, 1996, p. 187)-
information concerning the translation of contextual information into temporal 
duration estimates. Finally, the actua1 duration estimation involves a context 
comparison, which incorporates information held in the long-term episodic memory 












Figure 1. Block and Zayak's (1996) contextual-change model of retrospective 
duration judgement. 
Finally, Burt and Kemp (1991; 1994), and Burt (1992; 1993) have put forward 
a reconstructive model to help explain retrospective duration estimation. Burt (1992) 
suggests that "reconstructing event duration may involve the use of (1) general event 
knowledge already stored in memory, (2) information provided in the event 
description, and (3) memory of the event." (p. 128). This model suggests that people 
rely heavily on reconstructing the event based on general knowledge gained through 
repeated exposure/experience to that 'category' of event (Burt, 1992). When a person 




reconstructed estimates either upwards or downwards, depending on the direction and 
degree of atypicality. It is suggested that temporal infonnation may be encoded as 
part of this general event knowledge. Although most other theorising focuses on the 
effects of perceptual input during the event, this model highlights the influence of 
general knowledge (concerning the events typical duration) has on the duration 
estimation (Burt, 1993). 
It should be noted that this model was developed using events longer than one 
day. Although Burt (1993) suggests that caution is needed in applying this model to 
shorter events (i.e., hours or minutes rather than days) he sees no obvious reason why 
the process should be different for these shorter events. 
Burt and Kemp (1991) found no evidence to support Ornstein's (1969) implied 
relationship between retention interval and estimated duration, however they did find 
evidence that people reconstruct public event duration by using genera] knowledge. 
Participants required to provide duration estimates of specific public events (e.g., the 
1985 hij acking of TWA Flight 847) gave similar estimates to those required to 
provide estimates for general descriptions of such events (e.g., an aeroplane hijack). 
Overall people tended to underestimate these durations. Burt and Kemp (1991) 
suggest that this may have been because most ofthe specific events used in this study 
were atypically long. In addition, they found that event knowledge (measured on a 7-
point rating scale) did increase estimation accuracy. 
Furthennore, Burt (1992) examined participants' capacity to recall the 
duration of autobiographical events recorded in personal diaries. No support was 
found for Ornstein's storage size model in that the duration estimates were not 
proportional to event knowledge and there were no clear time order effects. He also 
found that estimates were generally accurate, even when the events could not be 
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remembered, suggesting that participants reconstructed the event duration. Support 
for the view that this reconstruction is based on general event knowledge was 
provided by a second study in which participants provided with general descriptions 
of specific events used in the first study, provided very similar duration estimates. 
More recently Burt, Kemp, and Conway (2001) have retested many of the 
participants involved in Burt's (1992) study. This follow-up study gathered data 
concerning these participants' capacity to recall autobiographical duration information 
10 years on. Overall, they found these estimates to be very similar to the earlier 
estimates (the estimates replicated all of the patterns outlined above). This follow-up 




Before introducing my model of expected duration, a paradigm in which this 
type of cognitive task is regularly used will be introduced - time management. It is 
important that this topic is introduced at this point as it provides an excellent real-
world situation in which to develop and test the 'expected duration model' . 
Time management is an ideal area in which to investigate expected duration 
estimation. One of the primary tasks one has to undertake in order to be able to 
manage their time is that of estimating how long future tasks are going to take so that 
their completion can be 'scheduled'. In light of this fact this chapter introduces the 
reader to the concept of time management and the function that expected duration 
estimation plays within time management. 
Specifically this chapter introduces the concept of time management including 
the measurement of this construct, its potential bearing on an individual's 
psychological and physical health, and the utility of time management training. The 
second half of the chapter provides a discussion of the role and importance of 
scheduling, and more specifically estimating the duration of to-be-completed tasks, 
for effective time management. It will be argued that accurate duration estimates of 
to-be-completed tasks are desirable from both a time management/psychological well-
being perspective and a pure efficiency perspective (further reinforcing the need for a 
comprehensive understanding of the expected duration process). 
3.1 The concept of time management 
Time management is a broad term used by lay and business people, and 
academics alike. But what do we mean by time management? Surely one cannot 
truly manage time? 
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Time is arguably our most valuable resource, being directly related to all 
forms of human activity. However, unlike many other resources it cannot be stored 
for later use (Sharp, 1981). Given that time must be spent (in one way or another), the 
central issue becomes how we can use it most effectively. Strategies and techniques 
that purport to enhance the effective use oftime are typically discussed under the 
heading of time management (Drucker, 1966). Although the accepted term is 'time 
management', 'self management' better represents the construct. Time management 
concerns the processes and outcomes of strategies that people use to manage 
themselves in relation to time rather than the management of time per se. That said, 
the term time management is widely used and understood so will be adopted in this 
thesis. 
Use oftime is constrained by strong cultural dictates (see section 2.3), which 
determine how one's day and night, week, and life should be organised. It is widely 
recognised that the standardisation of time measurement throughout western society, 
facilitated as clocks became widespread, went hand-in-hand with the idea of 'time 
thrift' proclaimed by educators, moralists, and employers (Dohrn-van Rossum, 1996). 
Thompson (1967) suggests that western mass consciousness has gradually absorbed 
an ethic that one's time should be spent in clearly purposive action. Generally, this is 
still held to mean being engaged in, preparing for, or supporting those in paid 
employment. Those whose life has no such purpose, notably the unemployed (but 
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also the sick and the retired), tend to be condemned and/or accorded low social status 
(Thompson, 1967). A quote from a man who had recently been made redundant 
demonstrates the connection between time and employment - "Time doesn't matter 
now as much as it used to .... there's so much of it" (UK, 1980s, cited in Fryer & 
McKenna, 1987). 
The need for some kind of regularity and order is fundamental to humankind 
(Thompson, 1967). In more 'traditional' societies, structure is provided through 
various kinds of ritual (often religious) activity. In the western world this need has 
come to be associated with the desire for a 40-hour working week (depending upon 
the country), and a working life often spanning up to 50 years. In fitting with this 
viewpoint, many people comment that if they earned the same pay for working only 
20 hours instead of 40 they would seek a second job (Bostyn & Wight, 1987). 
Likewise, Jahoha (1982) argues that ''time experiences are structured in industrialised 
societies through the Ubiquity of employment conditions" (p. 59). Fonna1 
employment provides a basic grid against which a person's life is charted out. 
It is important to re-emphasise that temporal orientations and reasoning about 
time vary greatly across cultures (Block et a1., 1996; Rubin & Belgrave, 1999) and 
also to a lesser extent between different organisations within the same culture 
(Hassard, 1991; Schriber & Gutek, 1987). In relation to these findings, care must be 
taken when applying the predominately western model of time management to other 
cultures (Mpofu, D'Amico, & Cleghorn, 1996) (see section 2.3). 
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3.2 Defining the time management construct 
Presently, there is disagreement in the literature as to whether time 
management behaviours reflect a set of learned behaviours or some dispositional 
aspect of an individual's personality (Landy, Rastegary, Thayer, & Colvin, 1991; 
Macan, 1994). Fontana (1993) suggests that effective time management comprises of 
a multitude oflearned behaviours. In support of this view research demonstrates that 
training in time management techniques can improve an individual's time 
management ability (e.g., Hall & Hursch, 1982; Hanel, Martin, & Koop, 1983; King, 
Winett, & Lovett, 1986). Other researchers argue that effective time management is a 
result of various dispositional aspects of an individual's personality. For example, 
Calabresi and Cohen (1968) and Wessman (1973) propose that attitudes towards time 
reflect a basic feature of an individual's personality. More recently, Shahani, Weiner 
and Streit (1993) conducted a longitudinal study that revealed that university students' 
self-reported use of time management behaviours remained relatively stable under 
varying levels of academic pressure, providing some support for the dispositional 
nature of the time management construct. 
Whether effective time management behaviours reflect a set of learned 
responses or some dispositional aspect of an individual's personality, most researchers 
agree that it involves particular key processes, such as identifying goals and 
obj ectives, ranking them in regard to importance or priority, and then allocating time 
and resources accordingly (see Landy et aI., 1991; Macan, Shahani, Dipboye, & 
Phillips, 1990). Macan's (1994) process model, shown in Figure 2, identifies three 
main factors which contribute to effective time management: setting goals and 
priorities; mechanics (including making lists and task time estimation); and preference 
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for organisation. These three factors all contribute to a person's perceived control of 
time. The important part of this model is that it is this perceived control of time (as 
opposed to some objective time usage type of measure) that results in the positive 
outcomes cited on the right-hand side of the figure below. 
Figure 2. Macan's (1994) process model of time management. 
3.3 Measuring the time management construct 
LESS JOB-INDUCED 
TENSIONS· 
HIGHER JOB ] 
PERFORMANCE; 
The capacity to systematically research and contribute to our understanding of 
time management is ultimately linked to the ability to develop and utilise 
psychometrically sound measures to represent this multidimensional concept 
accurately. In addition, in light of the negative effects of poor time management 
discussed in section 3.4 below, it appears prudent, where effective time management 
45 
is identified as an essential competency, to include a measure of time management 
ability as part of employee selection packages. This inclusion is of particular 
importance given the probable dispositional component of the time management 
construct. If effective time management is essential for a given occupation, it will be 
more efficacious to recruit superior time managers than try to overcome a 
predisposition for poor time management through substantial, and expensive, training. 
If effective time management is a robust aspect of an individua1's personality, time 
management training will have only a limited effect on behaviour. Again, selection of 
superior time managers is reliant on having a reliable and valid measure of time 
management ability. 
A number of published scales exist which purport to measure the time 
management construct ~ The Time Structure Questionnaire (Bond & Feather, 1988), 
The Time Management Behaviour Scale (Macan et al., 1990), The Britton and Tesser 
Time Management Instrument (Britton & Glynn, 1989), The Temporal Experience 
Questionnaire (Wessman, 1973), and The Time Attitudes Questionnaire (Calabresi & 
Cohen, 1968). 
The Time Structure Questionnaire (Bond & Feather, 1988) and The Time 
Management Behaviour Scale (Mac an et aI., 1990) are two of the most popular scales. 
The Time Structure Questionnaire (TSQ) (Bond & Feather, 1988) contains 26 items 
that measure the degree to which participants perceive their use of time as structured 
and purposive. Each item is rated using a one to seven scale. Six scores are 
calculated from the TSQ ratings, a summed TSQ score which ranges from 26 to 182 
(higher scores indicate more time structure), and five factor scores - Purpose, Routine, 
Orientation, Organisation and Persistence, respectively. Coefficient alphas in the 
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vicinity of. 73 - .75 have been reported for both the summed TSQ score and the factor 
scores (e.g., Shahani et ai., 1993). 
During earlier validation and development of the scale, Feather & Bond 
(1983) investigated time structure in a sample of employed and unemployed 
university graduates using a number of self-assessment scales, including a 17 -item 
version of the TSQ. They reported that the unemployed group were less organised 
and less purposeful in their use of time, and reported higher levels of depression and 
lower self-esteem than the employed group. In addition, they found that the more 
structured and purposeful use of time, as indexed by the TSQ, was positively related 
to global self-esteem and negatively related to depressive symptoms for both the 
employed and unemployed samples. 
However, studies by Burt and Forsyth (1999), and Forsyth (1998) suggest that 
the TSQ may not predict actual time management ability. Both these studies llsed 
task duration estimation accuracy as their performance measure. Both studies found 
no meaningful relationship between task duration estimation accuracy and TSQ 
scores. Although superior time management involves much more than estimating the 
duration of future to-be-done tasks, it is one of the essential components of good time 
management. 
The Time Management Behaviour scale (TMBS) was developed by Macan et 
al. (1990) to assess behaviours they felt were critical to successful time management. 
The original instrument contained 46 (reduced to 38, then 34 by Macan) items, rated 
on a scale from seldom true (0) to very often true (4). Negatively worded items are 
reverse scored so that upper ends of the scale indicate more frequent use of productive 
time management behaviours. The scale is made up of four factors: setting goals and 
priorities (TMBS 1); planning and scheduling (TMBS 2); perceived control of time 
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(TMBS 3); and preference for organisation (TMBS 4). More recently Adams and Jex 
(1997) carried out a confinnatory factor analysis, which provided further support of 
the factor structure proposed in the TMBS. Their study suggested that the instrument 
could be reduced to 28 items without a reduction in psychometric properties. 
Additionally, Krause's (1999) recently developed 'Australian Time 
Organisation and Management Scale (ATOMS)' looks promising. The scale, which is 
yet to be published, consists of 62 items measuring both time management behaviours 
and attitudes. Krause (1999) suggests these will provide clarification of the concept 
of time management, with specific focus on its relationship to personality dimensions. 
The scale is comprised of six factors: purposivism; time facilitation; mechanics; 
temporal perspective; spontaneity; and effective organisation. It appears to be 
psychometrically sound (Krause, 1999). 
3.4 The effects of poor time management 
The importance of effective time management for psychological well-being is 
widely reported. The literature contains substantial longitudinal and cross-sectional 
studies which suggest that whether a person is able to occupy their time in a purposive 
and structured way is highly correlated to psychological well-being (e.g., Banks & 
Jackson, 1982; Feather, 1990; Hepworth, 1980; Kilpatrick & Trew, 1985; Warr & 
Payne, 1983). Conversely, Hawkins (1997) suggests that adults tend to view time and 
its management as their greatest stressor. 
Specifically, poor time management skills have been associated with high 
levels of stress (e.g., Goldberger & Breznitz, 1982; Macan et a1., 1990; McLaughlin, 
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Connier, & Connier, 1988; Schuler, 1979; Tanner & Atkins, 1990; Wratcher & Jones, 
1986), low perfonnanceiproductivity (e.g., Britton & Tesser, 1991; Kleijn, Van der 
Ploeg, & Topman, 1994; Macan et aI., 1990; Wratcher & Jones, 1986), feelings of 
purposelessness, neuroticism, hopelessness and depression (Bond & Feather, 1988; 
Feather & Bond, 1983), and less effective group and individual decision making 
(Benson & Beach, 1996; Kelly, Jackson, & Hutson-Comeaux, 1997). Similarly, 
studies by Owen (1991) and Steinberg (1996) suggest that whether a person sees him 
or herself as being an effective time manager or not is connected with whether they 
perceive their time as being 'filled' or 'wasted'. In the business world filled time most • 
often equates to productive time on-the-job. 
In student populations effective time management has been shown to be an 
important facilitator of academic perfonnance (Battle, Grant, & Heggoy, 1995; Huang 
& Waxman, 1995; Sweidel, 1996). Students with effective time management skills 
also have an ability to cope with stress (Tracey & Corlett, 1995), and have higher 
levels of motivation (Senecal, Koestner, & Vallerand, 1995). Similarly, effective time 
management has been shown to be an important moderator of student time usage 
(Bruno, 1995; Etcheverry, Clifton, & Roberts, 1993), and time allocation choices 
(Kobasigawa & Metcalf-Haggert, 1993; Shaw, Caldwell, & Kleiber, 1996). 
Conversely, ineffective time management has been associated with problem 
behaviour (also see developmental differerices in section 2.3) (Ansari & Chowdhri, 
1988; McKee, 1996; Thombs, 1995). Interestingly, Shaw, Caldwell, and Kleiber 
(1996) suggest that female students may suffer greater levels of time stress than their 
male counterparts (also see section 2.3). 
Jacobs (1992) vividly demonstrates the potential monetary costs of poor time 
management. If an organisation employs 1000 people who earn on average $30,000 
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per annum, and if all these employees waste only 1 minute per day through poor time 
management, the organisation has spent $62,500 on unproductive time over a year. 
Incredibly, this amount is equivalent to having two workers absent for the whole year! 
However, the association between performance and time management is probably 
often less direct than alluded to by Jacobs (1992). For instance, Barling, Kelloway 
and Cheung (1996) suggest that a number of other variables - notably motivation-
may moderate the association between effective time management and performance. 
Likewise, Burt and Forsyth (2001) report an association between organisational 
climate and effective time management. However, it is important to note that there 
are likely to be both direct influences to productivity through effective time 
management (see, Macan, 1994) and indirect ones through elevating the negative 
elements mentioned above, such as improved motivation, more effective decision 
making, and less purposelessness. 
In general, research suggests that employees who are good at managing their 
time are generally more successful than those who are poor at doing so (Kotter, 1982; 
Mackenzie, 1990). 
3.5 Time management training 
In light of the importance of effective time management, it is not surprising 
that organisations spend a substantial amount of time and effort trying to improve 
employees' time management skills (Lakein, 1991; Maher, 1990). Strategies include 
purchasing expensive scheduling software and daily planners, running in-house time 
management seminars, and sending employees to time management workshops 
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(Maher, 1990). The latter, aimed at reducing levels of stress and improving 
employee productivity, are often advocated by occupational counsellors (Schuler, 
1979; Wratcher & Jones, 1986). However, despite many organisations spending a 
great deal oftime and money on promoting effective time management behaviours, 
there appears to be very little in the way of measurement of actual needs or resulting 
behaviour changes. It is often presumed that all employees are of equal need when it 
comes to time management training (Hall & Hursch, 1982). Where time management 
training programs are evaluated, they tend to concern only employee attitudes (e.g., 
Hanel et aI., 1983; Woolfolk & Woolfollk, 1986). It is only occasionally that an 
attempt is made to assess behaviour changes due to these training programs (e.g., Hall 
&Hursch, 1982; Orpen, 1994; Slaven & Totterdell, 1993). By not carrying out a 
needs analysis an organisation puts itself in an impoverished position making it 
difficult, ifnot impossible, to develop training objectives, choose appropriate training 
methods, or evaluate training effectiveness (Goldstein, 1993). 
Although the effectiveness of time management training is often touted (e.g., 
Lakein, 1991; Richards, 1987; Schuler, 1979), the limited research into this area 
questions its true effectiveness. A number of studies have revealed that time 
management training can increase the amount of time participants spend on high~ 
priority tasks (Hall & Hursch, 1982; King et aI., 1986; Maher, 1986; Orpen, 1994). 
However, these studies do not directly address whether the time management training 
resulted in an increased use of time management behaviours advocated by time 
management consultants (e.g., Lakein, 1991; Mackenzie, 1990). 
In addition, research suggests that time management training may be 
ineffective at reducing stress or improving performance (Bost, 1984; King et aI., 
1986). In general, much of the research in this area has been conducted with small 
51 
sample sizes (i.e., N<5) and/or in the absence of appropriate control groups (e.g., Hall 
& Hursch, 1982; Maher, 1986). 
To overcome some of these methodological shortcomings Macan (1996) 
conducted a field study that compared a variety of self-reports and supervisory 
performance ratings of a group of employees who had undergone time management 
training with a group that had not (all measures for both groups were assessed before 
the training and approximately five months later). Somewhat surprisingly, trained 
participants did not report greater use of time management behaviours, more job 
satisfaction, or less job-induced stress than the non-trained group. In addition, the 
trained group's job performance (measured by supervisor ratings) showed no 
signifIcant increase five months after training. 
The only positive outcome of the training in Macan's study appeared to be that 
the trained participants' perceptions of control over time showed an increase five 
months after training - where it approached the level of the non-trained group. Macan 
(1996) provides an interesting explanation for this outcome - "perhaps training 
allowed the participants to compare themselves with others, providing them with a 
realistic benchmark with which to evaluate their situation" (p. 234). In support of this 
view she highlights similar findings that have shown comparative knowledge can be 
helpful in alleviating some of the negative consequences associated with burnout 
(Maslach,1982). Basically, Macan (1996) suggests that comparative knowledge 
(concerning the similar situation other people are in) about one's situation in respect 
to 'time pressure' results in similar positive affects as does formal time management 
training. 
Another area that warrants attention by researchers and practitioners is the role 
personality plays as a moderator of time management training effectiveness. If time 
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management is unrelated to personality type then time management training may be 
able to be applied undifferentiated across the population. However, this is probably 
not the case. For example, Williams, Verble, Price, and Layne (1995) report that time 
management factors were significantly related to the 'Judging' dimension ofthe J-P 
index of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), suggesting 
that time management factors are most closely related to what Myers and Briggs 
(Myers & McCaulley, 1985) refer to as having a planned, orderly, and controlled way 
of living. 
It remains to be determined what differential effect personality has on time 
management training. Williams et al.'s (1995) study suggests that people with a 
judging orientation will probably respond to time management training in a 
favourable way. However, this population is likely to already be 'good time 
managers'. As Williams et al. (1995) point out" ... an individual with a perceiving 
orientation might really need time management training, but his or her orientation 
might be an impediment to profiting from that training" (p. 41). 
Similarly, Shahani, Weiner, and Streit (1993) suggest that companies should 
be careful about ''jumping on the time management bandwagon" as "it is likely that 
the typical 3-4 hour time management workshop will have limited efficacy in 
permanently changing employee time management skills" (p. 242). However, they 
allude to the possibility that certain factors (e.g., high motivation) may over-ride time 
management dispositional orientations. 
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3.6 Scheciuling the completion of to-be-completed tasks 
The scheduling of to-be-completed tasks is a ubiquitous component of 'how-
to' time management books (eg. Fontana, 1993; Jacobs, 1992; Mackenzie, 1990) and 
the academic time management literature (e.g. Bond & Feather, 1988; Britton & 
Glynn, 1989; Burt & Kemp, 1994; Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 1999; Macan, 1994). 
The importance of effective scheduling to managing one's time is further 
demonstrated by Macan's process model oftime management. As can be seen in 
Figure 2 the 'mechanics' component, of which scheduling plays a major part, is one 
of the three factors that her model suggests leads to a perceived control of time. There 
is some empirical support for the view that those who perceive themselves as being 
good time managers are more accurate at estimating the expected duration of to-be-
completed tasks (Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 1999). Specifically, those who 
perceived themselves as being in control of time, or practising effective time 
management behaviours, estimated expected task durations with greater accuracy than 
those who did not (Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 1999). 
Past research concerning scheduling has addressed issues like time planners as 
an organisational tool (e.g., Hildreth, Macke, & Carter, 1995; Sweide1, 1996); project 
management scheduling (e.g., Sa1ewski, Schirmer, & Drexi, 1997); scheduling as a 
cognitive activity (e.g., Garling, 1994, 1996; Paese, 1995; Payne, 1993); scheduling as 
a communication tool (e.g., Walleri & Stoering, 1996); planner/scheduler design (e.g., 
Burt & Forsyth, 1999; Kelley & Chapanis, 1982); and the costs of poor scheduling 
(e.g., Benson & Beach, 1996; Kelly et al., 1997; Mano, 1990). 
54 
3.7 Scheduling materials 
Whether they are referred to as diaries, calendars, planners or schedulers, their 
usage is an important part of many people's workday, and in many professions it is a 
ubiquitous personal tool (Kelley & Chapanis, 1982; Payne, 1993). For example, 
Kelley and Chapanis (1982) report that all 23 working professionals in their study 
used a calendar or diary on a daily basis, and all participants believed that a calendar 
or diary was essential to conduct their business. Diaries, or schedulers, are used in a 
variety of ways depending on personal preference. Typically they enable one to 
manage one's time, and other important information and facts. Benefits such as 
'being able to use your head for more important things', and stress reduction are 
widely proclaimed (e.g., Burger, 1974; Hegarty, 1976; Mackenzie, 1990). However, 
surprisingly little research has been conducted on these tools. 
One important issue of scheduling use is its design and format. However, a 
recent literature search returned very few studies dealing directly with schedule design 
and format (see Kelley & Chapanis, 1982; Payne, 1993; Burt & Forsyth, 1998). At a 
most basic level are the mass-produced 'diaries', which provide basic facilities for 
scheduling appointments, and filing personal information and notes. These devices 
also provide varying degrees of calendar information and other useful facts (e.g., 
currency conversions). Typically, these diaries are rather generic and offer no formal 
personal customisation. At the other end of the continuum is the range of digital 
schedulers that are custom-designed to meet the user's particular requirements. 
Marketers of scheduling devices and business consultants (e.g., Bickers, 1997; 
Fienberg, 1995) often proclaim the advantages of digital schedules over paper ones. 
Advantages include superior information capacity, reusability, smaller size, superior 
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'look-up' capabilities, ease of archiving, and increased functionality (i.e., clocks and 
alarms), and greater information security. In a similar vein, Kelley and Chapanis's 
(1982) study of scheduler usage by a variety of professions strongly supported a move 
towards computerisation of schedulers. More recently, Payne (1993) suggests that the 
reality of electronic schedulers may not be as rosy as Kelly and Chapanis (1982) 
prophesised. Specifically, people still tend to continue to use paper schedulers, even 
in highly computerised enviromnents. 
Payne (1993) undertook an analysis of scheduler use focusing on electronic 
versions, again finding that some form of scheduler was essential for most 
professionals to manage their day-to-day lives. Similar to Kelly and Chapanis (1982), 
Payne found that while studying a rather homogeneous sample, there was a large 
amount of diversity in what type of schedulers people used and how they used them. 
Seventy per cent of the participants used only paper schedulers and of the 30 per cent 
who reported using electronic versions over half of these also still relied on some 
form of paper scheduler. 
In light of these findings Payne (1993) suggests that paper schedulers are more 
effective in promoting prospective remembering - remembering to do things - through 
the by-product of incidental browsing of existing appointments during subsequent 
scheduler entering. Furthermore, Payne (1993) suggests that "electronic calendars are 
restricted in their representational capabilities, for they do not mimic the capabilities 
borne by the rich typography and arbitrary graphical conventions used in paper 
calendars" (p. 97). Figure 3 depicts Payne's graphical representation ofthe general 
structure of this prospective remembering. This process model shows the stages from 
fonning the intention to carrying the act out until completed. The boxes on the left 
represent the influence of scheduling the intention - a common but not essential 
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prerequisite of prospective remembering. Of course entering an intention into a 
scheduler 'forces' it to be scheduled within a time frame. The boxes on the right-hand 
side ofthe main stages represent the possibility of being inadvertently 'reminded' 

































Figure 3. Payne's (1993, pp 91) graphical representation of prospective 
remembering. The central virtual lines enclose and join necessary stages, while 
other links (dashed lines) represent possible stages. 
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One ofthe interesting parts of Payne's model, is that it incorporates the view 
that an intention is encoded by mentally projecting it - "the imagined realization of 
the intention" (payne, 1993, p.91). Payne goes on to suggest that this process will 
often involve elaboration, which will include" ... some 'backward' imagining of 
precursive actions" (payne, 1993, p. 91). Likewise planning per se may occur at the 
same time or be somewhat temporally removed. In addition, Payne suggests that the 
proj ection of intentions is elaborated during scheduler entry by the context of other 
entries and also the spatial representation of time (i.e., time is typically represented 
chronologically down a page and onto the next). By being forced to enter a task or 
appointment into a calendar 'around' other tasks/appointments one is forced to 
imagine a richer sequence of events - facilitating 'event reconstruction' (see expected 
duration estimation model, Chapter 4). These factors are more easily facilitated with 
the higher levels of browsability inherent within paper based calendars. It appears 
that the projection of new entries is made more effective by the rehearsing of existing 
ones, giving a form of feedback. 
3.8 Duration estimation and scheduling 
Of particular relevance is the duration estimation component of the scheduling 
process, which relatively few researchers have addressed (e.g., Buehler, Griffin, & 
Ross, 1994; Burt & Forsyth, 1999; Burt & Kemp, 1994; Forsyth, 1998; Francis-
Smythe & Robertson, 1999; Hildreth et al., 1995; Josephs & Hahn, 1995). Task 
duration estimation accuracy is an important aspect of effective scheduling and so an 
essential component of effective time management. Estimating expected duration of a 
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task or event, as part of a planning process, is a frequently undertaken cognitive 
process (Hayes-Roth, 1980). It is utilised in many common activities as diverse as 
feeding a baby, to building an offshore oil-drilling platform, and in some cases the 
planner has limited prior knowledge of time requirements. In such circumstances the 
planner must estimate time requirements, and the accuracy of these estimates is an 
important limiting factor on the quality of the plan. Most people have experience of 
the potential costs of inaccurate future task-duration estimation. There are ubiquitous 
reports of grand construction projects blowing budgets primarily through inaccurate 
duration estimates (see Hall, 1980). At an individual level they can range from 
offending a friend because you are late for a movie, to losing one's job (Mano, 1990). 
The importance of being able to accurately estimate the expected duration of a 
task or event is reinforced by Burt and Kemp (1994) who state that" ... the allocation 
of time is fundamental to the success or failure of one's time management activities" 
(p.157). As they point out, if an individual always underestimates task-time they will 
run out of time. Conversely, if the individual always overestimates task-time they 
will be left with time to spare, which mayor may not be used productively (see 3.10 
below for a discussion of this issue). 
An early study by Bums (1957) found, somewhat intuitively, that employees 
tend to overestimate the time they spend on important activities related to work and to 
underestimate personal time. However this study had a major confound in that the 
measures of actual and estimated durations were both based on self reports (there 
were no 'objective' measurement of actual durations) meaning that caution is required 
in interpreting these findings. Another study by Klemmer and Snyder (1972), which 
used a more objective measure of actual duration (random activity sampling), found a 
large level of variability in the accuracy of employees' estimation of task durations-
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both across employees and tasks. For instance, they found that participants typically 
underestimated how long they had spent in face-to-face conversation, whereas they 
tended to overestimate the time they spend on reading or writing. 
It is also worth pointing out that accurate task duration estimates have other 
occupational uses beyond facilitating effective time management. From an 
organisational perspective, specifically during the process of job analysis, it is helpful 
if employees are able to accurately estimate how much time they spend on different 
tasks. A common way to gather information about a position/job is to ask the 
incumbent (Levine, Ash, Hall, & Sistrunk, 1983; Schuler, 1989). Accurate duration 
estimates from such self-reports are used to help define training needs, facilitate job 
restructuring, and establish wage and salary levels (Schuler, 1989). Additionally, 
collecting duration estimates of work tasks/processes over time can potentially 
provide valuable information concerning savings or costs resulting from the 
implementation of new work procedures, training, or technology (Hartley et aI., 
1977). 
3.9 Accuracy feedback for duration estimation 
Although Campbell (1990, p. 101) has pointed out that typically "time 
estimation is neither a well-reinforced behavior nor one for which there is much 
opportunity to practice" it is argued that this is not the case for duration estimation 
connected to the scheduling of to-be-completed tasks. As has already been noted 
above, on the first count there would appear to be many reinforcements connected to 
being able to accurately estimate the duration of a to-be-completed task. For example, 
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a study by Robertson and Kinder (1993) demonstrated that human resource 
consultants believe that employees who are accurate at estimating expected duration 
are more effective workers. Secondly, people are continually getting practice at 
estimating such durations. This may range from scheduling to-be-completed-tasks 
using a daily scheduler or diary, or making mental notes concerning the expected 
duration of an up-coming task. All of these duration estimates represent practice, as 
the person will typically receive feedback on their estimation accuracy (whether they 
update relevant knowledge or not is another issue). It therefore appears that people 
can potentially receive feedback for accurate duration estimation for to-be-completed 
tasks in a work environment. 
3.10 Parkinson's first law - why accurate duration estimates are 
important 
From what has already been discussed, there are two main outcomes of 
inaccurate duration estimation for the scheduling of to-be-completed tasks. Firstly, if 
an individual always underestimates task-time they will run out of time and not be 
able to complete all tasks. Clearly, this is not a good situation, although some 
underestimation may increase productivity in specific situations (see discussion 
below). Conversely, if the individual always overestimates task-time they will be left 
with time to spare. This second situation could be viewed as an effective strategy to 
manage your time (Burt & Kemp, 1994). Specifically it provides a 'buffer' of time 
that can be used if unforeseeable complications or if interruptions arise while 
completing the task. If not, the' extra' time can be used in other productive ways. 
However, will the extra time be used in such a way? The answer, it is argued, is 
probably not and the reason is best expressed by Parkinson's first law (Parkinson, 
1957, 1980). 
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Simply put Parkinson's first law suggests that work expands so as to fill the 
time available for its completion (Parkinson, 1957). Although the tongue-in-cheek 
'law' was originally applied at the group level (specifically bureaucracy) (Parkinson, 
1980), or indirectly at an individual level (Aronson & Gerard, 1966; Aronson & 
Landy, 1967; Landy, McCue, & Aronson, 1969), more recently Brannon, Hershberger 
and Brock (1999) have provided direct evidence of the effect at an individual level. 
In their first experiment, Brannon et al. (1999) initially lead participants to 
believe that they had to complete four trials of judging different sets of facial photos 
to a set criterion. However, only three were completed, one group was told that the 
fourth set was withdrawn from the study at the end of completing the second set, 
while the other group was told this at the end ofthe third set. Upon completion of the 
third set participants were also asked a number of questions concerning the 
experiment including their estimation of how long each set had taken them and 
whether they felt that the cancellation of the fourth set had effected the amount of 
time they had spent on the third set. Brannon et a1.(1999) found that those 
participants who were informed of the cancellation before starting the third (last) set 
took significantly longer to complete it - they 'dallied' on the third set. This result 
was confirmed in three subsequent similar experiments. In addition, participants 
appeared to be unaware of this dallying on the third set in that although, as mentioned, 
the experimental group took significantly longer to complete the third set, there was 
no significant difference between the two groups estimated duration of the third set. 
Further, most participants in the experimental group felt that the cancellation made no 
difference to the amount of time they spent on the last set, and more importantly no 
participant mentioned issues such as 'tried harder' or 'tried to be more accurate' or 
'spent more time on the pictures' . 
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In a fourth experiment Brannon et al. (1999) extend the generalis ability of the 
phenomenon by demonstrating that the effect also occurs with inherently unpleasant 
tasks, and that the degree of dalliance is proportional to the amount of 'spare time' 
(i.e., the magnitude of the cancelled work). In addition, they demonstrated that 
dalliance was not associated with increased performance, concentration or effort. 
However, it is worth noting that this result may not generalise to a true work situation 
were motivation levels are likely to be higher. 
Taken together these results strongly suggest that it is unlikely that any 
remaining scheduled time will be used in a productive way. Alternatively, it is 
suggested that people will slow down so as not to finish early while still keeping to 
schedule. A view reinforced by Brannon et al. (1999) that if" ... excess time arises, 
dalliance by workers on their present task could amount to substantial and costly 
inefficiency" (p. 155). 
Additionally, research suggests that overestimating the time to complete a task 
will have a negative rollover effect on the speed of completing similar future tasks. 
Research by Aronson and Gerard (1966) and Aronson and Landy (1967) 
demonstrated that a person who is given an excessive amount of time to complete a 
task will take significantly more time to complete a similar subsequent self-paced task 
than a person who is not given excessive time to complete the initial task (note: it 
would be interesting to see whether the opposite effect occurs, specifically if people 
are 'forced' to complete a task in a shorter time than 'normal' will this result in less 
time be allocated to a similar task in future?). Although, not quite the same thing, it is 
suggested that the same effect is likely to occur when scheduling the completion of 
similar tasks. A person may tend to successively overestimate the 'actual' time 
required to complete similar tasks. 
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It may be possible to apply Parkinson's law to the situation whereby task 
completion times are underestimated. Specifically, that a greater amount of effort will 
be expended on a given task when 'tight' time restrictions are placed on its 
completion than when there are fewer time restrictions (parkinson, 1980). This 
application of the 'law' suggests that a degree of underestimation in respect to the 
scheduling of to-be-completed tasks could have a positive effect on personal 
productivity by enabling more to be done in less time. This type of reasoning has 
some support in the literature, as well as in laboratory and field settings (Bryan & 
Locke, 1967; Latham & Locke, 1975). For example, Latham and Locke (1975) 
demonstrate that logging crews increased their output as time restrictions were 
imposed. 
Given this fact, should a tendency towards slightly underestimating the 
expected durations of to-be-completed tasks be encouraged? It is suggested that on 
the whole it should not. Although this strategy may be useful for some individuals 
who 'need' constant time pressure in order to work efficiently, for most people such 
pressure will tend to have a negative effect on productivity. However, that said, task 
duration underestimation could be viewed as a useful strategy when scheduling tasks 
with a large potential duration variability (for example, mundane tasks like putting 
letters in envelopes). Although even with these types of tasks, a point will be reached 
whereby the task cmmot be successfully completed any faster. Presuming the person 
repeatedly allots less time to its completion, sooner or later the task will not be able to 
be completed in the allotted time. 
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Chapter 4 
Understanding expected duration estimation 
As mentioned earlier, the tenn 'expected duration estimation' (Burt & Kemp, 
1994) has been used to describe the process of estimating the duration of to-be-
completed tasks or events. Chapter 4 will attempt to clarify the process of making an 
expected duration estimate. During the discussion my process model of expected 
duration will be introduced. Time management, specifically the task scheduling 
component that was discussed in the previous chapter, will be used as a paradigm in 
which to develop and examine the model. The majority of the chapter is concerned 
with discussing the model's four main components: 1/ searching memory for similar 
tasks or events to the task or event which is to be estimated, 21 gauging the 
appropriateness of the remembered tasks or events, 31 what is labelled the 
'retrospective process', and lastly 4/, what is labelled the 'expected process'. As part 
of this discussion the four empirical experiments undertaken as part of this thesis are 
introduced. 
4.1 What type of duration estimation is the scheduling of a to-be-
completed task - experienced or remembered? 
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Before introducing my model of expected duration estimation, consideration 
of the paradigm this type of estimation best fits needs to be undertaken - prospective, 
retrospective or a third new 'expected' paradigm? 
Following from the seminal work of Burt and Kemp (1994), a recent study by 
Francis-Smythe and Robertson (1999) further explored people's ability to estimate the 
duration of to-be-completed tasks (expected duration) and their self-report of the use 
of time management practices. The study also collected prospective and retrospective 
duration estimates, as it was suggested that good time managers should also be 
accurate at these types of duration estimates. By utilising an arguably more 
appropriate self-report measure oftime management behaviours (The Time 
Management Behaviour Scale) than Burt and Kemp (1994), they found some support 
for the view that people who perceive themselves as being good time managers are 
more accurate at expected duration estimates. An interesting finding of this study was 
that people who rated themselves as good time managers tended to estimate time as 
passing more quickly than it actually did. They suggested that this may be a 
motivational strategy designed to enhance a sense of control over time that will help 
them to be on time for the next task. What Francis-Smythe and Robertson (1999) 
appear to be suggesting is that these 'good' time managers will feel as if they are in 
control of time because they will tend to find that it is earlier than they think it is 
when they check the time before moving on to a new task. 
Although Francis-Smythe and Robertson (1999) discuss some interesting ideas 
concerning the relationship between expected, prospective and retrospective duration 
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estimates, for the following reasons it is very difficult to interpret their findings. 
Despite it professing to improve our understanding of how people estimate the 
duration of to-be-completed tasks and the role this plays in managing one's time, it is 
suggested that the situation which the participants were put in was so artificial that the 
results cannot provide much information about the 'real-world' situation oftime 
management and expected duration estimation. The biggest problem was that the 
participants were hypo-vigilant towards temporal issues and time management in 
general- participants were told at the onset it was a time management study, watches 
were removed, and throughout the study they had to carry around and operate a 
stopwatch (having the face covered is of little consequence). In fact, it is suggested 
that this temporal hypo-awareness made so-called retrospective duration estimates 
prospective in nature. It is suggested that the pattern of results could have come about 
through a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
It is worth noting that many ofthe above concerns can also be made of Burt 
and Kemp's (1994) study. Participants in this study were required to make duration 
estimates before completing the tasks (additionally, temporal aspects of the 
experiment were highlighted by requiring participants to remove their watches, fill in 
temporally related questionnaires, and start and stop stopwatches) - hence similar to 
Francis-Smythe and Robertson's study, the duration estimates requested after the 
tasks might be categorised as prospective in nature. It is important to remember that it 
is not the declared paradigm that necessarily defmes the estimation - more important 
is the SUbjective paradigm as perceived by the participants (Zakay, 1990). 
Returning to the original question regarding the paradigm that best fits 
expected duration - do these estimates fit into the retrospective paradigm? Expected 
duration estimates are not what we would typically call a retrospective estimation 
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even though the underlying process may be very similar. For one thing the subjective 
duration estimates of a particular task/event are not (in fact in most cases cannot be) 
comparable to the objective duration ofthe 'actual/remembered event' - a defining 
feature of this paradigm. At best it can only be inferred by measuring the objective 
duration (the actual time taken) for the future event of which the duration has been 
estimated. Additionally, congruency between the objective duration of the 
remembered event and the future scheduled event will vary greatly depending on how 
closely the event matches the person's schematic event memory. Moreover the to-be-
scheduled event will almost certainly be a lengthened, shortened, or moderated 
version ofthe remembered event - in fact it will quite likely involve the 'blending' of 
more than one remembered event together to fonn the new to-be-scheduled event (see 
following section). However, that said, it is clear that most expected duration 
estimates involve making some form of retrospective estimate/s as part of the process. 
It addition, it could be argued that in some cases, real-world expected duration 
estimation is somewhat prospective in nature. This will certainly be the case for 
regular 'schedulers' given that they are routinely (usually on a daily basis) required to 
estimate how long a task is going to take them, which must lead to a heightened 
awareness of temporal aspects of all daily tasks. Even for those who are only 
occasionally required to schedule the completion of a to-be-completed task, the 
inherent temporal structure of the 'work-day' will probably result in the same effect. 
Overall, it is argued that retrospective duration estimate/s (and therefore 
research findings concerning this paradigm) will be an important part of most 
expected duration estimates. However, as mentioned above, some expected duration 
estimates might also involve prospective type estimates (e.g., heightened temporal 
awareness is likely in work environments where the scheduling ofto-be-completed 
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tasks is a very regular activity), Based on our presently limited understanding of 
expected duration estimation it is difficult to decide whether these types of estimates 
represent a truly different paradigm. In light of this fact it is suggested that at present 
these estimates can usually be best categorised as a special type of retrospective 
estimation. Therefore a review and discussion of relevant retrospective duration 
estimation research will now be undertaken. 
Assuming that expected duration estimates are at least partly reliant on a type 
of retrospective duration estimation, what is known about these types of duration 
estimates? As should be clear from earlier discussions, no definitive agreement exits 
on how to explain remembered (retrospective) duration, however most accounts focus 
on the role of memory processes (Block, 1990). Most researchers agree that 
retrospective duration estimates are based on more than the degree ofrecallability of 
events from the time period (Block, 1990; Boltz et a1., 1998; Loftus et aI., 1987). 
Some earlier research suggested that people remember a duration as being longer if 
they can remember more things about it - if there are more 'events' available in 
memory then the time period is likely to be estimated as longer (Ornstein, 1969; 
Vroon, 1970). However, such duration estimates are not based solely on the degree of 
recallability - other processes such as the amount of contextual change (Block, 1985) 
or degree of structure (Boltz, 1998c) also appear to be involved. Block (1990) 
summed this up by suggesting that "people remember the duration of the time period 
by relying both on event infonnation and on contextual infonnation associated with 
the event" (p. 30). 
More specifically, there is evidence to suggest that the objective length of the 
duration may moderate the resulting SUbjective duration estimation. Block and 
Zakay's (1997) meta-analysis suggested that greater levels of underestimation are 
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associated with lengthening stimulus durations. They reported the average duration 
estimation ratio (the ratio of sUbjective to objective duration) for studies using short 
durations (5.0 - 14.9 sec) to be 0.90, whereas for moderate duration studies (15 - 59.9 
sec) and long duration studies (60.0 sec or longer) it is 0.78. This finding can be 
explained by some, but not all, memory based models. For example, utilising 
Ornstein's (1969) storage size hypothesis, Block and Zakay (1997) reported that there 
seems to be no reason to think that the encoded stimulus event needs more storage 
space as the duration lengthens. Alternatively, Block and Reed's (1978) contextual 
change model does assume that the amount of change per unit oftime will decrease as 
a person continues with a certain type of activity. This finding was also reflected in 
the lesser slope of the psychophysical function for retrospective, compared to 
prospective, estimates found in many studies (see Block & Zakay, 1997). Block and 
Zakay (1997) suggest that whatever memory information is used in forming 
remembered duration, more encoding appears to occur during the start of the duration 
than at any other time, reflecting a process similar to that involved in positive time-
order effects whereby participants judge the first of two equal duration events as being 
longer (Block, 1985). 
It also appears that retrospective duration estimates are moderated by stimulus 
complexity. Block and Zakay's (1997) meta-analysis found that average duration 
judgement ratios were greater for studies using complex duration stimuli (0.94) than 
for studies using simple duration stimuli (0.75). Both storage size and contextual 
change type models can adequately explain this finding. For instance, the person may 
encode more interpretations of a more complex stimulus that will result in more 
changes in processing context (Block, 1990). 
Finally, retrospective duration estimates tend to be more variable than 
prospective (both within and between participants). This has been interpreted as 
suggesting that whereas people use similar cognitive processes for prospective 
estimates, they make use of a wide variety of cognitive strategies (both within and 
across participants) in retrospective duration estimates (Block & Zakay, 1997). In 
addition, there appears to be a trend towards larger coefficients of variation (the 
standard deviation divided by the mean estimates) as stimuli duration increases. As 
Block and Zakay (1997) suggested: "As duration increases, different processes may 
sub serve duration judgements in different participants, especially for remembered 
duration" (p.192). 
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Lastly, before introducing my model of expected duration estimation, it needs 
to be highlighted that there are important conceptual and practical differences between 
estimating the duration of a relatively short duration task of an hour or so compared to 
one that may last all day or even span multiple days. On the one hand, estimating 
how long it will take to complete tasks of actual duration of a few hours is primarily 
one of estimating the expected duration of the task per se. On the other, when 
estimating the duration of a longer task that could potentially span multiple days it is 
argued that the focus is on estimating the expected completion date not the actual 
duration of the task. Expected duration on this longer time scale involves numerous 
other processing steps and inevitably additional unique biases. For example, in 
addition to being able to estimate the required duration of the task, a person also needs 
to be able to factor in numerous additional temporal variables (e.g., sleeping, eating, 
sickness, and recreation to name but a few). Although it is acknowledged that there is 
no clear differentiation, because while completing a relatively short task a person may 
have to visit the toilet or grab a snack, clearly the longer the task the less the 
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scheduling of its completion is a matter of 'pure' duration estimation. The model 
proposed below primarily explores the process of 'pure' expected duration estimation 
(i.e. tasks of an actual duration up to a few hours). 
4.2 Development of a model that explains expected duration estimation 
Figure 4 graphically represents the proposed process a person undertakes in 
order to estimate the duration of a to-be-completed task. The model draws upon, 
among others, Burt and Kemp's (1994) 'reconstructive processes' (see section 2.4) of 
expected duration estimation, and also aspects of the 'verisimilar representation' 
perspective (discussed later in this chapter) put forward by Michon (1990). 
Although temporal information processing is often automatic there are many 
circumstances where a person would need to process this information on a more 
conscious level (Michon, 1990). It is argued that, to a degree, making an expected 
duration estimation fits into this category. Michon (1990) suggests that one effective 
type of temporal conceptual structure is a 'verisimilar representation' - for instance, 
when you are asked to respond to a question like "how long will it take me (a friend) 
to get to the beach?" To effectively answer this question Michon (1990) suggests that 
you must be able to represent the spatial distances and superimpose on this an 
appropriate time scale based on your analysis of the person's walking pace. However, 
although a person may report that they 'play-back' some sort of ' veri similar 
representation' of a past event or task when asked to make an expected duration 
estimation like the one above, it is argued that they are in fact most likely 
reconstructing (Burt & Kemp, 1994) this event from memory traces. 
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There are four main components outlined in the model depicted in Figure 4 
that attempt to describe this reconstructive process. The first involves searching 
memory for similar tasks or events to the task or event that is to be estimated. A 
second component of the model involves gauging the appropriateness of the 
remembered tasks or events. This stage is suggested to be heavily reliant on what will 
be referred to as schematic event/task memory. The third component referred to as 
the 'retrospective process' whereby the person estimates the duration of the 
remembered/reconstructed events/tasks. Finally, the fourth component labelled 
'expected process' involves coming up with the actual expected duration estimation 
and is presumed to be moderated by temporal bounding and rounding processes. 
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4.3 Retrieving potentially relevant memories 
One of the first processes a person may undertake when attempting to estimate 
the duration of a to-be-completed task is the 'searching' of autobiographical memory 
for a similar task/s that the estimator has completed (see Figure 4). It is presumed that 
both autobiographical incidents (a person's memory of events which happened in a 
specific time period) and personal semantic memory (factual knowledge concerning 
the person's past like the names of work colleagues, and friends' contact information) 
components of autobiographical memory (Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989) will 
potentially be utilised when attempting to estimate the duration of a future task. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that it is likely that general semantic memory 
(knowledge concerning objects, facts, meanings, and concepts) will also be a source 
of potentially useful information especially where the person does not remember the 
'event' of having completed a similar task. Although this type of knowledge is 
typically not temporally-specific it may be helpful in estimating the duration of a 
future tasks. For instance, imagine that a person is required to schedule the 
completion of a performance development meeting with a subordinate. Although the 
person has never actually been involved with a performance development meeting per 
se, semantic knowledge ofthe term will be helpful for estimating the likely duration. 
Furthermore, this semantic knowledge may cue more useful memories 
It is worth pointing out that the most likely situation is that knowledge 
concerning the to-be-estimated task/event is likely to be cued at a number of different 
levels of specificity (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). As far as autobiographical 
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knowledge is concerned Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) describe three broad 
levels of specificity. At the broadest level are what they refer to as 'lifetime period' 
memories which contain thematic knowledge about common features of a particular 
period of a person's life. At a more specific level are general event memories, which 
may be made up of a number of repeated similar events (Robinson, 1992). Finally, of 
greatest utility for the present purpose are what Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) 
refer to as 'event-specific knowledge' which are vivid memories of a specific event. 
Importantly for the present focus, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) suggest that it 
is likely memories at lower levels of specificity will cue more specific and useful 
memones. 
The best possible scenario from a duration estimation point-of-view would be 
if the person can construct memories containing 'event-specific knowledge' (Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) pertaining to the to-be-estimated task/event. During these 
ideal (and most probably rare) circumstances where a person can retrieve detailed and 
specific information concerning the event, the reconstruction may come close to a 
'replaying' of the event. For example, Poynter (1989) comments on the fact that 
participants in his retrospective duration estimation studies" ... frequently claim that 
they mentally replay (or scan) the visual events filling an interval as a strategy for 
reproducing the interval duration" (p. 311). Similarly, in his discussion of prospective 
remembering (see section 3.7), Payne (1993) suggests that an intention is encoded by 
mentally projecting it, which often involves" 'backward' imagining of pre cursive 
actions" (p. 91). 
At the other end ofthe continuum are situations where, faced with the 
description ofthe task/event, the individual is only able to draw upon thematic 
knowledge concerning a period of their life (e.g., working as an academic in the 
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1980s) which seems to have similarities with the task/event for which they are 
required to schedule. However these low specificity memories may cue more specific 
memories concerning 'general events' (e.g., the marking of assignments) (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce,2000). Although less specific than 'event-specific knowledge', this 
type of memory it likely to be useful when faced with scheduling the specific task or 
event for the first time (e.g., the marking of a specific group of assignments) in that 
they often represent memories of sets or groups of events that are linked together by a 
common theme (Robinson, 1992). 
Evidence which demonstrates the value of trying to reconstruct events based 
on past memories can be found in studies which have looked at the use of imagery in 
making retrospective duration estimates. For instance, Pigott, Brigham, and Bothwell 
(1990) found that people were more accurate at retrospectively estimating the 
duration of a staged crime if they were encouraged to reconstruct the event with 
imagery-rehearsal. Likewise, Y mmey and Y mmey' s (1997) retrospective estimation 
study found that people in a field situation tended to greatly (300%) overestimate the 
IS-second interaction they had had with a 'confederate' whereas those who were 
encouraged to use imagery-rehearsal when making their estimation were relatively 
accurate. 
Furthermore, the verisimilar nature of these reconstructions is provided by 
studies from Hornik (1984) and Cottle (1976), which demonstrate that people employ 
spatial schemes when making retrospective estimates of duration. For instance, a 
field study by Cottle (1976) found the length ofthe customer service line in a 
supermarket was positively associated with the retrospective estimation ofthe 
duration spent waiting for service. 
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4.4 Gauging the appropriateness of the remembered tasks or events and 
the role of schematic event/task memory 
The next stage of the estimation process involves two interrelated cognitive 
tasks - remembered task/s appropriateness analysis and remembered task/s duration 
estimation (covered in the next section). Gauging the appropriateness of the cued 
memories is suggested to involve categorising these memories by their usefulness in 
relation to the to-be-scheduled task/event. This categorisation process will most 
likely draw heavily on semantic knowledge the person possesses concerning the 
task/event description. For instance if the person is required to estimate how long it is 
going to take them to 'balance a ledger unassisted', their understanding of the word 
'unassisted' may mean that memories concerning balancing a ledger using a 
calculator may be categorised as being less useful than memories of 'pencil and 
paper' type arithmetic. 
Further, it is argued that many of these memories will be schematic in nature-
'memory of a partiCUlar type of event' for instance attending a business luncheon. 
Although everyday events are individually encoded they will tend to lose detail and 
acquire a "schematic or prototypical character" (Michon, 1998, pp. 207). It is argued 
that these schematic event memories may be very useful in making an expected 
duration estimation. As Michon (1990) points out, adult humans have "access to a 
large repertoire of temporal standards for concrete, everyday, 'natural' events, 
associated with scenarios (scripts, frames), not only in order to efficiently execute 
routine activities, but also in order to explain and communicate" (p. 43). Similarly, 
Schank (1999) has proposed that much of human behaviour in everyday situations is 
guided by scenarios/explicit representations of remembered situations that are 
sufficiently close to the prevailing situation as to serve as a guide to further action. 
Over the course of a person's life they build up a repertoire of useful scenarios 
(Schank & Abelson, 1977). As each sort of scenario includes an implicit temporal 
structure (Michon, 1998) a person who is exposed to a similar task will be able to 
cognise whether it is unfolding in a temporally plausible way. 
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4.5 The retrospective process of estimating the duration of remembered 
events 
The other interrelated cognitive task is to estimate the duration of this/these 
remembered tasks. A number of researchers (e.g., Boltz, 1998b; Burt, 1992) have 
alluded to the fact that people can potentially estimate the duration of an upcoming 
task by either utilising remembered clock time or by estimating the duration of an 
event 'held' in memory by 'reconstructing' the event. The proposed model (see 
Figure 4) argues that these are distinct (although potentially complementary) ways in 
which to base duration estimates of an upcoming task. Firstly the utilisation of clock 
time will be discussed followed by an in-depth discussion concerning the 
reconstruction of task durations, especially those reconstructions that make use of 
schematic task/event memories. 
One problem with most of the theoretical work done in this area is that it tends 
to have been undertaken with the presumption that clocks and other 'objective' cues 
are not readily available. For example, as mentioned earlier most duration estimation 
studies are conducted in the absence of watches and clocks. However, as mentioned, 
79 
this is clearly not the real-world case. Clocks and watches are omnipresent in modem 
society (Campbell, 1990; Michon, 1998). This is especially the case in a work 
environment where the majority of task/event scheduling occurs. It is argued that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, not to be aware and encode directly temporal aspects of 
the workday. In support of this view Francis-Smythe and Robertson (1999) suggest 
that good time managers appear to rely heavily on objective temporal cues such as 
watches. They go on to suggest that the tendency for people in their study, who rated 
themselves as good time managers, to overestimate time in passing may reflect a 
cautious reaction to not having these cues. 
Furthermore, the encoding of clock time is in line with the view that in many 
cases expected duration estimation is somewhat prospective in nature. For obvious 
reasons prospective studies are normally undertaken without the assistance of 
'accurate' time keepers (watches, clocks). However, in a real-world situation this is 
often not the case. If a person 'knows ' (either implicitly or explicitly) that they are 
going to be required to recall the duration of an upcoming task (prospective) the 
easiest/most fecund way would be to utilise a watch or clock. 
Is clock time really different from the encoding of any other forms of 
'change'? It could be argued that there is no meaningful difference between the 
encoding of clock time and the encoding of any other forms of change, which 
duration estimates could be extrapolated from. The differentiation being made in the 
present model is between the duration of the referent event at the time it occurs versus 
reconstructing the duration of an event at a later date by attempting to reconstruct a 
somewhat verisimilar representation of the event. It should be pointed out that there 
are other forms of change from which duration could be inferred (the growing length 
oftext as one types), however it is argued that clock time, by far, provides the most 
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accessible and accurate form of change to infer duration. In a similar vein, it has been 
suggested that at least on one level we use much the same strategy for estimating 
duration without clocks as we do with them (Poynter, 1989). This statement suggests 
that any perception of duration involves perceiving change of some sort whether it is 
movement of the hands ofa clock or the 'growing' length of words freshly written on 
a computer screen. Although this is essentially true, it is not however the case that 
they provide an equal resource of temporal information. Firstly, the rate of change 
evident from the clock will inevitably be more predictable and linear than the change 
in length of a written piece of work, for example. However, that aside, it is argued 
there is a fundamental difference between how we perceive and interpret these two 
different events/changes. 
For instance, imagine that there are two people at their respective places of 
work. The first person sits down at their computer for an unknown period of time and 
at the end of which they have produced three pages oftext before moving on to 
another task without attending to 'objective' temporal cues (a difficult, ifnot 
impossible situation to imagine). The second person looks at their watch before 
starting to write and then again when they finish, taking note of the 'change'. The 
next day these same two people are required to estimate how long it typically takes 
them to write three pages of text. The first person will probably try to reconstruct the 
duration of the event by 'reviewing' what they most likely see as a verisimilar 
representation of the event to recreate (probably involving an 'analysis' of the amount 
of writing - the change- that occurred) yesterday's' event'. However, the second 
person will probably find this task significantly easier. It is suggested all they will 
have to do is remember the time they started and the time they finished and perform a 
quick calculation to arrive at the estimate. It may be the case that clocks and time 
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telling is so common in our western society that most people in most situations 
directly encode temporal information concerning day-to-day tasks, and this is 
fundamentally different from encoding other forms of 'change'. If this is in fact the 
case, the duration of this event may have been 'automatically' encoded at the time, in 
which case the duration estimation is solely one of memory. 
Although to a large extent our daily lives are governed by clock time, whereby 
we are continually using watches to consciously monitor the passage of time, there are 
probably just as many times where we have to estimate duration based on 'subjective 
time' (Boltz, 1998b). As Michon (1998) points out "we continue to live by our 
episodic, contextual, experiences" (p. 210) as is evident by the fact that we often find 
that time 'drags' or 'flys'. It seems likely that many expected duration estimates will 
be based on reconstructions of schematic events/tasks (or at best seemingly 
verisimilar representations of a remembered event/task). 
In support of this view, Burt (1992) suggested that schematic event durations 
appear to be developed in memory as part of general event memory and that this 
schematic duration is used in the reconstructive process. Further, the nature and 
accuracy (possibly also flexibility) of this schematic event duration is determined by 
the amount of experience/frequency of exposure to the particular type of event. In 
addition, the accuracy will depend on how the person perceives the events (the reason 
for individual differences) (Burt, 1999). If a person is able to identify atypical aspects 
to the event this information could be used to adjust the estimated duration (Burt, 
1993). 
Furthermore, Burt (1993) demonstrated that an event's degree of typicality is 
associated with duration estimation accuracy. Specifically, typicality scores were 
predictive of both accuracy and whether the estimate was an under or overestimation. 
This study provided further support for the view that "the magnitude and nature of 
estimation error, under conditions of substantial retention interval, are related to the 
typicality of the actual event" (Burt, 1993, pp. 71). ill addition, the findings suggest 
that the effect of actual event memory on duration estimation typically is not 
sufficient to completely remove the effects of generaVtypical event duration 
infonnation. 
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Research by Yarmey (2000), Burt and Popple (1996), and Burt (1999) address 
typicality using the retrospective duration estimation paradigm. Yanney (2000) 
undertook an interesting field study of the accuracy of retrospective duration 
estimates of various invariant (e.g., a computer 'booting up') and variant (e.g., talking 
to a friend) naturalistic events. One of the useful things about this study for the 
present discussion is that it deals with a wide variety of naturalistic events of varying 
objective duration (4 seconds to 80 minutes). ill general he found that the events' 
objective duration was inversely related to overestimation of estimated duration. 
Whereas the shortest events tended to be overestimated by as much as 100 per cent, 
longer tasks tended to be accurately estimated with a possible trend towards 
underestimation for the longest duration (invariant) events. ill addition, in line with 
past research (e.g., Boltz, 1998c) people were significantly more accurate at 
estimating the duration of invariant events than variant ones. However, this study was 
somewhat different to what people need to do to estimate expected duration - for 
example the above study collected duration estimates within seconds of the events' 
completion. 
Another aspect of schematic event memory proposed by Burt and Popple 
(1996), and expanded upon by Burt (1999), is the effect speed of action has on 
retrospective duration estimates. Specifically Burt (1999, pp. 353) suggested "the 
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faster the actions in an event are perceived to be, the shorter the estimated event 
duration". For example, Burt and Popple (1996) demonstrated that people tend to use 
their general knowledge concerning the relationship between the speed of action and 
its duration. They showed that participants who were led to believe an event involved 
running instead of walking provided retrospective duration estimates which were 
significantly shorter. Similarly, Burt's (1999) second experiment had participants 
view a 76-second video of a bank robbery before one group was asked to 
retrospectively estimate the duration of the video and write a narrative describing it 
straight after viewing, while another group were required to return the next day before 
being prompted for the same information. One of the main findings of this study was 
that there was a large degree of variation between the wording participants used to 
describe the robbery and also variability in the estimated duration. However, 
somewhat surprisingly, there was no significant difference between the immediate 
group and the delayed group on either of these measures. Overall there was a general 
trend toward overestimating the duration of the robbery in both groups. The results 
revealed a significant negative correlation between the number of action words used 
and the participants' estimate of the robbery's duration - more action words, shorter 
duration jUdgement. Unfortunately the results did not allow for conclusions to be 
made as to the relationship between the 'speed' (i.e., charged vs. pushed vs. passed) 
of the action words used and the duration jUdgement. It would be expected that there 
would have been a significant interaction effect between the 'speed' of the words 
used, the total number of action words used, and the duration estimation. 
Burt (1999) suggested the direction of the causation of this effect is from the 
construction of the narrative that describes the event to estimating the events duration. 
This interpretation is in line with the view that retrospective duration estimates tend to 
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be based on reconstructive and constructive processes (Burt, 1992, 1993; Burt & 
Kemp, 1991). In order to further develop this idea it would be interesting to see what 
effect providing the participant with different event durations after they had viewed 
the video would have on the narrative they produced. 
As far as expected duration estimation is concerned, an interesting set of 
experiments that shed light on the effect of semantic event memory was undertaken 
by Josephs and Hahn (1995). They suggested that when people are required to 
estimate expected duration (of various academic type tasks) they tend to trade 
accuracy in favour of minimising cognitive effort. Their series of studies focused on 
the quality of infonnation the schedulers received. Overall they found that 
participants tended to base their estimates on task features that required the least 
amount of computational effort to process. The resulting accuracy of such estimates 
was to a large degree dependant on the diagnostic value of these features. 
In their first study Josephs and Hahn (1995) asked students to estimate how 
long they would need to complete a written assignment of either four single-spaced 
pages or seven double-spaced pages. As predicted students on average allotted 
significantly more time to the completion of the seven-page assignment even though it 
contained fewer words. They explained this finding in tenns of the fact that although 
pages are less diagnostic than number of lines they are computationally easier. 
Although this is an interesting finding it is suggested that it is not an effective test of 
their theory. As pointed out by Gilbert (1991), people only undertake the type of 
discounting required in the above example if they are highly motivated - in this case 
to provide an accurate estimation. However, it is argued that this was not the case -
students were motivated to provide an estimate that allowed them 'plenty of time' to 
complete the assignment, after all they did not want to hand it in late. It is argued that 
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this situation motivated them to give themselves a 'safety net' - an overestimation. 
As they are not primarily focused on accuracy per se it is not surprising that only 
surface features were principally taken into account when making the duration 
estimation. A way to test this hypothesis of generic overestimation would have been 
to have a group estimate how long it would take them to complete a four double-
spaced page assignment. 
In their second study Josephs and Hahn (1995) found students estimated the 
completion of significantly fewer anagrams when each anagram was attached to the 
front cover of a journal (hence the anagram looked 'bigger'). They suggested that this 
was because the most salient feature of this task was the size of the 'pile' of 
anagrams, and so people would use this information on which to base their estimate. 
One interesting issue is that although they suggest that reducing cognitive effort by 
relying on surface features of the to-be-estimated task tends to result in people vastly 
underestimating required duration, this study in fact shows the opposite. In both cases 
participants completed substantially more (in the order of 2-3 times more) anagrams 
than they had estimated, in both cases vastly overestimating the actual duration 
required to complete each anagram. Their third study reported a similar conclusion-
people place more weight on page length than more useful, but cognitively taxing, 
information like font and margin size when estimating the expected duration of 
reading. In a similar vein are studies demonstrating that people are more likely to 
complete and return a questionnaire if it is formatted onto fewer pages (see Hornik, 
1981), 
It is worth pointing out, the tendency for over or underestimation in many of 
Josephs and Hahn's (1995) studies were influenced, or potentially determined, by 
experimenter imposed boundary effects, which are discussed later in this chapter. For 
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instance, it is suggested that the trend towards overestimation of the duration of the 
anagram task (Study 2) was primarily due to expectations set up by the experimenter 
concerning how long each anagram 'should' take. Participants had lO anagrams in 
front ofthem and 10 minutes in which to complete anagrams. Although they were 
told more anagrams were available ifthe 10 were completed, it is argued that the 
experimenter has inadvertently provided a cue to how many they 'should' be able to 
complete. Similarly, in their reading studies there was an implicit maximum time in 
which it would take to read the material. The fact that participants were stopped after 
a set time only long enough to read a small proportion of the required amount would 
suggest they were implicitly supplied with unrealistically low boundaries of possible 
durations hence the tendency for huge underestimates of actual duration. 
Although Josephs and Hahn (1995) explain their findings in tenns of 
minimising cognitive effort, another way to look at it is in tenns of typicality of to-be-
estimated tasks or events, whereby more typical ones were estimated with greater 
accuracy. For example, when asked to estimate how long it would take you to read 
the paperback novel in front of you, your accuracy would be dependant on how 
typical the book's attributes were - its font type and size, its grammatical complexity, 
its paper thickness, the size of its margins. In the first study single-spacing may have 
been more typical of what students were required to do. Likewise, it is a very atypical 
situation to have to complete anagrams attached to the cover of journals. 
Interestingly, one fonn a schematic event memory that has received very little 
attention is the number of presentations required to 'build' such a memory? 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 5) investigates the effect a single exposure has on the 
updatinglbuilding of a schematic event/task memory. It is argued that saliency (in the 
fonn of recency) of presentation will have a significant effect on schematic event 
memory and future expected duration estimations, which cue this schematic event 
memory. 
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4.6 The expected process - two factors which influence the accuracy of 
the resulting expected duration estimation 
Finally, appropriateness of remembered similar task/s and duration of these 
task/s are then combined in the ways outlined below to produce an estimation of the 
to-be-completed task. In the simplest (and unlikely) situation this would involve 
directly transposing the remembered duration of a single (identical) event to the 
estimation of the to-be-comp1eted task. It is likely the situation would be more 
complex than this, involving the 'splicing' of a number of reconstructed tasks' 
remembered durations resulting in a single duration estimation for the to-be-
completed task. This 'splicing' would involve making adjustments to the resulting 
expected duration based on the appropriateness of the remembered task/so It is argued 
that due to the perceived veri similar nature of the reconstructed episodes they are able 
to be played back and most importantly manipulated and combined with other 
reconstructed episodes if required (Michon, 1998). This process could be in three 
forms (often a combination of all three) corresponding to the three possible types of 
event similarity mentioned above. Firstly, a number of less complex/shorter 
remembered events could be sequentially ordered to 'arrive'at an estimated duration 
for a future 'complex' task. Secondly, by analysing the remembered duration of a 
slightly less demanding task and a slightly more demanding task 'cued' from 
memory. Thirdly, and similarly, by analysing the remembered duration of two or 
more 'similar' tasks 'cued' from memory. 
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As can be seen in Figure 4 there are two factors included in the expected 
process that are predicted to moderate the accuracy of the final expected duration 
estimate - externally andlor internally imposed temporal boundaries and the tendency 
to round estimates to convenient arithmetic prototypes. The final part of this chapter 
will be devoted to an in-depth discussion of these two factors. 
One of the potentially interesting, and to a large extent unavoidable, 
situational variables that is likely to significantly effect the real-world accuracy of 
expected duration estimation are temporal boundaries. By and large, most to-be-
estimated tasks or events will have either a self or external imposed upper boundary 
on how long a task is likely to take, or can take. For instance, most work tasks have 
an externally derived time in which they 'need' to be fmished (e.g., if you are giving a 
team presentation at 4 pm today it is obvious that the accompanying PowerPoint 
presentation needs to be finished before 4 pm - you have no real choice in the matter). 
Further when given a task to complete the individual will most likely have a temporal 
boundary in mind concerning how long they can possibly spend on the task due to 
other responsibilities or focuses. This upper limit may truncate resulting duration 
estimates. Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Bradburn (1990) argue that, as far as 
retrospective estimates are concerned, this truncation will result in an underestimation 
of actual duration. 
In support of boundary effects, Huttenlocher, et al., (1990) demonstrated that 
peoples' estimates of reported duration since a particular event (an autobiographical 
memory) is not distributed evenly (as they actually were) but truncated (reported as 
occurring more recently than they actually did), creating a forward bias of reported 
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date/duration (duration underestimation). It is argued that when a memory is inexact, 
people will inevitably 'create' boundaries concerning maximum possible durations, 
and forward bias (underestimation of actual duration) will necessarily arise 
(Huttenlocher et aI., 1990; Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Prohaska, 1988). 
In addition, Hornik (1981) suggests that if a person "lacks memory or retrieval 
variables, his or her perception of time is easily influenced by temporal values 
presented as cues prior to or during the task" (p.244). Hornik (1981) conducted a 
study that examined the effect that predetermined expectancy of duration would have 
on a person's decision to complete a mailed out questionnaire (although actual 
average completion duration was 28 minutes, participants were lead to believe it 
would take them either 20 minutes, 40 minutes or no time was mentioned). Hornik 
found that the prior temporal cue (or lack of one) had a significant effect on 
retrospective duration estimates of questionnaire completion duration, with the 20 
minute cue resulting in the shortest estimate, followed by the condition which 
provided no temporal cue, and then the 40 minute cue. 
Furthermore, time stress has been shown to affect the amount of time allocated 
to the completion of an upcoming task. In this context Hayes-Roth (1980) undertook 
an interesting study that investigated the role of cognitive and motivational factors in 
influencing expected task duration estimation. One of her underlying assumptions 
was that time stress increases the tendency to underestimate required time - the more 
difficult it seems to be to fit all tasks in within the known time constants, the stronger 
the tendency to underestimate time requirements for individual tasks. It is suggested 
that this tendency can partly be explained by the fact that people will be inclined to 
have a natural desire to accomplish all tasks under consideration. It is assumed that 
people realise there is a certain amount of variability in the time that a task can be 
perfonned. Under time stress, the desire to perfonn all of the actions seems to bias 
people's duration estimates toward the lower bounds of these distributions. 
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Hayes-Roth (1980) conducted a number of studies to test these predictions. In 
these studies participants were given a 'city' map with buildings and streets marked 
on it along with a list of desired errands, a start time and location, and an end time and 
location (total allowable duration tended to be around 2-3 hours). Participants were 
given a 'problem', which included a number of errands and they were required to 
indicate which errands they would accomplish and in what order and routes taken. In 
one ofthese studies she manipulated the number of desired tasks and the available 
time resulting in four conditions. In three of the four conditions participants 
underestimated completion times by over 50 per cent (the condition where 
participants tended to overestimate task completion duration was the only one where 
time available exceeded required time). Specifically, she found evidence that time 
stress was significantly reI ated to participants' underestimation of task duration -
underestimation increased as the number of desired tasks increased and also as the 
available time for performing the task decreased. It is worth noting that participants 
did tend to plan to complete significantly fewer tasks as time stress increased, 
however they failed to reduce it sufficiently to meet actual time constraints. 
It is also worth pointing out that in the present context of estimating expected 
duration this effect may be even more important, potentially providing bias in two 
distinct - yet related - and cumulative ways. Firstly, like Huttenlocher, et al.'s (1990) 
autobiographical memory studies it is suggested that when people try to estimate the 
duration of similar tasks they will tend to impose a boundary on how long that task 
took, such as 'it could not have taken longer than one morning otherwise I would not 
have been able to get my regular work done'. 
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Secondly, when it comes to using that infonnation to estimate how long the 
present task is going to take there will tend (in 'nonnal' real-world situations) to be an 
imposed boundary on how long the task 'can' take. Often it will be externally 
imposed. An externally imposed boundary could be in the fonn of a deadline 
imposed by a supervisor in a work situation or a teacher or professor in an educational 
environment. Likewise, individuals often provide their own upper limit as well aslor 
instead of an externally derived one ~ 'I must get this done by Monday otherwise I 
will have no chance of getting my monthly bonus' or 'This task can only take me 15 
minutes max. otherwise I will not have time to meet Frankie and May for morning 
tea'. It is argued that these two boundary effects will have the cumulative effect of 
biasing people towards allocating (typically) less time to the completion of a task than 
they would have otherwise and, based on the findings of Hut ten locher, et al. (1990), 
often underestimate actual duration. 
The effects of boundaries on expected duration estimation might explain some 
of the divergent results found in the literature. For instance, unlike many other similar 
studies (e.g., Burt & Kemp, 1994), Francis-Smythe and Robertson's (1999) expected 
duration estimation experiment (described earlier) did not find evidence of a general 
trend towards overestimation of task durations. It may be the case that these results 
can partly be explained by the greater bounding cues inherent in this experiment. 
Specifically, Francis-Smythe and Robertson's (1999) experiment components were 
segmented thereby creating more distinct boundaries to the possible time each 
component could take - en bloc. This was in contrast to Burt and Kemp's (1994) 
study where many tasks were scheduled/estimated within one 'segment'. 
Additionally, another more subtle type of bounding effect could have contributed to 
people estimating much less time than they otherwise would have. Participants in the 
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Francis-Smythe and Robertson (1999) study were required to estimate expected 
duration in seconds, which provides a distinct boundary on possible expected 
durations. By asking participants to provide estimates in seconds, the researchers are 
giving a salient cue to the potential duration (Huttenlocher et aI., 1990). In the 
Francis-Smythe and Robertson study the median actual duration was 349 seconds, 
which are a lot of seconds (people would probably normally estimate such a duration 
using a 'minutes' temporal scale). 
It seems evident from the research reviewed that temporal boundaries which 
create real time pressures for the completion of a task will result in less time being 
allocated to their completion. A more speculative claim is that the same truncation of 
expected duration estimations will occur when the temporal boundaries are more 
remote (i.e., when there is plenty oftime to complete the task). Experiment 2 
(Chapter 6) investigated this claim by comparing the expected duration estimates for 
three tasks under three different remote temporal boundary scenarios. 
Attention is now directed towards the second factor predicted to effect 
expected duration estimation accuracy ~ the rounding of estimates (see 'expected 
process' component of the model portrayed in Figure 4). Overall it is argued that 
because ofthe inexactness of people's reconstructions of relevant memories, and 
temporal estimations of these memories, they will tend to round their expected 
duration. Furthermore, it is argued that this rounding will often be rather subtle (but 
no less significant as far as accuracy is concerned), in that it will be in the form of a 
convenient arithmetic prototype temporal value. Research to support this claim will 
now be reviewed. 
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, there is a body of research that addresses the 
duration estimation component of task scheduling. Studies that have looked at task-
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duration estimation accuracy of relatively long duration tasks (i.e., greater than one 
day) report that participants tend to underestimate task completion durations (Buehler 
et aI., 1994; Josephs & Hahn, 1995). Conversely, studies incorporating shorter 
duration tasks (less than 30 minutes) report that participants tend to overestimate task 
completion duration (e.g., Burt & Forsyth, 1999; Burt & Kemp, 1994; Forsyth, 
1998), although significant overestimation is not always found (e.g., Francis-Smythe 
& Robertson, 1999). 
Studies that have found participants who underestimate task completion times 
tend to explain their results using a form of the 'planning fallacy', or the tendency to 
be confident in the belief that although most similar projects have run late this one 
will be completed as planned (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, Buehler et 
al. (1994) suggest that when making time estimates people utilise' singular 
information' , which involves the construction of narratives and scenarios for 
completing the specific task as opposed to 'distributional information', which 
includes past experience of similar tasks. Buehler et al. (1994) suggest that there are a 
number of things inherent in the process of task duration estimation that cause people 
to use this flawed strategy. Firstly, they suggest that the forward nature of the 
prediction tends to reduce reflection on the past. Secondly, they argue that people 
tend not to have the ability to apply information from a similar past experience, even 
ifit is retrieved. Thirdly, and probably most importantly, where similar experiences 
are considered, their pertinence to the present estimate is deemed to be low because of 
the causal attributions made of this past experience (e.g., being late because of some 
external cause or a specific failure related to that particular task). 
Alternatively, the overestimation found in studies using relatively short tasks 
has been described as a 'safe estimation strategy' (Burt & Kemp, 1994). By 
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overestimating the time required, a person is left with time to spare at the completion 
ofthe task, which may lead to an increased perception of time control (however, it is 
worth noting that although this strategy may result in an increase of perceived control 
of time it does not necessarily result in effective time management per se - as has been 
mentioned, it really depends on how the 'spare' time is used). Unlike Buehler et al. 
(1994), Burt and Kemp (1994) suggest that people do use distributional information to 
make predictions concerning future task duration. They suggest that future duration 
predictions are based on knowledge concerning the durations of similar categories of 
events. 
In addition to 'pure' over and underestimation inaccuracy, for the reasons 
given above, Francis-Smythe & Robertson (1999) allude to the fact that 'rounding' 
could also effect task duration estimation. When discussing possible reasons for time 
estimation patterns found in their results they suggest" ... rounding to the nearest 
minute may have taken place (even though participants were asked to estimate in 
seconds)" (Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 1999, p. 343). Likewise, this potential 
problem has been indirectly hinted at by Zakay (1990) who points out that any verbal 
estimate of a duration is prone to error arising from the response bias of reporting 
durations in round numbers. In support of this view, Hornik (1981) noted that 
participants in his study tended to report duration estimates in mUltiples of five 
minutes. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that many of the rounded values found in duration 
estimation studies represent or 'stand for' a larger category (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
In other words, five minutes is a "prototype" of this category (Oden, 1987). In the 
present context it is suggested that although a person may provide expected duration 
estimates in minutes, their estimates often really represent larger commonly 
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recognised temporal categories (e.g., five, 15,30, and 60 minutes) - which will be 
referred to as 'prototypical temporal values' (Huttenlocher et aI., 1990). In support of 
this view, utilising a similar type of task to that of task expected duration estimation, 
Huttenlocher et al. (1990) found that participants over-reported prototypical temporal 
values like 7, 14,30, 60 (week, fortnight, month, and two months respectively) when 
asked how many days had elapsed since various personal (autobiographical) events. 
They suggest that these result in a local bias in the regions around each prototypic 
temporal value. In summary it is suggested that, largely because of the inexact nature 
of expected duration estimations, a person will tend to round estimates to what they 
see as a prototypical temporal value. Typically, studies have tried to reduce the 
influence of this type of perceptual error by requiring participants to estimate 
durations to the nearest minute or half minute (e.g., Boltz, 1998a, 1998c; Boltz et aI., 
1998; Hornik, 1984), however given the above discussion this may actually have very 
little effect on rounding. 
Although, this potential problem for duration estimation accuracy has been 
mentioned in passing by other duration estimation researchers (e.g., Hornik, 1981), it 
appears that no research has been conducted to specifically investigate this 
phenomenon. In the present context it is essential to have an understanding ofthe 
effect rounding has on estimation accuracy as any potential inaccuracy it causes is 
likely to be exasperated in 'real-life' task duration allocation where, unlike the 
Francis-Smythe and Robertson's (1999) study, people are not required/encouraged to 
make estimates to the relatively fine-grained level of seconds. Typically, daily 
planners provide very little encouragement to make anything like fine-grained 
estimates (most diaries/planners, whether digital or paper default at 30 minute or 
Ihour segments with only a few having the ability to schedule five or 10 minute 
slots). 
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Studies by Burt and Kemp (1994), Forsyth (1998), and Burt and Forsyth 
(1999), that have looked at various aspects of expected duration estimation, indirectly 
provide support for such rounding to prototypical temporal values. These studies 
required participants to allocate time for to-be-comp1eted tasks using various daily 
planners. These tasks had average completion times of between three and 15 minutes, 
and therefore encompassed probably the most common task times in a work 
environment (Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 1999). The duration estimates collected 
in these three studies suggest that, for tasks of these durations, people tend to split 
(round) their time into five minute segments/prototypical temporal values (this 
appears to be the case even when participants are using daily planners without pre-
determined time intervals) (Burt & Forsyth, 1999; Forsyth, 1998). Specifically, 
although participants responded on a schematic, which divided time into one minute 
intervals the medians for all four main task groupings in Burt and Kemp's (1994) 
study were multiples of five minutes. In addition, expected duration estimates from 
studies by Burt and Forsyth (1999) which utilised four daily planner types (5, 15, 30 
minute intervals, and one with no pre-determined time intervals) and from Forsyth 
(1998) which used daily planners with no pre-determined time intervals, were 
predominately multiples of five minutes (90% and 92%, respectively) across all 
planner types. The type of planner appeared to have no significant effect on this 
rounding. 
Experiments 3 and 4 (Chapter 7) investigated the effect rounding expected 
duration estimates to prototypical temporal values had on estimation accuracy. It was 





Experiment 1: Updating schematic task/event memory. Task 
presentation order - contrast effects between short and long 
actual duration tasks. 
Introduction 
As discussed in section 4.5, the proposed model of expected duration 
estimation (Figure 4) embraces the view that schematic event durations appear to be 
stored in memory as part of general event memory and that this schematic duration is 
used as part of the estimation process. Additionally, the nature and accuracy of this 
schematic event duration is determined by the amount of experience/frequency of 
exposure to the particular type of event. 
Inherent in this view is that people will vary in their ability to perceive and 
judge typicality (the level of congruence with the relevant schematic event memory) 
of to-be-estimated tasks. As mentioned, Burt (1993) demonstrated that an event's 
degree of typicality is associated with duration estimation accuracy. Specifically, his 
study found that events that were atypically long tended to be underestimated, 
whereas events that were atypically short were overestimated. It appears that specific 
event duration estimation information in general is not sufficient to completely 
remove the effects of general/typical event duration information. Overall, people 
appear to underestimate the degree of atypicality. 
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One aspect of typically that has not been addressed is the number of 
presentations required to 'build' a schematic event memory, and the effect of saliency 
(in the fonn of recency) in updating a schematic event memory. Most research in this 
area has looked at typicality, which has been built up over many years of experience 
and over numerous presentations. For example, the relationship between the speed of 
action and duration (Burt & Popple, 1996), between the number of action words used 
and the participants' estimate ofthe robberies (Burt, 1999), and standard fonnatting of 
printed material (Josephs & Hahn, 1995). 
However, given the fact that people appear to adopt estimation strategies that 
minimise cognitive effort (Josephs & Hahn, 1995) it may be the case that saliency of 
past similar experiences may be a crucial factor in detennining typicality. More 
specifically, it may be the case that a single (recent) exposure to a similar expected 
estimation experience may alter/effect a future expected duration estimation by 'up-
dating' the schematic event memory (Burt, 1993). 
It is argued that a high degree of saliency (in the present case, specifically in 
the fonn of recency) will have a similar effect to that of repetition in the fonnation of 
a schematic event memory and associated duration. Further, it is argued that a person 
need not have experienced the specific task or its 'duration' (Le., actually completed 
the task or experienced the event) in order to update schematic event memory, in that 
the expected duration process outlined in the previous chapter suggests that the person 
will most likely reconstruct a type of veri similar representation of what they believe 
the task entails. To test these ideas participants were required to either estimate the 
expected duration of a short 'version' of a task followed by a longer version or vice 
versa. Based on the trends reported by Burt (1993) the following hypothesis was 
proposed: 
THE LIBRARY 
UNIVERSiTY OF CANTERBURY 
CHRISTCHURCH, N.Z. 
100 
The order of presentation of task, which only vary with respect to scale (e.g.) 
10 pages of proofreading as opposed to five pages of proofreading), will have 
a significant effect on the time participants allocate to the tasks) completion. 
Specifically, participants will allocate significantly less time to the completion 
of a task if they have previously estimated the expected duration of a shorter 
similar task. Conversely, they will allocate significantly more time to the 
completion of a task if they have previously estimated the expected duration of 
a similar but longer task. 
Method 
Experiment design overview 
The experiment consisted oftwo between-group conditions. In condition one, 
participants were required to estimate the duration of four tasks which were presented 
in the following order - short version of balance task, long version of balance task, 
short version of proofreading task, long version of proofreading task. In condition 
two participants were also required to estimate the duration of the same four tasks, 
however they where presented in a different order from condition one -long version 
of balance task, short version of balance task, long version of proofreading task, short 
version of proofreading task. 
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Participants 
Eighty people, with a mean age of20.8 years, undertaking a stage one psychology 
course at the University of Canterbury, participated in this experiment (none had 
participated in any ofthe three other experiments). Forty were randomly assigned to 
each of the two conditions. The first condition contained 12 males and 28 females, 
while the second condition contained 10 males and 30 females. The University of 
Canterbury human ethics committee approved the experiment. 
Materials 
As mentioned above each of the two conditions were made up of the same two 
versions of a balance and proofreading task. As shown below the two versions of 
each task differed only in magnitude. The two conditions varied in respect to the 
presentation order of the short and long versions of each ofthe two types of tasks - in 
condition one the short version of each task was presented before the long version of 
the task. In contrast, in condition two the long version of each task was presented 
before the short version of each task (see Appendix 1). The four tasks are listed 
below in the form in which the participants received them (task headings were 
omitted in experimental materials). 
Balance task short version: 
Five 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an account 
balance sheet. Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt column 
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and subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance after each 
subtraction (pen and paper subtraction - no calculator). 
Balance task long version: 
Twenty 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an 
account balance sheet. Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt 
column and subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance 
after each subtraction (pen and paper subtraction - no calculator). 
Proofreading task short version: 
A three-page document typed (double-spaced) on A4 paper is provided. 
Your task is to proofread itfor spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling 
mistake that you find. 
Proofreading task long version: 
A J3-page document typed (double spaced) on A4 paper is provided. Your 
task is to proofread it for spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling mistake that 
you find. 
As can be seen from the stimuli in Appendix 1, a space was provided below each 
of the four tasks for the participant to enter their expected duration estimate. No 
temporal scale prompts were provided - no hour, minute, or second prompts. 
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Procedure 
Potential participants from stage one psychology laboratories were invited to take 
part in a study requiring them to estimate how long they thought it might take them to 
complete four office-type tasks. Interested participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the two conditions outlined above. Participants were infonned that they were 
to assume they worked in an office-type environment and that they were required as 
part of their job to complete four tasks. They were also asked to assume that they had 
the equipment/resources to complete the tasks. Each participant received a self-
explanatory questionnaire outlining the requirement to estimate how long they 
thought it would take to complete each of the four tasks. After each written 
description of a task, a space was provided in which to enter their estimation. 
Following completion participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
The first, second and third numerical columns of Table 1 show the average, 
the median, and the range of expected duration estimates for the four tasks for each of 
the two conditions. 
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Table 1. The effect of presentation order of tasks that vary in magnitude on expected 
duration estimation 
Order of Mean Estimated Median Estimated Range of Estimated 
Presentation Time (&SDs) to Time to Complete Times to Complete 
Complete (Seconds) (Seconds) (Seconds) 
Short Presented first 339 300 60 - 1200 
Bolance (condition I) (232) 
Sheet Presented second 760 570 60-5400 
(condition 2) (913) 
Long Presented first 1942 1200 300-9000 
Balance (condition 2) (1957) 
Sheet Presented second 1050 900 180 - 3600 
(condition 1) (718) 
Short Presented first 526 600 180-900 
Proofread (condi lion I) (214) 
Presented second 819 870 180 -- 7200 
(condition 2) (1152) 
Long Presen ted first 3247 2100 720 -21600 
Proofread (condition 2) (4242) 
Presented second 1863 lEOO 600 - 3600 
(condition I) (877) 
A 2x4 mixed design ANOVA, with the order of presentation (either long tasks 
first or short tasks first) being the between subject variable and the duration estimates 
for the four tasks being the within subject variables, was conducted to see whether 
these difference were significant (Figure 5 depicts the relationship between these 
variables). The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for order of presentation 
(F (1,78) = 6.61, p=.012) and for the different tasks (F (3,234) = 34.66, p=.OOO), 
however the interaction between these two did not reach significance (F (3,234) = 
2.50, p=.06). More specifically, planned comparisons revealed significant differences 
between whether the short task was presented first or second for three of the four 
tasks - short balance (F (1,78) = 8.00, p=.005), long balance (F (1,78) = 7.32, 
p=.008), and long proofread (F (1,78) = 4.08, p=.046) - short proofread (F (1,78) = 




































-0- Condition 1 
(short 1 st) 
-0- Condtion 2 
(long 1 st) 
Figure 5. A graphical representation of the relationship between the two conditions in 
Experiment 1 and the estimated duration of the four tasks. 
Overall these results suggest that more time is allotted to relatively short tasks 
when they are presented after a longer similar task. Conversely, it appears that less 
time is allocated to the completion of a relatively long task if it is preceded by a 
shorter task. Strengthening this view, the pattern is consistent across both types of 
tasks - balance and proofreading. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that presenting a highly salient similar to-be-
estimated task can affect a subsequent task estimate. Overall there was support for 
the hypothesis, in that participants tended to allocate significantly less time to the 
completion of a task if they had previously estimated the expected duration of a 
shorter similar task. Conversely, they tended to allocate significantly more time to the 
completion of a task if they had previously estimated the expected duration of a 
similar but longer task. 
These results could be interpreted as suggesting that schematic event 
memories can potentially be 'adjusted' with a single presentation of a similar task. 
Although further research is required one can speculate that the 'power' of this single 
presentation lies in its saliency, in that if participants were required to estimate the 
completion of the similar task the day before, rather than immediately before, it would 
not have had such a large effect (if any) on the estimation. Additionally, following on 
with a 'change in schematic memory' type interpretation of the experimental results, 
and in line with the reconstructive process involving a verisimilar representation 
advocated in the previous chapter, the 'up-dating' of schematic event memories 




Experiment 2: The effect that remote temporal boundaries 
have on expected duration estimates 
Introduction 
Based on the research reviewed in section 4.6 it seems likely that rea] time 
pressure in the fonn of a temporal boundary, either self or externally imposed, will 
tend to create the tendency for a person to allocate less time to the completion of a 
task than they would have otherwise. A more appropriate question may be whether 
the same effect occurs when the temporal boundary is more remote (i.e., when there is 
plenty of time to complete the task). For instance, it's 8am and a person has to finish 
a report that will in actuality take about two hours. Will they allocate less time to its 
completion if it needs to be completed by noon than ifit has to be completed by 5pm 
that day? It is argued that even remote and, objectively speaking, 'non-time 
pressuring' boundaries will influence the amount of time a person will allocate to the 
completion of a task. Experiment 2 will investigate the above proposition by 
comparing expected duration estimates for tasks under different remote boundary 
scenanos. 
The overall view of research reviewed in section 4.6 concerning the effects of 
boundaries on expected duration estimates is that it reduces accuracy, resulting in an 
underestimation of the actual completion time. However, is this necessarily the case? 
Clearly unrealistic boundaries (time pressures) will inevitably result in over ambitious 
scheduling. However, it is argued that the opposite is also likely - boundaries that are 
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too 'lax' on possible completion times, which result in an overestimation of the 
duration required to complete the task (at least for those who do not succumb to 
Parkinson's fIrst law - see Chapter 3). It is argued that 'appropriate' boundaries are 
essential for accurate expected duration estimation. Experiment 2 addresses this by 
comparing the expected duration estimates for three tasks within three different 
remote temporal boundary scenarios. 
Hypothesis: The more remote the temporal boundary, the more time 
participants will allocate to the completion o/the task. 
Method 
Experiment design overview 
The experiment consisted ofthree between-participant conditions. All 
conditions required that participants estimate the expected comp letion durations for 
three tasks. The same tasks were used for all three conditions. Conditions varied in 
the remote temporal boundary scenario that was assigned to the task description. 
Across conditions a task was either introduced with an associated' short', 'medium', 
or 'long' remote temporal boundary scenario. 
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Participants 
One-hundred-and-thirty-five people undertaking a stage one psychology course at 
the University of Canterbury participated in this experiment (none had participated in 
any ofthe other three experiments). Forty-five were randomly assigned to each of the 
three conditions. The first condition contained 15 males and 30 females with a mean 
age of 22.1 years, the second condition contained 10 males and 35 females with a 
mean age of 21.5 years, while the third condition contained 16 males and 20 females 
with an average age of 21.2 years. The University of Canterbury human ethics 
committee approved the experiment. 
Materials 
The experiment utilised three different tasks which participants were required to 
estimate the completion duration, and three different temporal boundary scenarios. 
The three to-be-comp1eted tasks were: 
• Proofread for spelling mistakes a 13-page company report (A4, typed, and 
double spaced). 
• Using the supplied telephone directory, look up and record 10 different 
contractors' contact details for eight different types of contractors. 
• Entering 10 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone hill) into an account balance 
sheet creating a new balance as each bill was entered. 
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The three temporal boundaries required that each task be completed either 
before morning tea, before lunch, or by the end of the week. For the first two 
scenarios the participants were to presume that they had just arrived at work, whereas 
for the third scenario they were to presume that they had just arrived at work on 
Monday morning. Based on the completion times of similar/identical tasks in 
experiments conducted by the author (see Chapter 7) it was known that the average 
completion time for the longest task used here was about 30 minutes. Therefore it 
could be safely assumed that all of the boundary scenarios used in the present 
experiment were remote in nature with none ofthem 'truly' (based on the actual time 
it would take them to complete the task) constraining the amount oftime a person 
CQuid potentially allocate to their completion. 
All participants were required to estimate completion times for all three ofthe 
above tasks. Likewise, for all participants one of the tasks was associated with the 
'short' remote bOillldary scenario, one with the 'medimn' remote bOillldary scenario, 
and one with the 'long' remote boundary scenario. This combination resulted in three 
true conditions, consisting of the three combinations of temporal boundary for each 
task:. For instance, in condition one the participant was required to estimate the 
expected duration of the proofreading task under the shortest remote scenario, in 
condition two it was the medium one, and condition three it was the most remote 
temporal scenario (see Appendix 2). However, to control for any potential order 




Potential participants from stage one psychology laboratories were invited to take 
part in an experiment requiring them to estimate how long they thought it might take 
them to complete three office-type tasks. Interested participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the six counterbalanced versions of the three conditions outlined 
above. Each received a self-explanatory questionnaire outlining the requirement to 
estimate how long they thought it would take them to complete the tasks described 
(see Appendix 2). The written instructions were: 
You are invited to take part in a research project looking into time 
management in the workplace. The aim of the study is to understand and 
ultimately reduce the 'time stress' inherent in many jobs. Your 
participation will involve responding to three work scenarios and providing 
estimates of how long you think they will take you. Although there is no 
time limit, this process should take you less than five minutes to complete. 
A space was provided after each written description of a task in which to enter 
their estimation. Participants made their three estimates in class time. After 
completion participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
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Results 
Table 2 below shows the estimated times for completing the three tasks under 
the three different temporal boundary scenarios. The numerical columns show the 
mean estimated duration (and standard deviations), median estimated durations, and 
range of estimated durations respectively for each of the three tasks under each of the 
three temporal boundary scenarios. As can be seen there is a general trend for more 
time to be allocated to the completion of the task as the temporal boundary becomes 
more remote. The most pronounce differences in expected duration across all three 
tasks appear to be between the most remote temporal boundary scenario and the two 
shorter temporal boundary scenarios. 
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Table 2. The effect of varying remote temporal boundary scenarios had on expected 
duration estimation 
Task Temporal Mean Estimated Median Estimated Range of 
Boundary Time (&SDs) to Time to Complete Estimated Times 
Scenario Complete (minutes) to Complete 
(minutes) (minutes) 
Morning tea 60.07 60 10-150 (condition 1) (32.65) 
Proof-read Lunch time 70.67 60 15 -270 (condi tion 3) (50.52)) 
End of week 81.78 70 15 - 360 (condition 2) (65.77) 
Morning tea 76.11 60 5-90 (condition 2) (45.65) 
Contact Lunch time 81.00 
lookup (condition 1) (57.16) 60 15 - 120 
End of week 115.56 90 (condition 3) (125.21) 20 - 150 
Morning tea 40.78 30 5-120 (condition 3) (35.92) 
Balance Lunch time 43.78 30 5 -190 (condition 2) (26.00) 
End of week 86.22 60 8-600 (condition 1) (102.14) 
A 3x3 mixed design ANOYA, with the combination of task and temporal 
boundary being the between subject variable and the duration estimates for the three 
tasks being the within subject variables, was conducted to see whether the differences 
were significant. The ANOY A revealed no main effect for group/condition (F (2, 
132) = .52, p=.60). This result demonstrated that the three groups do not differ 
significantly as far as the amount of time they estimated it would take to complete the 
three tasks (given the crossover nature of the experimental manipulation this is the 
expected result). It revealed a significant main effect for the task variable (F (2, 264) 
= 1004, p=.OOOl), which suggests that there was a significant difference between the 
three tasks in respect to the amount of time participants allocated for their completion. 
This result is not unexpected as no predictions were made concerning the temporal 
equivalence of the three tasks. 
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More importantly, as expected, the ANOVA revealed a significant interaction 
between the group and task variables (F (4, 264) = 6.87, p=.OOOI). Specifically, 
planned comparisons revealed significant differences between temporal boundaries. 
In respect of the proofreading task a significant difference was found between the 
morning tea temporal boundary and the end of the week temporal boundary (F (1, 
132) = 4.00, p= 0.047). Although in the right directions, the differences between the 
temporal boundaries of morning tea and lunchtime, and lunchtime and the end of the 
week did not reach significance. In respect of the contact lookup task a significant 
difference was found between the lunchtime and the end of the week temporal 
boundary (F (1, 132) = 3.83, p= 0.05) and the morning tea and the end of the week 
temporal boundary (F (1, 132) = 4.99, p= 0.027). Although in the right direction the 
difference between the temporal boundaries of morning tea and lunchtime did not 
reach significance for the contact lookup task. Lastly, with respect to the balance 
sheet task, a significant difference was found between the lunchtime and the end of 
the week temporal boundary (F (1, 132) = 9.81, p= 0.002) and the morning tea and the 
end of the week temporal boundary (F (1, 132) = 11.24, p= 0.001). Again, although 
in the right direction the difference between the temporal boundaries of morning tea 
and lunchtime did not reach significance for the balance sheet task. Taken together 
these results suggest that varying the remoteness ofthe temporal boundary had a 
significant effect on expected duration estimation. 
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Discussion 
The present experiment provides support for the hypothesis that remote 
temporal boundaries have an effect on expected duration estimation. Support was 
found for the view that the more remote the temporal boundary, the more time 
participants will allocate to the completion of the task. Participants allocated 
significantly more time to the completion of all three tasks under the end-of-week 
temporal boundary scenario, compared to the morning tea scenario. Further, for two 
ofthe three tasks participants allocated significantly more time to the end-of-week 
scenario than the lunchtime scenario. 
Although this is probably one of the first experiments that specifically deals 
with the potential positive effects (in that they potentially reduce the degree of 
overestimation of task completion times) of temporal boundaries in making accurate 
expected duration estimates, other expected duration estimation research can be 
interpreted in this way providing further support for the stance put forward here. For 
example, it is argued that Burt and Forsyth's (1999) scheduler segmentation 
experiment discussed earlier can be viewed as demonstrating the importance of 
providing appropriate temporal boundaries, whereby segmentation matched to the 
actual duration of the task resulted in more accurate estimates than either a blank 
scheduler (no temporal boundary cue) or one providing too large a segmentation (an 
inappropriate temporal boundary cue). 
As mentioned earlier, most research concerning the effect of bounding appears 
to suggest that it hinders accuracy. However, the present findings suggest otherwise 
in that it appears even remote temporal boundaries can be useful in 
directing/constraining a persons' expected duration estimation. 
116 
Chapter 7 
Experiments 3 & 4: The effect of estimation rounding and 
preference for reporting estimates in the form of prototypical 
temporal values 
Chapter 7 is comprised of two experiments. In relation to the 'expected 
process' component of my model of expected duration estimation (see Figure 4) 
discussed in section 4.6, it is argued that when a person is required to make an 
expected duration estimate they tend to round their estimate, often to the form of a 
prototypical temporal value. Experiments 3 and 4 are primarily concerned with the 
effect the rounding of expected durations to prototypical temporal values has on the 
accuracy of these estimates. 
7.1 Experiment 3: Chunking relatively short duration tasks together as a 
strategy to increase scheduling accuracy 
Introduction 
Experiment 3 was designed to test some ofthe predictions concerning the 
rounding of expected duration estimates to prototypical temporal values as outlined in 
section 4.6 above. Firstly, based on the findings outlined in that section, it appears 
when faced with relatively short duration tasks (minutes rather than days) people tend 
to overestimate task completion times. Specifically, the present experiment will seek 
to test: 
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Hypothesis 1: When asked to schedule the completion ofrelatively short 
duration tasks (2 - 8 minutes) participants will tend to overestimate the time 
required for their completion. 
Secondly, it is suggested that based on the pattern of estimates reported in 
previous expected duration and autobiographical studies (e.g., Forsyth, 199B; 
Huttenlocher et aI., 1990), when asked to estimate the duration of an upcoming 
event/task a person is likely to round that estimate to a prototypical temporal value. 
Specifically: 
Hypothesis 2a: When asked to estimate the duration of a to-be-completed task 
participants will be more likeZv to provide an estimation which is in the form 
of a prototypical temporal value (e.g., five-minute 'chunks ') than a non-
prototypical temporal value (e.g., one, two, or three minutes). 
Further, one of the like1y indictors of the tendency to report prototypical 
temporal values is that there will be an inverse relationship between actual (& 
presumab1y estimated) duration and the coefficient of variability of the estimated 
duration. This relationship is expected to occur due to the magnitude differences in 
actual duration of tasks around five minutes and ones around 15-20 minutes, and the 
nature of the coefficient of variability statistic. Because of the tendency to estimate 
prototypica1 temporal values, where there is inter-subject variability of relatively short 
duration task estimates, that variation will be of a larger magnitude than for longer 
tasks. For example, the 'available' (assuming people will tend to report common 
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prototypical temporal values) variation for a relatively short duration task, which will 
typically be estimated as taking five minutes, will tend to be 10 minutes (i.e., twice as 
long). Alternatively, longer tasks have more fine-grain (relatively speaking) 
variations available to participants. For instance, if the actual duration is around 10 
minutes a person trying to accurately estimate its duration can potentially choose 
(again assuming they will tend to favour prototypical temporal values) estimates of 
five, 10, or 15 minutes. These 'available' variations represent a lower magnitude of 
variation than in the five-minute example. 
Hypothesis 2b: As a result of the tendency to report prototypical temporal 
values there will be an inverse relationship between actual (& estimated) 
duration and the coefficient ofvariability of the estimated duration. 
Thirdly, although such rounding and the associated over-reliance on 
prototypical temporal values will tend to lead to inaccuracies for almost all expected 
duration estimates, it is argued that this tendency to separate time into five-minute 
segments will result in greater inaccuracy (increased duration overestimation) for 
shorter duration tasks. An inverse relationship between actual task duration and task 
duration overestimation will occur, because as the actual task duration increases, the 
five-minute segmentation (rounding) becomes less detrimental to accuracy. For 
example, under this segmentation a task with an actual duration of 1 Yz minutes will 
have an estimated completion duration of five-minutes (an overestimation of 333%) 
whereas for tasks of a greater actual duration the five-minute segmentation becomes 
proportionally less detrimental. In support of this assertion Forsyth (1998) found a 
significant inverse relationship between objective task duration and overestimation. 
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In light of this finding it is predicted that grouping relatively short duration 
tasks (between three - eight minutes) together will result in greater task duration 
estimation accuracy. Experiment 3 evaluated this proposition by encouraging 
participants to group some relatively short duration tasks together while scheduling 
and completing others individually. Specifically: 
Hypothesis 3: Grouping relatively short duration tasks (between three - eight 
minutes) together for scheduling purposes will result in less time being 
allocated to their completion than if the same task were scheduled separately. 
Method 
Experiment design overview 
The experiment consisted of two participant conditions, with both between 
and within condition variables. Both conditions involved the scheduling and 
completion of the same six office-type tasks. In condition one the description of the 
last three tasks were chunked together to form 'one' task. In condition two it was the 
description of the first three tasks that were chunked together to form 'one' task. 
These manipulations resulted in both groups scheduling and completing 'four' tasks. 




A group of people comprised of20 males and 20 females; with a mean age of22.5 
years, undertaking a variety of studies within the University of Canterbury 
participated in this experiment (none had participated in any of the three other 
experiments). A power analysis was conducted which suggested that based on 
finding a relatively large effect, 40 was a suitably large sample to make a type II error 
unlikely. Participants were recruited through the local Student Job Search. They 
received NZ$20 remuneration for participating in this experiment (a level similar to 
that expected in an office workplace environment). This remuneration was deemed 
an important part of the experiment by helping to provide similar real-world 
motivational levels and generally increasing the external validity of the findings. The 
University of Canterbury human ethics committee approved the experiment. 
Materials 
Daily planner 
The daily planner consisted of an A4 sheet of paper with a plain border headed 
up 'Daily Planner' (see Appendix 3). 
Activities 
Participants were required to complete four different 'tasks'. One ofthe four 
'tasks' in each of the two conditions had three sub-components, which resulted in six 
tasks being utilised in this experiment. Two criteria were used in the selection of 
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these tasks. Firstly, a balance was sought between creating a verisimilitude of an 
office environment, and having tasks that all participants wouldfind at least somewhat 
familiar, and most importantly, possible to complete. Secondly, individual tasks were 
designed (based on previous research and informal pilot studies) so as to have a 
relatively short average completion time (between three - eight minutes), with most 
having an average completion duration of less than five minutes. Additionally, for 
purposes of being able to compare estimates both across and within subjects, an effort 
was made to match tasks on average completion times, resulting in three pairs of 
tasks. The ability to make within subject comparisons was deemed an important part 
of this experiment. This is because~ as Zakay (1990) points out, averaging duration 
estimates across subjects and comparing group data can potentially be misleading. 
Although it is typically impossible to undertake a within-subj ects design when using 
the retrospective paradigm (Zakay, 1990), the present expected duration estimation 
situation potentially (as long as the pairing of tasks on actual duration was successful) 
enables some with-in subject comparisons to be made so strengthening any findings. 
The three pairs of tasks consisted of: 
Pair ODe 
Task 1: Proofreading a three-page document for spelling mistakes. 
Task 4: Entering five 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) into an account balance 
sheet, creating a new balance as each bill is entered. 
Pair two 
Task 2: Delivering eight preaddressed letters to their respective pigeonholes on 
another floor in the same building. 
Task 5: Purchasing a candy bar from the vending machine in a nearby building. 
Pair three 
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Task 3: Telephoning an automated river report to obtain current fishing conditions for 
four local rivers. 
Task 6: Alphabetising 20 job applications in respect to the applicant's surname. 
Participants received a complete description of what the task involved, including 
all the required materials for their completion (e.g., money to make the candy bar 
purchase). Outlined below is the full description that the participants received for each 
ofthe six tasks: 
Task 1 
A three-page document, typed (double spaced) on A4 paper is provided. Your 
task is to proofread Ufor spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling mistake that you 
find. 
Task 2 
Deliver eight letters to their respective pigeonholes. The addressee's pigeonholes 
are located in Room 209 of the psychology building (i.e., the Resource room). 
This room is basically two floors directly below your present location (opposite 
the secretaries' office). 
123 
Task 3 
Obtain the current river conditions (water colour & fish-ability) for the following 
four Canterbury rivers: Waimakariri river (at the mouth), Rakaia river (at the 
mouth), Hurunui river, and Waiau river. To gain this information you will need to 
phone Fish and Game North Canterbury's automated river report. The phone 
number should be looked up in the telephone book provided. 
Task 4 
Five 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an account 
balance sheet. Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt column and 
subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance after each 
subtraction (pen and paper subtraction - no calculator). 
Task 5 
Buy a candy bar (or similar) from the vending machine just inside the law cafe (if 
you look out the window you will see the new law building - the cafe is located 
near the main entrance on the groundfloor). One dollar is in the appropriate 
folder. 
Task 6 
Arrange 20 job applications in alphabetic order with respect to the applicants' 
surnames (i.e. 'A I in the front, through to 'Z' at the back). 
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Procedure 
As noted above in section 4.1 one of the biggest problems when trying to interpret 
the findings of many expected duration estimation studies is the fact that, because of 
experimental conditions, participants are often hypo-vigilant towards temporal issues 
and time management in general. The present experiment attempted to overcome this 
problem by promoting the experiment as being primarily interested injob satisfaction 
in office work. In addition, no one was required to remove watches (so as to reduce 
their focus on temporal matters) and at no time were participants aware that their 
progress was being timed. Furthermore, participants were not required to complete 
any temporally related psychometric scales. 
Finally, many studies require participants to provide expected duration 
estimates in seconds or minutes. However, it is argued that this is not a typical 
situation in real-world duration estimation, and that it leads participants to be overly 
aware of temporal aspects of the experiment. Another reason not to constrain the 
scale of response is so that the expected duration estimation is not overly restrained by 
providing a cue concerning the possible duration of the task (Huttenlocher et al., 
1990). For these reasons participants were not constrained to provide duration 
estimates in any particular scale/magnitude (i.e., minutes versus seconds). 
It should be pointed out that potentially important variables could be assumed 
to be controlled for (e.g., education, IQ, age, and gender) by the randomisation 
process outlined below. 
Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions. In the first condition 
(group 1) tasks four, five, and six were grouped together as a single 'task' whereas 
tasks one, two, and three were presented separately thus resulting in four to-be-
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scheduled and completed tasks. In condition two (group 2) tasks one, two, and three 
were grouped together while tasks four, five, and six were presented separately, again 
resulting in four to-be-scheduled and completed tasks. Descriptions of the individual 
tasks, and their order of presentation, were identical for both conditions. The only 
difference between the two conditions was that either the first three or last three tasks 
were introduced as a single to-be-scheduled and completed 'task'. Below are the 
'four' tasks, as introduced to the participants, in condition one and condition two. 
Condition one: 
"TASK 1 
• A three-page document, typed (double spaced) on A4 paper is provided. 
Your task is to proofread it for spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling 
mistake that you find. When completed place the materials back in the folder and place the 
folder ill the completed task tray. 
TASK 2 
• Deliver eight letters to their respective pigeonholes. The addressee's 
pigeonholes are located in Room 209 of the psychology building (i.e., the 
Resource room). This room is basically two floors directly below your 
present location (opposite the secretaries' office). When completed place the 
folder il! the completed task tray. 
TASK 3 
• Obtain the current river conditions (water colour & fish-ability) for the 
following four Canterbury rivers: Waimakariri river (at the mouth), Rakaia 
river (at the mouth), Hurunui river, and Waiau river. To gain this 
information you will need to phone Fish and Game North Canterbury's 
automated river report. The phone number should be looked up in the 
telephone book provided. Whell completed place the materials back ill the folder alld place 
the folder ill the completed task tray. 
TASK 4 
• Five 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an 
account balance sheet. Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt 
column and subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance 
after each subtraction (pen and paper subtraction - no calculator). 
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• Buy a candy bar (or similar) from the vending machine just inside the law 
cafe (if you look out the window you will see the new law building - the 
cafe is located near the main entrance on the ground floor). One dollar is 
in the appropriate folder. 
• Arrange 20 job applications in alphabetical order with respect to the 
applicants' SU1l1ames (i.e. 'A' in the front, through to 'z' at the back). When 
completed place the materials back in the folder and place the folder in the completed task tray. " 
Condition two: 
"TASK 1 
• A three-page document, typed (double spaced) on A4 paper is provided. 
Your task is to proof read it for spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling 
mistake that you find 
• Deliver eight letters to their respective pigeonholes. The addressee's 
pigeonholes are located in Room 209 of the psychology building (i.e., the 
Resource room). This room is basically two floors directly below your 
present location (opposite the secretaries' office). 
• Obtain the current river conditions (water colour & fish-ability) for the 
following four Canterbury rivers: Waimakariri river (at the mouth), Rakaia 
river (at the mouth), Hurunui river, and Waiau river. To gain this 
information you will need to phone Fish and Game North Canterbury's 
automated river report. The phone number should be looked up in the 
telephone book provided. When completed place the materials back in the folder and place 
the folder ill the completed task tray. 
TASK 2 
• Five 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an 
account balance sheet. Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt 
column and subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance 
after each subtraction (pen and paper subtraction - no calculator). When 
completed place the materials back in the folder and place the folder in the completed task tray. 
TASK 3 
• Buy a candy bar (or similar) from the vending machine just inside the law 
cafe (if you look out the window you will see the new law building - the 
cafe is located near the main entrance on the ground floor). One dollar is 
in the appropriate folder. When completed place the materials back ill the folder and place 
the folder in the completed task tray. 
TASK 4 
• Arrange 20 job applications in alphabetical order with respect to the 
applicants' sumames (i.e. 'A' in the front, through to 'Z' at the back). Whell 
completed place the materials back ill the folder and place the folder in the completed task tray. " 
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Task scheduling and completion 
Participants were seated individually at a cubicle (up to four participants 
completed the experiment at anyone time) which contained: a table, experimental 
instructions, task activity descriptions, a daily planner, four folders containing the task 
material, a telephone and directory, and a 'Completed Task' tray. 
Upon being seated each participant was instructed to read the following instructions, 
which were placed in front of them: 
"This experiment examinesjob satisfaction in office work. You are required 
to complete four tasks (some tasks may have a number of separate 
components). These tasks can be carried out in any order you choose, 
however you must complete one task before you move on to the next one. Try 
to imagine that you are working in an office situation and the completion of 
these tasks is part of your duties. A researcher will be present during the 
experiment - please try to ignore their presence. 
Specifically you are required to: 
1. Read the accompanying sheet that describes the tasks. 
2. Plan the completion of the four tasks using the accompanying 
(daily planner', Enter each task onto the planner in the order you 
propose to complete them, along with the time you expect to need 
for their completion. Tasks must be scheduled one after the other. 
Please do this now. 
3. Upon completion of the planning please begin completing the tasks 
in the order you have chosen. 
- if you have any questions please ask the researcher now. " 
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As can be seen from the instructions above, as soon as the participant had completed 
the scheduling of the four tasks they were free to start completing them in the 
sequential order they had chosen. The researcher, who was partitioned off from the 
participant completing the experiment (in a raised cubical in which the experimenter 
had a clear view of the participants), discretely recorded the time taken for the 
participant to complete each task. Upon completion participants were paid, debriefed, 
and thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
Hypothesis 1: The tendency to overestimate actual duration 
To answer the question - 'do people tend to overestimate the time required to 
complete relatively short duration tasks?' - the data was examined to determine the 
degree to which participants were able to estimate how long it would take to complete 
the three tasks which they where presented individually (as opposed to the three that 
were chunked together as 'one task'). Due to the crossover design used in this 
experiment only half of the participants provided individual time estimates for any 
particular task. The first and second numerical columns in Table 3 show the mean 
actual and estimated times for the completion of each task. As can be seen, the mean 
durations for completing the six tasks ranged from just over three minutes (191 
seconds - order documents) to around seven minutes (420 seconds - proofreading & 
423 seconds - balance sheet tasks). In addition, these two columns showed that the 
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mean estimated times tended to be longer than the mean actual times to complete the 
6 tasks. 
Numerical column number three in Table 3 shows the coefficient of variation, 
which is the standard deviation divided by the mean estimation (standard deviations 
cannot simply compared as they typically increase as actual/estimated duration 
increases). This is an underutilised statistic that can often provide valuable 
infomlation conceming duration estimates (Block & Zakay, 1997; Block et al., 1999). 
It enables the direct comparison of variability across conditions. This coefficient of 
variation data is discussed below under hypothesis 2b. 
The fourth numerical column in Table 3 shows the mean signed error 
(estimated minus actual duration) for each task. As can be seen from column four of 
Table 3 the mean signed error was positive for all six tasks, meaning that participants 
tended to overestimate the amount of time they would actually need to complete each 
task. The fifth (second to last) numerical column in Table 3 displays this signed error 
as a proportion of the actual time taken. This figure was derived by calculating what 
percentage the mean signed error is of the actual time taken (numerical column one). 
This percentage of error (in this case overestimation) shows that, at least in the case of 
the present tasks, a greater degree of overestimation was associated with shorter 
duration tasks (e.g., the river report and the ordering of the documents). 
Francis-Smythe and Robertson (1999) have commented that although studies 
like that by Burt and Kemp (1994) report a trend towards overestimation it may be 
caused by just a few people vastly overestimating the duration. However, no support 
for this claim was found in the present experiment. As can be seen in the last column 
of Table 3 the majority of participants provided overestimates for each ofthe tasks 
(except the balance task). 
Table 3. Summary of task duration estimation accuracy. 
Mean Time (&SDs) to Mean Estimated Time Coefficient of Signed Error Mean Proportion of 
Complete (Seconds) (&SDs) to Complete Variation of (Estimated - Difference as a Participants 
(Seconds) Estimated Actual Time) Proportion of Who 
Durations Actual Time Overestimated 
Taken Actual 
Duration 
1. Proof Reading 420 498 0.596 +78 19% 60% 
(101) (297) 
Group 1 2. Deliver letters 252 402 0.331 +150 60% 100% 
data n=20 (75) (133) 
3. River reports 234 546 0.524 +312 134% 90% 
(67) (286) 
4. Balance Sheet 423 483 0.793 +50 12% 45% 
(148) (385) 
Group 2 5. ('.,andy Bar 285 451 0.641 +166 58% 75% 
data n=20 (62) (289) 
6. Order Documents 191 393 0.654 +202 106% 95% 
(59) (257) 
All Six Tasks 1808 2773 0.352 +965 53% 
(188) (974) 
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If the various actual and estimated durations shown in the first and second 
numerical columns of Table 3 are compared, it appears that the general trend of the 
overestimates is that the shorter the task the greater the average overestimation and 
the higher the proportions of individual participants providing overestimates (the last 
column of Table 3). It is worth noting that the degree of overestimation found with 
the river condition task (134%) maybe somewhat inflated due to the relative 
unfamiliarity of the task, however it is argued that the remaining five tasks were 
equally familiar to participants from a western university. Therefore, an unfamiliarity 
exp lanation does not explain why mean overestimates of the document ordering task, 
which should have been a familiar task for the participants to complete, was so high 
(106%). 
UnJike previous research, which has suggested that overestimates found in 
expected duration studies using relatively short duration tasks are due to a 'safe 
estimation strategy' (Robinson, 1992), it is argued that this overestimation is 
primarily due to, or at the very least substantiaIJy effected by, 'rounding' or in the 
language used by Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Bradburn (1990) 'a local bias in the 
regions around prototypic values' - in this case five minutes (similar to Burt and 
Forsyth (1999) and Forsyth (1998) less than one per cent of estimated durations were 
outside of five-minute intervals). For example, the three tasks (letter delivery, river 
conditions, and document ordering) with the shortest average durations (around three 
to four minutes) also have the highest proportions of participants providing 
overestimates (100, 90, and 95% respectively). As the predominant 'natural' 
prototypic value for this scale of duration estimation appears to be five minutes, 
participants tend to be 'forced' to overestimate the duration of these tasks. 
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Conversely, at the other end of the continuum, the two tasks with the longest average 
actual duration (proofreading and balancing bills) of around seven minutes had the 
lowest proportions of participants providing overestimates (60 and 45% respectively). 
Accepting that the prototypical value for these tasks is five minutes (see hypothesis 2a 
& 2b below), participants striving for accuracy had a choice between allotting five (an 
underestimation) or 10 (an overestimation) minutes to the tasks - a choice which is 
reflected in the proportion of over and underestimates for these two tasks (see Figure 
6). 
Hypothesis 2 a & b: The tendency to report prototypical temporal values 
It was suggested that when asked to estimate the duration of a to-be-completed 
task participants would be more likely to provide an estimation which is in the fonn 
of a prototypical temporal value (e.g., five minutes) than a non-prototypical temporal 
value (e.g., one, two, or three minutes). An infonnative way to display each of the 
four duration estimates the 40 participants' supplied (i.e., a total of 160 estimates) is 
to tabulate all actual durations against all estimated durations. As can be seen in 
Figure 6, although actual task durations (both grouped and individual) are spread 
along the temporal continuum (far right-hand column), estimates tend to be 
predominately prototypical temporal values (,shaded' vertical columns) - specifically 
in the present case multiples of five-minutes. 
Specifically in relation to the hypothesis put forward, the majority (73%) of 
the 160 estimates, which participants supplied, appear to be prototypical temporal 
values (multiples of five minutes), and furthennore, 51 per cent of all estimates were 
either five- or lO-minutes. Although it could be argued that some ofthese five-
minute interval estimates do not represent prototypical temporal values (i.e. the 
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estimates represent five individual minutes rather than one or two larger 'five-minute' 
chunks), given the irregular nature of the actual task duration (see right-hand column 
of Figure 6) this interpretation cannot explain the overwhelming tendency to report 
estimates in multiples of five-minutes. 
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Figure 6. A tabulation of all actual durations against estimated durations 
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Further, it was predicted that one of the likely indictors of the tendency to 
report prototypical temporal values would be that there would be an inverse 
relationship between actual (& presumably estimated) duration and the coefficient of 
variability of the estimated duration. A significant (negative) Spearman rank order 
correlation of -.25 (p< .05) was found between the coefficient of variability of 
estimated durations and the actual durations of these estimates (n=160). Similarly, a 
significant (negative) Spearman rank order correlation of -.37 (p< .05) was found 
between the coefficient of variability of estimated durations and the relevant 
estimated durations (n= 160). These findings provide support for the view that shorter 
tasks are associated with more variable estimates than relatively longer ones. 
Hypothesis 3: Evaluation of task grouping strategy 
As has been mentioned, in order to investigate whether the grouping of short 
tasks together can increase duration estimation accuracy, half of the six tasks were 
'chunked' (grouped) together and presented as one task (the last three for group 1 and 
the first three for group 2). Firstly it needs to be shown that there were no significant 
completion time differences between the groups. 
The first numerical column of Table 4 shows the mean actual duration it took 
participants to complete the first three, second three, and all six tasks. A 2x2 mixed 
design ANOY A, with group being the between subject variable and whether the tasks 
were chunked together or not being the within subject variable, was conducted for the 
actual task durations. It revealed no main effect for group (F (1, 38) = 1.53, p=.22). 
This result confinns that the two groups do not differ significantly as far as the overall 
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duration it took to complete all six tasks. In addition, it revealed no main effect for 
the chunking variable (F (1, 38) = 1.46, p=.23). Likewise, the ANOV A revealed no 
significant interaction between the group and chunking variables (F (1, 38) = .15, 
p=.70). Taken together these three results suggest that there was no significant 
difference between the average completion durations of the first three and second 
three tasks. The result confinns the balancing of actual task duration for the first and 
second groups ofthree tasks (three pairs - see Materials section) had been successful. 
This non-significant difference means that analysis of the effect chunking these tasks 
together has on duration estimation accuracy can be conducted both within and across 
the two groups of participants. In addition, although not expected, this finding also 
suggests that chunking relati ve1y short duration tasks together has no significant 
positive ( or negative) effects on actual completion durations. 
Table 4. Duration estimation accuracy data comparing chunked and non-chunked tasks. 
Mean Time (&SDs) Mean {& median} Coefficient of Signed Error Mean Difference as a 
to Complete Estimated Time Variation of (Estimated - Actual Proportion of Actual 
(Seconds) (&SDs) to Complete Estimated Durations Time) Time Taken 
(Seconds) 
Presented separately I. Proofreading, 2. Deliver Letters, 3. 907 1446 {1440} 0.343 +539 59% 
River Reports (lOS) (496) 
Grouped together 4. Balance Sheet, 5. Candy Bar, 6. Order 770 1077 {900} 0.397 +307 40% 
Group 1 Documents (132) (428) 
All six tasks 1678 2523 0.325 +845 50% 
(132) (821) 
Grouped together L Proofreading, 2. Deliver Letters, 3. 874 966 {900} 0.373 +92 11% 
River Reports (182) (360) 
Presented separately 4. Balance Sheet, 5. Candy Bar, 6. Order 727 1327 {l170} 0.636 +600 83% 
Group 2 Documents (151 ) (844) 
All six tasks 1601 2293 0.493 +692 43% 
(232) (1130) 
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Turning now to the main question at hand - the effect of task chunking on 
expected duration estimation accuracy - numerical column two of Table 4 shows the 
mean estimated durations for the two conditions of each group. These means appear 
to demonstrate that chunking tasks to gether has had the effect of reducing 
overestimation of actual task durations. This is further backed up by the signed error 
(estimated duration - actual duration) data displayed in the fourth numerical column 
of Table 4. A similar trend is evident in the last column of Table 4 where this 
information is displayed as 'mean difference as a proportion of actual time taken'. 
Whereas presenting the first three tasks (proofreading, letter delivering, river reports) 
separately resulted in a mean overestimation of 59 per cent, presenting the same tasks 
grouped together resulted in a mean overestimation of only 11 per cent. Similarly, 
presenting the second three tasks (balancing the books, making a purchase, ordering 
documents) separately resulted in a mean overestimation of 83 per cent, whereas 
presenting the same tasks grouped together resulted in an mean overestimation of only 
40 per cent. 
A 2x2 mixed design ANOV A, with group (condition) being the between 
subject variable and whether the tasks were chunked together or not being the within 
subject variable, was conducted for estimated task durations (see Figure 7.). It 
revealed no main effect for group (F (1,38) = .54, p=,47). This result confirms that 
the two groups did not differ significantly as far as the overall duration estimated to 
complete all six tasks. In addition, it revealed no main effect of chunking (F (1,38) = 
.00, p=.96), which was expected due to the crossover nature of the experimental 
design (for group one the second three tasks were chunked together whereas for group 
two it was the first three). However, as expected, the ANOVA revealed a significant 
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Figure 7. A graphical representation of the relationship between the two groups and 
chunked vs. non-chunked tasks. 
More specifically, planned comparisons revealed significant differences 
between the two groups on their duration estimates for tasks one, two, and three (F 
(1,38) = 12.27, p=.OOl), group one's estimation oftasks one, two, and three and tasks 
four, five, and six (F (1,38) = 9.15, p=.004) and similarly group two's estimation of 
tasks one, two, and three and tasks four, five, and six (F (1,38) = 8.76, p=.005). 
Although in the right direction, the only comparison where a significant difference 
was not found was between the two groups and tasks four, five, and six (F (1,38) = 
1.39, p= .25). A possible reason why this comparison did not reach significance may 
have been due to the relatively large amount of variation evident in the estimates 
group one provided for tasks four, five, and six. 
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These results support the hypothesis put forward in the introduction that 
grouping relatively short duration tasks together results in less time being allocated to 
them and, in this case, more accurate estimates. It is argued that the reason for this is 
similar to the reason outlined above whereby shorter individual tasks were 
overestimated to a larger extent more often than longer ones. Specifically, as 
discussed earlier in the present experiment it is argued that the predominant 
prototypical temporal value is five minutes. Due to the fact that most of the six 
individual tasks have an average actual duration of less than five minutes participants 
will tend to be 'forced' to allocate the minimum feasible duration to their completion 
(i.e., five minutes) - resulting in very large overestimates for the shorter duration 
tasks (i.e., ordering documents and river reports). Alternatively, when presented with 
the three tasks grouped together, because ofthe substantially longer actual duration 
the same prototypical temporal value offive minutes enables a more fine-grained 
estimation than it did for the individual tasks. So rather than being forced to allocate 
15 minutes (which is the case when they allocate time for the three individual tasks-
three lots of five) they may decide to allocate 10 minutes instead. It is important to 
point out that it is not being suggested that all people will behave in this way when 
presented with a similar problem, only there is a predisposition for this to occur. 
Summary of Experiment 3 
The results provide support for the view that people tend to overestimate the 
durations of relatively short duration tasks. Additionally, it is argued that the pattern 
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of individual overestimation is primarily due to the effect of a local bias in the regions 
around the prototypic temporal value - in this case five-minute chunks. 
Further, the results appear to suggest that chunking short duration tasks 
together results in less time being allocated to their completion and therefore 
increased duration estimation accuracy. The suggested reason for this increase in 
estimation accuracy is the predisposition participants had to providing estimates that 
were in multiples of five minutes. As explained above, this predisposition means that 
inaccuracies are likely to be greater, the shorter the actual duration of the task is. 
However, although the above findings appear to provide evidence for 
chunking tasks together for scheduling purposes of relatively short duration tasks (less 
than five minutes) it is less clear what they mean for longer tasks. For instance, it 
seems likely that people will change the 'scale' (prototypical value) of their 
estimation as the actual duration increases. If asked to estimate how long it will take 
to read a 300-page manuscript it would seem unlikely that the predisposition towards 
estimates of multiples of fIve minutes would prevail! This being the case, the 
effectiveness of chunking tasks together in order to increase accuracy may be 
dependent on the association between the actual duration of the task and the 
prominent prototypical temporal value chosen. This association will be investigated 
in Experiment 4. 
7.2 Experiment 4: Chunking relatively long duration tasks (20-30 
minutes) together as a strategy to increase scheduling accuracy 
Introduction 
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Experiment 4 extends the generalisability of the findings from Experiment 3 
by assessing the effect chunking tasks together for scheduling purposes has on 
duration estimation accuracy in tasks of around 20-30 minutes each. The following 
four hypotheses will be tested: 
Hypothesis 1: When asked to schedule the completion of tasks rangingfrom 
20-40 minutes participants will tend to overestimate the time requiredfor their 
completion. 
Hypothesis 2a: When asked to estimate the duration of a to-be-completed task 
participants will be more likely to provide an estimation which is in the form 
of a prototypical temporal value (e.g., five-minute 'chunks:> than a non-
prototypical temporal value (e.g., one, two, or three minutes). 
Hypothesis 2b: As a result of the tendency to report prototypical temporal 
values there will be an inverse relationship between actual (& estimated) 
duration and the coefficient of variability of the estimated duration. 
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Hypothesis 3: Grouping tasks with an average individual duration of 20 - 40 
minutes together for scheduling purposes will result in less time being 
allocated to their completion (and therefore as a result of hypothesis 1, more 
accurate estimates) than if the same task were scheduled separately. 
Method 
Experiment design overview 
The experiment design was identical to that used in Experiment 3. 
Participants 
Forty participants, 19 males and 21 females; with a mean age of22.4 years, 
undertaking a variety of studies within the University of Canterbury participated in 
this experiment (none had participated in any ofthe three other experiments). Like 
Experiment 3, participants were remunerated for taking part in this experiment at a 
level similar to that expected in a workplace environment (NZ$30). The University of 




As in Experiment 3 the daily planner consisted of an A4 sheet of paper with a 
plain border headed up 'Daily Planner' (see Appendix 3). 
Activities 
Participants were required to complete four 'tasks'. One of the four 'tasks' in 
each of the two conditions had three sub-components, which resulted in six tasks 
being utilised in this experiment. Two criteria were used in the selection ofthese 
tasks. As with Experiment 3, a balance was sought between creating a verisimilitude 
of an office environment, and having tasks that all participants would find at least 
somewhat familiar and possible to complete. Secondly, individual tasks were 
designed so as to have a significantly longer average completion time than those used 
in Experiment 3. This was achieved by either increasing the magnitude of some of 
the tasks used in Experiment 3 or by designing new tasks that were trialled by 
volunteers and adjusted accordingly. Tasks with an average completion time of 
between 20-40 minutes were created. Similar to Experiment 3, an effort was made to 
match tasks on average completion times resulting in three pairs oftasks. As in 
Experiment 3 it was hoped that there would be no significant difference between the 
actual time it takes to complete the first three and the second three tasks. Although 
half of the tasks from Experiment 3 were retained in an extended fonn, three 
completely new tasks were designed for this experiment to help extend the external 
validity of the findings. The three pairs of tasks consisted of: 
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Pair one 
Task 1: Proofreading a 13-page document for spelling mistakes. 
Task 4: Entering 20 'bills ' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) into an account balance sheet 
creating a new balance as each bill is entered. 
Pair two 
Task 2: Writing a two-page report concerning the participants' Christmas holidays for 
a consumer research company. 
Task 5: Ordering 100 job applications with respect to the year they were received then 
alphabetised in respect to the applicant's surname (within that particular year). 
Pair three 
Task 3: Looking up (using a telephone book) and recording the contact details for 10 
different contractors for eight different types of contracting work. 
Task 6: Going to the campus library and retrieving sUbscription information on 11 
journals. 
Participants received a complete description of what the task involved along with 
'credible' justification (where required - see below) for the tasks' completion. All 
materials for completion ofthe tasks were provided to the participant (e.g., paper, 
pens, 'forms' in which to enter specified information, & phone book). Outlined 
below is the full description, as given to the participant, ofthe six tasks: 
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TASK 1 
A 13-page company report, typed (double spaced) on A 4 paper is provided. Your 
task is to proofread it for spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling mistake that you 
find. 
TASK 2 
The consumer research company you work for is currently interested in how 
people spend their holiday time. As part of this information gathering process you 
are required to write a two-page document describing what you did during the 
Christmas holidays. 
TASK 3 
The company you work for is thinking of building or renting a new office. As part 
of this process they want to get quotes from relevant providers. Using the 
telephone book (yellow pages) provided look-up and record the names and phone 
numbers (response forms provided) of 
10 Builders 10 Plumbers 
10 Real Estate Agents 
10 Civil Engineers 
10 Roofing Contractors 
TASK 4 
10 Concrete workers 
10 Interior Decorators 
10 Architects 
Twenty 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an account 
balance sheet. Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt column and 
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subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance after each 
subtraction (pen and paper subtraction - no calculator). 
TASK 5 
The company you workfor has many job application letters, which it has received 
over the past five years. These need to be ordered and filed. The folder contains 
100 job application letters. Firstly, you need to sort the letters with respect to the 
year they were sent. This will result infive groups of letters (1995,1996,1997, 
1998, and 1999). For each ofthesefive groups you are required to arrange the 
job applications in alphabetic order with respect to the applicant's surname (i.e. 
'A ' in the front, through to 'z' at the back). The paper clips provided should be 
used to keep each group together. 
Task 6 
The company you work for is thinking of subscribing to various academic 
journals. Your task is to gather subscription information on thesejournals 
(normally found on the inside front or back cover). Go to the current periodicals 
section of the main library and record the annual institutional subscription rate 
(non-airmail where applicable) and the subscription address for the following 10 
journals (call numbers provided): 
Utilitas 
Memory 
In/ant Behaviour & Development 
Journal 0/ Jewish Studies 
Pacific Affairs 





Journal 0/ Social & Evolutionary Systems 
Camera Obscura 










The procedure used in Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment 3 with the 
exception of the tasks that were completed. Specifically, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions. In the first condition (group 1) tasks 4, 5, and 6 
were grouped together as a single 'task' whereas tasks 1,2, and 3 were presented 
separately thus resulting in four to-be-scheduled and completed tasks. In condition 
two (group 2) tasks 1, 2, and 3 were grouped together while tasks 4, 5, and 6 were 
presented separately, again resulting in four to-be-scheduled and completed tasks. 




• A 13-page company report, typed (double spaced) on A4 paper is provided. Your 
task is to proofread it for spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling mistake that you 
find. When completed place the materials back in the folder and place the folder in the completed task tray. 
TASK 2 
The consumer research company you work for is currently interested in how 
people spend their holiday time. As part of this information gathering process you 
are required to write a two-page document describing what you did during the 
Christmas ho Ii days. When completed place the materials back in the folder and place the folder in the completed 
task tray. 
TASK 3 
• The company you work for is thinking of building or renting a new office. As 
part ofthis process they want to get quotes from relevant providers. Using the 
telephone book (yellow pages) provided look-up and record the names and phone 
numbers (response forms provided) of: 
10 Builders 
10 Real Estate Agents 
10 Civil Engineers 
10 Roofing Contractors 
10 Plumbers 
10 Concrete workers 
lOIn terior Decorators 
10 Architects 
When completed place the materials back in thefolder and place thefolder in the completed task tray. 
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TASK 4 
• Twenty 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an account 
balance sheet. Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt column and 
subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance after each 
subtraction (pen and paper subtraction - no calculator) .. 
• The company you work for has many job application letters, which it has received 
over the past 5 years. These need to be ordered and filed. The folder contains 100 
job application letters. Firstly, you need to sort the letters with respect to the year 
they were sent. This will result in 5 groups ofletters (1995,1996, 1997, 1998, 
and 1999). For each ofthese 5 groups you are required to arrange the job 
applications in alphabetic order with respect to the applicant's surname (i.e. 'A' in 
the front, through to 'Z' at the back). The paper clips provided should be used to 
keep each group together. 
• The company you work for is thinking of subscribing to various academic 
journals. Your task is to gather subscription information on these journals 
(normally found on the inside front or back cover). Go to the current periodicals 
section of the main library and record the annual institutional sUbscription rate 
(non-airmail where applicable) and the subscription address for the following ten 
journals (call numbers provided): 
Utilitas 
Memory 
Infant Behaviour & Development 







Journal of Social & Evolutionary Systems 
Camera Obscura 
New German Critique 
The Lichenologist 
Physiological Reviews 
When completed place the materials back in the folder and place the folder in the completed task tray. t t 
Condition two: 
"TASK 1 
• A 13-page company report, typed (double spaced) on A4 paper is provided. Your 
task is to proofread it for spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling mistake that you 
find. 
• The consumer research company you work for is currently interested in how 
people spend their holiday time. As part ofthis information gathering process you 
are required to write a two-page document describing what you did during the 
Christmas holidays. 
• The company you work for is thinking of building or renting a new office. As 
part ofthis process they want to get quotes from relevant providers. Using the 
telephone book (yellow pages) provided look-up and record the names and phone 
numbers (response forms provided) of: 
10 Builders 
10 Real Estate Agents 
10 Civil Engineers 
10 Roofing Contractors 
10 Plumbers 
10 Concrete workers 








When completed place the materials back in the/older alld place the/older ill the completed task tray. 
TASK2 
• Twenty 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an account 
balance sheet. Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt column and 
subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance after each 
subtraction (pen and paper subtraction - no calculator). When completed place the materials 
back ill the/older and place the/older in the completed task tray. 
TASK 3 
• The company you work for has many job application letters, which it has received 
over the past 5 years. These need to be ordered and filed. The folder contains 100 
job application letters. Firstly, you need to sort the letters with respect to the year 
they were sent. This will result in 5 groups ofletters (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 
and 1999). For each of these 5 groups you are required to arrange the job 
applications in alphabetic order with respect to the applicant's surname (i.e. 'A' in 
the front, through to 'z' at the back). The paper clips provided should be used to 
keep each group together. When completed place the materials back In the/older and place the/older in the 
completed ta~'k tray. 
TASK 4 
• The company you work for is thinking of subscribing to various academic 
journals. Your task is to gather SUbscription information on these journals 
(normally found on the inside front or back cover). Go to the current periodicals 
section of the main library and record the annual institutional subscription rate 
(non-airmail where applicable) and the SUbscription address for the following ten 
journals (call numbers provided): 
Utilitas 
Memory 
Infant Behaviour & Development 







Journal of Social & Evolutionary Systems 
Camera Obscufll 
New German Critique 
The Lichenologist 
Physiological Reviews 
" When completed place the materials back In the folder and place the folder In the completed task tray, 
Task scheduling and completion 
As in Experiment 3 participants were seated individually at a table, which 
contained: experimental instructions, task activity descriptions, a daily planner, four 
folders containing the task materials, a telephone directory, and a 'Completed Task' 






was placed in front of them. These instructions were identical to those used in 
Experiment 3. 
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Like Experiment 3 the participant was required to schedule the completion of 
the four tasks using the daily planner. Once this was finished they completed the tasks 
in the sequential order they had chosen. Identical to Experiment 3 the researcher 
discretely recorded the time taken for the participant to complete each task. Upon 
completion participants were paid, debriefed, and thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
Hypothesis 1: The tendency to overestimate actual duration 
The data was examined to detennine the degree to which participants were 
able to estimate how long it would take to complete the three tasks which they where 
presented individually (as opposed to the three that were grouped together as 'one 
task'). Again, due to the crossover design used in this experiment only half of the 
participants provided individual time estimates for any particular task. The first and 
second numerical columns in Table 5 show the mean actual and estimated times for 
the completion of each task, the third numerical column shows the coefficient of 
variation of the estimation, the fourth the mean signed error (estimated minus actual 
duration), and the fifth numerical column shows the signed error as a proportion of 
the actual time taken. 
Table 5. Summary oftask duration estimation accuracy. 
Mean Time (&SDs) to Mean Estimated Time Coefficient of Signed Error Mean Difference as a Proportion of 
Complete (Seconds) (&SDs) to Complete Variation of Estimated (Estimated Time - Proportion ff Actual Participants who 
(Seconds) Durations Actual) Time Taken Overestimated Actual 
Duration 
1. ProofTeading 1472 1425 0.420 -47 3% 50% 
(552) (599) 
2. Written Report 1339 1695 OA98 +356 26% 60% 
Group 1 data n=20 (305) (844) 
3. Contact Detail Look-up 1841 1518 OA47 -323 18% 40% 
(430) (678) 
4. Balance Sheet 1332 1356 OA34 +24 2% 50% 
(623) (589) 
5. Order Document~ 1125 1551 0.399 +426 38% 80% 
Group 2 data n=20 (191) (619) 
6. Library Subscription Details 2142 2175 0.260 +33 2% 60% 
(418) (566) 
All Six Tasks 9252 9720 0.199 +468 5% 
(991) (1939) 
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In contrast to Experiment 3, the current experiment's mean signed errors 
(numerical column 4) are not positive for all six tasks. For two of the tasks the actual 
duration tended to be underestimated (proofreading & contact detail look-up). A 
more infonnative description of the pattern of over and underestimates is gained by 
looking at individual tendencies. The last column of Table 5 shows the proportion of 
participants who overestimated completion durations. The pattern of results appear 
similar to those found in Experiment 3 in that higher numbers of overestimation 
appear to be associated with shorter actual durations and vice versa. This pattern of 
results is consistent with the explanation given in Experiment 3. 
Hypothesis 2 a & b: The tendency to report prototypical temporal values 
By tabulating actual durations against estimated durations a convincing 
argument can be made that people tend to round their expected duration estimates to 
prototypical temporal values. Similar to Experiment 3's estimates, Figure 8 
demonstrates that participants in this experiment tended to favour (potentially) 
prototypical temporal values like 10 15, 30, 40, 45, 50, 60 and 90 minutes (see the 
very top and very bottom rows of Figure 8. From looking at the pattern of estimation 
in Figure 8 it appears that participants are alternating between rounding to arithmetic 
prototypical values in the fonn of multiples of 10 and socially derived temporal 

























Estimated duration to the nearest minute 
Cumulative total of the number of estimates for each respective duration 
Figure 8. A tabulation of all actual durations against estimated durations (note that 






















































Further, it was predicted in Hypothesis 2b that in line with the tendency to 
report prototypical temporal values, there would be an inverse relationship between 
actual (& presumably estimated) duration and the coefficient of variability of the 
estimated duration. Similar to the result presented in Experiment 3 a significant 
(negative) SpeaITI1an rank order correlation of -.54 (p< .05) was found between the 
coefficient of variability of estimated durations and the actual durations ofthese 
estimates (n=160). Likewise, a significant (negative) SpeaITI1an rank order correlation 
of -.49 (p< .05) was found between the coefficient of variability of estimated 
durations and the relevant estimated durations (n=160). These findings provide 
support for the view that shorter tasks are associated with more variable estimates 
than relatively longer ones. 
These correlations further strengthen the explanation put forward in 
Experiment 3 that this relationship is primarily due to the magnitude differences of 
the preferred prototypical temporal values as the duration oftasks increase. 
Specifically, as discussed earlier, because people appear to have a tendency to 
estimate prototypical temporal values there will be a larger magnitude of variation of 
estimates for shorter tasks. 
Hypothesis 3: Evaluation of task grouping strategy 
Half ofthe six tasks were grouped together and presented as 'one' task (the 
last three for group one and the first three for group two). It first needs to be shown 
that there was no significant difference between the groups and the first three and 
second three tasks as far as actual completion times were concerned so that 
comparisons can be made both between and within the two groups in respect to 
expected duration estimates. 
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The first numerical column of Table 6 shows the mean actual time it took 
participants to complete the first three, second three, and all six tasks for both groups. 
A 2x2 mixed design ANOVA, with group being the between subject variable, and 
whether the tasks were grouped together or not being the within subject variable, was 
conducted for the actual task durations. It revealed no main effect for group (F (1, 38) 
= 2.91, p=.1 0). This result confirms that the two groups did not differ significantly in 
the actual duration it took to complete all six tasks. Likewise, the ANOV A revealed 
no significant interaction between the group and chunking variables (F (1, 38) = .40, 
p=.54). However, it revealed a main effect for the chunking variable (F (1, 38) = 
9.49, p=.004). To further analyse this effect a Post Hoc Tukey HSD test was 
undertaken, which revealed a significant difference (p= .02) between the average 
duration that group 1 took to complete tasks four, five, and six and group 2 to 
complete tasks one, two, and three (in both cases these were the tasks that were 
chunked together). Although this is not the ideal outcome it does not affect any of the 
important analyses concerning expected duration estimation (the difference in actual 
duration is between tasks that have been chunked together for both groups). Overall 
these results confirm that the important parts of balancing actual task duration for the 
first and second sets of three tasks had been successful. This means that, analysis of 
the effect chunking tasks together had on duration estimates could be undertaken both 
within and across the two groups of participants. This finding also reconfirms that 
grouping tasks together has no significant positive ( or negative) effects on actual 
completion durations. 
Table 6. Duration estimation accuracy data comparing chunked and non-chunked tasks 
Mean Time (&SDs) to Mean {& median} Coefficient of Variation of Signed Error Mean Difference as a 
Complete (Seconds) Estimated Time (&SDs) to Estimated Durations (Estimated - Actual Time) Proportion of Aetna] Time 
Complete (Seconds) Taken 
Presented separately I.Proofreading, 2. Written 4653 4638 {4350} 0.34] +]5 0.3% 
Report, 3. Contact Detail Look- (863) (1580) 
up 
Chunked together 4. Balance Sheet, 5. Order 4298 3540 {3600} 0.381 -758 18% 
Group 1 Documents, 6. Library (609) (1347) 
Subscription Details 
All six tasks 8951 8178 0.318 -773 9% 
(1219) (2601) 
Chunked together 1. Proofreading, 2. Written 5134 3579 {3600} 0.356 -1555 30% 
Report, 3. Contact Detail Look- (988) (1275) 
up 
Presented separately 4. Balance Sheet, 5. Order 4599 5082 {5100} 0.238 +483 11% 
Group 2 Documents, 6. Library (917) (1210) 
Subscription Details 
All six tasks 9733 8661 0.239 -1072 11% 
(1648) (2072) 
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Turning now to the main question at hand - the effect of task chunking on 
expected duration estimation accuracy - numerical column two of Table 6 shows the 
mean estimated times for the two conditions for each group. A 2x2 mixed design 
ANOV A, with group being the between subject variable and whether the tasks were 
chunked together or not being the within subj ect variable, was conducted for 







































-0- Group 1 
(tasks 4,5,6 chunked together) 
-a- Group 2 
(tasks 1,2,3 chunked together) 
Figure 9. A graphical representation of the relationship between the two groups and 
chunked vs. non-chunked tasks 
The results of the ANOVA revealed no main effect for group (F (1, 38) = .42, 
p=.52). This result confirms that the two groups did not differ significantly as far as 
159 
overall duration estimated to complete all six tasks. In addition, it revealed no main 
effect for the chunking variable (F (1, 38) = .88, p=.36). As mentioned in Experiment 
3, due to the crossover nature ofthe experimental design (for group one the second 
three tasks were chunked together whereas for group two it was the fIrst three) a non-
signifIcant result was expected. However, as expected, the ANOV A revealed a 
signifIcant interaction between the group and chunking variables (F (1, 38) = 36.16, 
p=.OOOO). More specifIcally, planned comparisons revealed signifIcant differences 
between the two groups on their duration estimates for tasks one, two, and three (F (1, 
38) = 5.44, p=.03), tasks four, five, and six (F (1,38) = 14.5, p= .000), group one's 
estimation of tasks one, two, and three and tasks four, five, and six (F (1, 38) = 12.89, 
p=.OOl), and similarly group two's estimation of tasks one, two, and three and tasks 
four, five, and six (F (1, 38) = 24.15, p=.OOO). This finding replicates the fInding of 
Experiment 3 whereby chunking tasks together had a significant effect on expected 
duration estimates. 
In contrast to Experiment 3, this reduction in estimated duration did not result 
in increased accuracy of the estimations (see numerical columns 4 & 5 of Table 6). In 
fact when presented separately these somewhat longer tasks were estimated with a 
relatively high degree of accuracy. Whereas chunking tasks together resulted in 




The concluding chapter will begin by briefly summarising my process model 
of expected duration estimation, pointing out which linkages/components of the 
model have received empirical support from the four experiments conducted as part of 
this thesis. The second part of the chapter will discuss the findings of these 
experiments in relation to time management, specifically task scheduling. 
The general thrust of my model outlined earlier in Figure 4, is that people will 
attempt to estimate the expected duration of an upcoming event or task by 'reflecting' 
back upon memories of similar tasks. It is argued that this 'reflection' will often 
involve reconstructing event/s from memory traces (Burt & Kemp, 1994). 
Additionally, it is argued that although these remembered events may be 
'reconstructed' they will often appear to be a verisimilar representation (Michon, 
1990) of a specific event. 
The process of making an expected duration estimate begins by 'searching' 
autobiographical and/or semantic memory for useful memory traces that can be 
reconstructed into useable memories. It was argued that useful autobiographical 
memory traces are likely to be cued at varying levels of specificity. Drawing upon the 
work of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), three levels of specificity were 
identified as potentially providing useful information. At the broadest level are 
memories that contain thematic knowledge concerning a period of a person's life. At 
the next level of specificity are those memories that are made up of a collage of 
similar events. Finally, at the most specific level, and of most direct utility to 
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providing duration estimates, are vivid memories of a specific event, and what 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) refer to as 'event-specific knowledge'. 
Importantly for the present focus, memories at lower levels of specificity are likely to 
cue more specific and useful memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
These memories are presumed to be categorised in relation to their usefulness 
or similarity to the to-be-estimated task or event. Task relevant semantic knowledge 
is likely to be utilised in this categorisation process. For example, a person who is 
required to estimate how long it is going to take them to deliver a package across 
town during peak: time is likely to draw upon their understanding of the tenn 'peak: 
time', and categorise memories of driving across town during early afternoon as being 
less relevant/useful than memories of where they travelled at Spm. 
It is also argued that the reconstructed events will often be in the fonn of 
schematic event memories rather than reconstructions of a specific event (Michon, 
1998; Schank, 1999). Experiment 1 addressed an aspect of these schematic event 
memories - specifically the effect that presenting a highly salient similar to-be-
estimated task has on a subsequent task estimate. The results of this experiment could 
be interpreted as suggesting that schematic event memories can potentially be 
'adjusted' with a single presentation of a similar task. It was tentatively argued that it 
was the saliency of the single presentation which effected the following estimation: if 
participants were required to estimate the completion of the similar task a day or two 
before, rather than immediately before, it would not have had such a large effect (if 
any) on their estimate. Furthermore, following on from this interpretation, the 'up-
dating' of schematic event memories appear to occur even when the person has not 
actually 'experienced' the event firsthand - which is inline with the reconstructive 
process involving a verisimilar representation advocated in Chapter 4. 
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Connected to this process of reconstructing useful events from memory is the 
estimation of how long these eventls took? It is suggested that this temporal 
information can be derived through two potentially complementary yet distinct 
methods - through memory of 'clock time' of the referent event or reconstructing the 
duration from the referent memory. Firstly, as clocks and watches are so pervasive in 
modem society it is argued that temporal aspects of the day (especially in work 
situations) are often encoded directly into memory. Secondly, there are probably just 
as many situations where the temporal estimate will be based on 'subjective time' 
(Boltz, 1998b) derived from reconstructions of remembered events or tasks (which 
are most likely schematic in nature). 
Lastly, the model suggests that the 'raw' estimate is likely to be 'adjusted' by 
two different moderators. Firstly, it is suggested that internally or externally derived 
temporal boundaries will influence the estimate either up or down depending upon the 
nature of the temporal boundary. Experiment 2 demonstrated that externally derived 
temporal boundaries effect expected duration estimates - even when they are remote 
in nature. Secondly, the model suggests that because an estimate is likely to be 
inexact, it will be rounded affecting the accuracy of the final estimate. Furthermore, 
this rounding will often result in the estimator favouring prototypical temporal values. 
Experiments 3 and 4 provided support for this rounding and the use of prototypical 
temporal values. 
Below, the findings of all four experiments are discussed in relation to the 
scheduling of tasks as part of the time management process. 
The results in Experiment 1 demonstrated that the scheduling of an earlier 
similar task can affect the amount of time allocated to a task. It has been suggested 
that this effect could be due to an updating of schematic event memory, in that the 
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process of estimating the duration of the first task potentially affects memory in a 
similar way to actually having completed it. Although a lot more research is needed 
to fully understand the role schematic event memory plays in expected duration 
estimation, it is interesting to speculate whether it may be feasible to develop an 
algorithm for scheduling software that could 'measure' the degree of task typicality 
and adjust the estimate accordingly. Such an algorithm would need to effectively 
classify tasks (both type and temporal magnitude) and 'predict' individual response 
biases in relation to the tasks' typicality (probably based on a combination of the 
number of exposures and relative saliency of a similar 'class' of task). The measure 
of typicality would be developed over time by recording and analysing the 
effectiveness ofprevious scheduling. To be truly effective it would also have to take 
into account the person's awareness of the degree of typicality in relation to their 
schematic event memory for that 'type' of task (i.e. is the person already adjusting the 
estimate appropriately?). Again, this would need to be achieved by recording and 
analysing the effectiveness of previous scheduling. 
Additionally, one of the interesting and largely unexplained processes evident 
in Experiments 3 and 4 (and most other estimation research) is that people appear to 
be able to choose and adjust the temporal 'scale' of their expected duration 
estimation. Specifically, whereas five minute chunks seem to be the standard for 
Experiment 3 (Figure 6), quarter-hour chunks seem to become the dominant scale as 
the tasks get longer in Experiment 4 (Figure 8). Given the difficulty of making 
expected duration estimates it is somewhat surprising estimators are as effective as 
they are at choosing an appropriate scale. It is argued that this choice involves, along 
with other task and estimator variables (such as experience at making duration 
estimates and temporal bounding effects), an analysis of the task typicality in relation 
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to the person's schematic event memory for that type of task. Similarly, the pattern of 
results may partly be a consequence of people choosing their scale values based on 
the first task. Therefore, if a short task is first then people will use a smaller 
scale/prototypical temporal value, meaning they will tend to allocate less time for the 
following longer task, and vice versa for long tasks that are first. 
Experiment 2 suggested, in contrast to most other research in the area, that 
temporal boundaries (even remote ones) can be useful in directing/constraining a 
person's expected duration estimation. What does this result suggest about the 
facilitation of accurate expected duration estimation when used as part of the 
scheduling process? It is argued that there clearly needs to be appropriate boundary 
information provided to the person to ensure accurate expected duration estimation (to 
avoid large overestimates of actual duration). Although it is acknowledged that 
nearly all real-world scheduling is undertaken with the aid (or hindrance!) of some 
kind of temporal boundary, it is argued that on the whole these boundaries are 
inappropriate they inhibit accuracy instead of facilitating it. For instance, in work 
situations temporal boundaries imposed on the task scheduler tend to be pragmatic in 
nature (e.g., the PowerPoint presentation needs to be completed by Monday a 11am 
because that is when it is required in order for Mike to be able to conduct his seminar) 
rather than reflective of the nature and/or likely duration ofthe task. 
Typically, the most salient temporal boundary in a work situation will be in 
the form of a completion deadline. Although this deadline potentially may provide 
directive feedback of the potential required duration, on the whole it will be externally 
imposed (not necessarily a bad thing) and have no logical or temporal connection to 
the actual potential duration of the task. 
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How could this situation be improved? Potentially the most effective way to 
provide appropriate temporal boundary prompting would be by utilising scheduling 
software. It may be possible to develop an algorithm that takes into account 
individual and task variables and, based on past success at estimating the duration of 
previous similar tasks, provide appropriate boundary prompts. Specifically, this could 
take the form of a maximum duration or range. Additionally, it will probably include 
a selection of an appropriate temporal segmentation (made by the software) in order 
to help 'enforce' appropriate boundaries (Burt & Forsyth, 1999). 
More research will be required to determine the exact form that this prompting 
would take. The difficultly will be identifying the most appropriate boundary scale 
and saliency. It is likely that un-weighted temporal data from estimating previous 
similar tasks may impose too tight a boundary, resulting in underestimation of the 
upcoming tasks' actual duration. It is likely that a weighted temporal value (or more 
likely a range) will result in the most effective feedback. The actual weighting is 
likely to vary with actual durations of the upcoming tasks and across different people. 
Additionally, the level of saliency of the prompt will be an important variable to 
determine. It is most likely that the person scheduling the task will have a more 
intermit understanding of the to-be-completed task, so the boundary prompt should 
not override this potentially useful information. Alternatively, the prompt will need to 
be salient enough to have the desired effect of facilitating accurate duration estimates. 
As with the issue of scale, there is likely to be both individual and task specific 
differences to the required saliency. 
However that said, there are many lower-tech strategies that could be utilised 
to improve the effectiveness of temporal boundaries. For example, supervisors and 
managers could be trained to provide more appropriate 'deadlines' when assigning 
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work to their incumbents. Alternatively, the idea put forward by Burt and Forsyth 
(1999) concerning the development of scheduling materials, which reflect the 
requirement of the specific types of tasks generally carried out by the person, could 
also be developed in a way for these materials to provide useful temporal boundaries. 
Before moving on to the final two experiments it is wOlth pointing out a 
potential confound in Experiment 2. Whereas the two shorter temporally bounded 
scenarios required that the estimator imagine that they had just arrived for work (day 
not specified), the longest temporally bounded scenario required that they imagine 
that they had just arrived for work on Monday morning. Although it is my view that 
this difference did not confound the results, it is a possibility wOlth mentioning. It 
could be argued that inclusion of 'Monday morning' in the longest temporal boundary 
scenario led participants to beHeve that they had more time than the other scenarios. 
Therefore, in hindsight, it may have been more appropriate to have all three scenarios 
beghll1ing on Monday morning. 
Experiments 3 and 4 suggested that people tend to report prototypical duration 
values when making expected estimates - these two experiments suggest somewhere 
in the magnitude of between 70 and 85 per cent of estimates could be expected to be 
of this sort. Secondly, this bias has a significant effect on the accuracy of expected 
duration estimates. 
As far as the relatively short duration individual tasks used in Experiment 3 
were concerned, there tended to be an inverse relationship between the degree of 
overestimation and the actual task duration. It was suggested that this was 
predominately caused by the tendency for participants to provide prototypical 
estimation values (in this case five minutes). Further, chunking the tasks in lots of 
three resulted in more accurate duration estimates. Again, this was explained by the 
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tendency to report prototypical values, which in this case resulted in the participant 
being able to provide a more 'fine-grained' estimation for the longer actual duration 
ofthe three chunked together tasks. 
The fmdings from Experiment 3 are most relevant for people who are required 
to complete numerous short duration tasks. For example, individuals undertaking 
secretarial work are continually required to undertake a multitude of 'small' tasks. 
Teaching these individuals to identify and chunk together appropriate short duration 
tasks may facilitate scheduling the completion of such tasks. An effective way to 
achieve this may be to develop software that prompts the user when they should 
chunk tasks together. 
A similar pattern of results, in respect to the predisposition to report 
prototypical temporal values, was found in Experiment 4 using somewhat longer 
tasks. However, overall there was less overestimation (in fact on average some tasks 
were underestimated), which is to be expected ifpeople are relying on similar 
magnitude (i.e., five minutes or even 10 minutes) prototypical values reported in 
Experiment 3, whereby participants have a real choice of estimates both below and 
above the actual duration. Further, as in Experiment 3 there tended to be an inverse 
relationship between overestimation and actual duration. Similar to Experiment 3, 
grouping three of the tasks together resulted in significantly less estimated duration. 
However, unlike Experiment 3 this resulted in less accurate estimation. Unlike the 
shorter tasks used in Experiment 3 it appears that these somewhat longer tasks will be 
most efficiently scheduled individually rather than being chunked together, although 
further replication of this finding is required. 
There are many questions concerning the tendency to report prototypical 
values that these two experiments do not adequately answer. For example, is it 
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possible to predict which prototypical values people will favour? Similarly, how do 
people choose the magnitude of the prototypical value they will use (Experiments 3 & 
4 suggest that there is quite a lot of consistency across participants on this matter)? 
Another important issue is whether the pattern of reporting observed in these two 
experiments represent a number of different prototypical values (i.e., 5, 10, 15,30) 
that are common in our culture, or do they represent multiples of a single (or a few) 
prototypical values (i.e., five minutes)? Although these studies can not adequately 
answer this question it is interesting to note the relatively high number of 40 minute 
estimates as opposed to 45 minute ones in Experiment 4 (see Figure 8), which points 
to a 'multiple-of prototype scenario (whereas 'three quarters of an hour' is a popular 
prototypical temporal value in our culture, 40 minutes is not). The reality is probably 
a combination of both. 
Additionally, the tendency for people to estimate prototypical temporal values 
may be helpful in explaining some of the variation found in expected duration studies 
to date. For example as mentioned earlier, unlike many other similar studies (e.g., 
Burt & Kemp, 1994) Francis-Smythe and Robertson's (1999) expected duration 
estimation experiment did not find evidence of a general trend towards overestimation 
in relatively short duration tasks. This lack of relative overestimation may be partly 
explained by the effect of the rounding of estimates to prototypical temporal values. 
As the single task used for the expected duration estimation had a median actual 
duration a little over the prototypical value (five minutes), it is probably not surprising 
that there was less overestimation than in previous similar studies (e.g., Burt & Kemp, 
1994 ). 
Although more research needs to be undertaken to fully understand the 
rounding of estimates to prototypical temporal values, a number of issues can be 
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discussed based on the findings of Experiments 3 and 4. Following is a discussion of 
the possible reasons why people appear to favour prototypical temporal values (and 
choose their scale), and some recommendations for increasing the accuracy of 
expected duration estimation where prototypical temporal values are reported. 
Why do people tend to round their estimates to prototypical temporal values 
and how do they choose the temporal scale? Firstly as Artieda and Pastor (1996, 
p.12) point out, "our perception oftime is always relative to our experience of the 
duration of a temporal unit (a second, a minute etc.)". Specifically, the threshold of 
discrimination comparison ofthe relative durations of two intervals is dependent on 
their objective duration. It is all a matter of scale - whereas a person is likely to be 
able to discriminate between a duration lasting two minutes and one lasting three 
minutes, it is unlikely they could successfully do the same for a duration lasting 40 
minutes and one lasting 41 minutes, even though the difference between the two 
durations is the same in both examples - one minute. 
Likewise, as outlined above, the prototypical temporal values found in these 
studies are values that are repeatedly used and reinforced in our culture, so gaining 
their prototypicality - they are learned ways of representing temporal category 
information. In their study of autobiographical memory Huttenlocher, Hedges, 
Bradburn (1990) suggest that the over-representation of prototype values, which stand 
for a larger category, occur primarily when memory for the duration is inexact. 
Clearly the same type of reasoning can be applied here with expected duration. In 
fact, there should be a greater use of these prototypes given the fact that not only are 
the estimates most likely based on an inexact memory of an event, it is most likely 
that the event will not be an exact facsimile of the expected task. There is some 
support for this view from Experiments 3 and 4. Whereas only 70 per cent of 
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estimates from Huttenlocher, et al.'s (1990) retrospective duration estimation studies 
could be categorised as being prototypical values, in Experiment 3 and 4, 
respectively, 73 and 83 per cent of duration estimates were in the form of prototypical 
values. 
In a related issue, Yarmey (2000) interestingly uses the fact that people tend to 
round durations to suggest that relatively long durations, greater than 10 minutes or 
so, must represent reconstructions of likely time spans rather than accurate 
recapitulation He suggests that in his study people appeared to round these longer 
durations to minutes ending in zero or five - unlike the shorter durations which may 
be a recapitulation of the actual event because this rounding was not evident. 
However it is suggested that his reasoning may be flawed, and that in fact the 
relative magnitude of rounding is similar for relatively short and long duration tasks -
although this is not obvious when comparing duration estimates which vary in scale 
from a few seconds to many minutes. Specifically, rather than rounding to minutes 
ending in zero or five, shorter duration estimates in some cases may be rounded to the 
nearest minute. 
Shifting attention to the value of chunking tasks together as a strategy to 
reduce the effect of rounding estimates to prototypical temporal values, Experiment 3 
and 4 suggested that tasks of certain durations should be chunked together for 
scheduling purposes whereas others might need to be split up. Specifically, these 
experiments suggested that it may be useful to chunk together a number of relatively 
short duration tasks (e.g., less than five minutes) for scheduling purposes. 
Alternatively, for longer tasks (e.g., one -{)ne and half hours) more accurate duration 
estimation may be achieved by, where possible, splitting the task up into sub-
components for scheduling purposes. 
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How would this be done? After all if the person knows how long the task is 
going to take there will not be a problem to estimate its duration. To a certain extent 
this is true, however it is argued that as most people carry out reasonably similar tasks 
in their day-to-day work they should be able to decide (if given the proper guidance) 
whether to group, split, or leave the to-be-scheduled task when making an expected 
duration estimation. Alternatively, scheduling software could be developed to prompt 
the person to undertake one or other of the three possible strategies based on past 
experience of various similar tasks. It is worth noting at this point that, as with most 
computerised initiatives suggested here, there is a requirement that the person 
provides feedback on the relative success of past duration estimates. 
Further, in relation to the view put forward above concerning the potential 
overriding ability of the scheduler segmentation, it may be the case that people should 
be encouraged to group tasks together in ways that are appropriate for their particular 
daily scheduler segmentation. 
Finally, there is a third and potentially useful way to overcome the local 
biasing effects of the tendency to rely on prototypical durations - expected duration 
estimates could be 'corrected' so as to account for this biasing effect. In support of 
this possibility, Hartley et al. (1977) suggest that if a common response bias could be 
effectively identified (i.e., consistently over or underestimate) it could be corrected by 
statistical means. This process is a real possibility with the proliferation of 
computerised schedulers that have the potential to make this correction automatic. It 
is likely that, similar to what has been mentioned earlier, software would need to 
undergo a substantial 'learning' period concerning the individual's idiosyncrasies 
using prototypical duration estimates, while at the same time receiving feedback on 
the accuracy of past expected duration estimates. That said, such statistical 
corrections remain an interesting possibility for not only the biasing effect of 
prototypical durations but for all 'regularly' occurring biases. 
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In conclusion, this thesis has attempted to provide a greater understanding of 
expected duration estimation. It has used the scheduling component of the time 
management process as a real-world situation in which to develop a process model of 
expected duration estimation, and to test some of the components of that model. 
Although many of the components in the proposed model are yet to be directly 
empirically validated, it is intended that the model and associated research presented 
in this thesis will provide an effective platform for further investigation into this 
interesting, complex, and pertinent topic. 
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Appendix 1 
Experiment 1 stimuli 
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You are invited to participate in a study which requires you 
to estimate how long you think it will take you to complete 
the tasks in the four following scenarios. Please read the 
descriptions carefully before making your estimation 
Age ........ . Gender: female I male 
Task 1 
Five 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an account balance sheet. 
Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt column and subtract the amount 
from the balance, creating a new balance after each subtraction (pen and paper 
subtraction - no calculator). How long do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 2 
Twenty 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an account balance 
sheet. Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt column and subtract the 
amount from the balance, creating a new balance after each subtraction (pen and paper 
subtraction - no calculator). How long do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 3 
A three-page document typed (double-spaced) on A4 paper is provided. Your task is to 
proofread it for spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling mistake that you find. How long 
do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 4 
A 13-page document typed (double spaced) on A4 paper is provided. Your task is to 
proofread it for spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling mistake that you find. How long 
do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Thank you, for your va7uab7e participation. 
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You are invited to participate in a study which requires you 
to estimate how long you think it will take you to complete 
the tasks in the four following scenarios. Please read the 
descriptions carefully before making your estimation 
Age ........ . Gender: female / male 
Task 1 
Twenty 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an account balance 
sheet. Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt column and subtract the 
amount from the balance, creating a new balance after each subtraction (pen and paper 
subtraction - no calculator). How long do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 2 
Five 'bills' (e.g., power bill, phone bill) are provided, along with an account balance sheet. 
Your task is to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt column and subtract the amount 
from the balance, creating a new balance after each subtraction (pen and paper 
subtraction - no calculator). How long do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 3 
A 13-page document typed (double spaced) on A4 paper is provided. Your task is to 
proofread it for spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling mistake that you find. How long 
do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 4 
A three-page document typed (double-spaced) on A4 paper is provided. Your task is to 
proofread it for spelling mistakes. Circle each spelling mistake that you find. How long 
do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Thank you, for your va7uab7e participation. 
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Appendix 2 
Experiment 2 stimuli 
204 
You are invited to participate in a study which requires you 
to estimate how long you think it will take you to complete 
the tasks in the "three following scenarios. Please read 
the descriptions carefully before making your estimation 
Age ........ . Gender: female / male 
Task 1 
Imagine that you have just arrived at work and your boss approaches you with a task which she 
would like completed before morning tea time. What she would like you to do is to proofread for 
spelling mistakes a thirteen page company report (A4, typed, and double spaced). How long do you 
think it is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 2 
Imagine that you have just arrived at work and your boss approaches you with a task which they 
would like completed before lunch time. The company you work for is thinking of building a new 
factory. As part of this process your boss wants you to record the contact details of relevant 
providers so quotes can be requested at a later date. Using the yellow pages of the telephone book 
you need to look-up and record the names and phone numbers of: 
10 Builders 10 Plumbers 
10 Real Estate Agents 10 Concrete workers 
10 Civil Engineers 10 Interior Decorators 
10 Roofing Contractors 10 Architects 
How long do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 3 
Imagine that it's Monday morning and you have just arrived at work and your boss approaches you 
with a task which they would like completed by the end of the week. The task involves entering ten 
invoices into the company balance sheet (e.g., power bill, phone bill). You will need to enter the 
'billed amount' in the debt column and subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance 
after each subtraction (pen and paper subtraction - no calculator). How long do you think this is 
going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Thank you, Tor your valuable participation. 
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You are invited to participate in a study which requires you 
to estimate how long you think it will take you to complete 
the tasks in the three following scenarios. Please read 
the descriptions carefully before making your estimation 
Age ........ . Gender: female / male 
Task 1 
Imagine that it's Monday morning and you have just arrived at work and your boss approaches you 
with a task wnich she would like completed by the end of the week. What she would like you to do 
is to proofread for spelling mistakes a thirteen page company report (A4, typed, and double 
spaced). How long do you think it is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 2 
Imagine that you have just arrived at work and your boss approaches you with a task which she 
would like completed before morning tea time. The company you work for is thinking of building a 
new factory. As part of this process your boss wants you to record the contact details of relevant 
providers so quotes can be requested at a later date. Using the yellow pages of the telephone book 
you need to look-up and record the names and phone numbers of: 
10 Bllilders 10 PI limbers 
10 Real Estate Agents 
10 Civil Engineers 
10 Roofing Contractors 
10 Concrete workers 
10 Interior Decorators 
10 Architects 
How long do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 3 
Imagine that you have just arrived at work and your boss approaches you with a task which they 
would like completed before lunch time. The task involves entering ten invoices into the company 
balance sheet (e.g., power bill, phone bill). You will need to enter the 'billed amount' in the debt 
column and subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance after each subtraction 
(pen and paper subtraction - no calculator). How long do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Thank you, For your va7uab7e participation. 
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You are invited to participate in a study which requires you 
to estimate how long you think it will take you to complete 
the tasks in the three following scenarios. Please read 
the descriptions carefully before making your estimation 
Age ........ . Gender: female / male 
Task 1 
Imagine that you have just arrived at work and your boss approaches you with a task which they 
would like completed before lunch time. What she would like you to do is to proofread for spelling 
mistakes a thirteen page company report (A4, typed, and double spaced). How long do you think it is 
going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 2 
Imagine that it's Monday morning and you have just arrived at work and your boss approaches you 
with a task which she would like completed by the end of the week. ihe company you work for is 
thinking of building a new factory. As part of this process your boss wants you to record the 
contact details of relevant providers so quotes can be requested at a later date. Using the yellow 
pages of the telephone book you need to look-up and record the names and phone numbers of: 
10 Builders 10 Plumbers 
10 Real Estate Agents 
10 Civil Engineers 
10 Roofing Contractors 
10 Concrete workers 
10 Interior Decorators 
10 Architects 
How long do you think this is going to take you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Task 3 
Imagine that you have just arrived at work and your boss approaches you with a task which she 
would like completed before morning tea time. The task involves entering ten invoices into the 
company balance sheet (e.g., power bill, phone bill). You will need to enter the 'billed amount' in the 
debt column and subtract the amount from the balance, creating a new balance after each 
subtraction (pen and paper subtraction - no calculator). How long do you think this is going to take 
you? 
Estimated time to complete: ............... . 
Thank you, Tor your va7uab7e participation. 
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Appendix 3 
Experinlent 3 & 4 'Daily Planner' 

